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Abstract
This research examines the impact of work-family reconciliation policies on gender in-
equality in the labour market, and on the division of paid work and care in the house-
hold. Policies designed to help families meet their work and care responsibilities have
undergone considerable reform over the last fifteen years. The research aims to under-
stand how this has affected the way that earning and caring are divided between mothers
and fathers, and the implications of this for mothers’ labour market outcomes. The re-
search compares two cohorts; the National Child Development Study (NCDS) tracks
individuals born in 1958, and the British Cohort Study (BCS) those born in 1970. These
cohorts experienced the key childbearing years of their early thirties on either side of
a fairly sharp discontinuity in work-family reconciliation policy. The research aims to
link this difference in policy environments to differences the way that couples in each
cohort divide paid work and care, and in the labour market behaviour of mothers and
the penalties they face when they are in employment. Logistic regression models are
employed to quantify the magnitude and significance of the impact of cohort member-
ship on the work and care outcomes of interest, controlling for other variables that affect
these outcomes. Some case-level analysis of the data is also carried out; individuals rep-
resenting typical family arrangements are highlighted, to demonstrate the relevance of
the theoretical model and assist with hypothesis generation. Case stories illustrate the
interplay of individual circumstances with policy and other external factors, in a way
that is difficult to achieve using statistical methods. A key finding is that the younger
cohort is less likely to report equal sharing of childcare than the older cohort, even after
controlling for other factors that might influence the division of labour. This is also in
spite of the finding that mothers in the younger cohort are more likely to be in work.
This suggests progress to some extent, in that mothers perhaps find it easier to be in
employment. However at the same time it represents a regressive step at the household
level, as they not only continue to shoulder the majority of the care work, but are even
more inclined to do so. Analysis of pay and status gaps also yields interesting results.
The findings suggest that the penalty to motherhood in terms of labour market status
accrues by virtue of the interrupted human capital accumulation that results from peri-
ods out of the labour market or working part time. However, the motherhood penalty
in pay persists even after controlling for other wage determinants, suggesting that these
gaps are a direct result of motherhood itself and not of the labour market behaviour
changes that occur as a result. The research contributes theoretically and substantively
to the wider literature on this topic. It brings together human capital perspectives with
theories of gender, power and resources, and of the impact of policy on family life, and
uses Amartya Sen’s capability approach to reconcile and move forward these ideas. It
also contributes to the practical understanding of the impact of policy on the way that
families reconcile work and care, and in particular the implications of policy for gender
equality. Finally, its methodological contribution is in the use of a narrative approach to
large-scale quantitative data, alongside more conventional statistical techniques, in order
to further exploit the detailed, longitudinal data available.
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1.1 Gender gaps and policy fixes
Family life has changed a great deal over the second half of the twentieth century and
into the first decade of the twenty-first. In 1950, female labour force participation in the
UK was 36.3% (Kenjoh 2005). By 2010, it was 70.2% (figure 1.1). At the beginning of this
period, it was still legal to discriminate against women when hiring and remunerating
employees, and women who became pregnant could be dismissed. Thus, equal rights in
the workplace was a key challenge facing the second wave feminists of the 1960s, and
the 1970s saw a number of key policy breakthroughs; the Equal Pay Act 1970, the Sex
Discrimination Act 1975, and the introduction of a statutory right to return to work for
mothers through the Employment Protection Act 1975.
In the ensuing period, female labour force participation soared (figure 1.1) while the
gender pay gap fell from 35% in 1980 – i.e. the median earnings of full-time women were
one third less than men’s – to around 20% in 2008 (figure 1.2). However, these figures
not only show progress in the latter part of the twentieth century, but also considerable
plateauing into the twenty-first. Female labour force participation does not seem to be
able to get much beyond about 70%, and the gender pay gap has remained stubbornly
around 20% in recent years.
The other side of the coin – if we see labour market and household activities as being
jointly determined – is a persistent inequality in the division of household labour. There
has been some increase in men’s participation in childcare and other unpaid work tasks
1
Figure 1.1: Labour force participation rate, 15-64 year olds, 1984-2010
Figure 1.2: Gender wage gap in median earnings of full-time employees, 1980-2008
2
Figure 1.3: Men’s share of total time spent on domestic work
over the last fifty years. Time use data suggests that men in the early twenty-first century
were doing just over a third of total hours, compared to just under a fifth in the 1960s
(figure 1.3). However, the less optimistic interpretation of this is that women are still
doing twice as much. Particular tasks also remain more female dominated; men do only
26% of routine housework and 28% of caring activities (Yee Kan et al 2011).
These figures all suggest the persistence of substantial intra-household disparity, al-
though as they are aggregate level statistics they cannot necessarily say much about
the micro level. They are an averaging out of a diversity of family forms, and analysis at
the household level is necessary to understand how couples divide work and care, and
this is one of the aims of this research. More broadly, the overall aim of the research
is to examine the change and continuity in gender inequality in the labour market and
the household, in order to understand what drives it and what might change it. This
is the key challenge of modern feminism, and it is far less tangible and straightforward
than the battles of the pre-equal rights era. Although formally, women have ‘equal’ op-
portunities in public life, the battle is a cultural and personal one. Furthermore, it goes
beyond a basic provision of equal opportunities, towards providing the support needed
to truly access these opportunities.
3
1.1.1 The role of policy
The key angle that the research takes is to consider the role of policy in perpetuating
inequality and bringing about change; what role policy has played in the UK, and what
role it could play in the future. Although the policy environment has a broad scope to
affect family life, this research by necessity has to focus, and it does so on a set of policies
that might be described as ‘work-family reconciliation policies’. The term ‘work-family’
is used instead of ‘work-life’ because the latter is too broad; ‘life’ encompasses those
without partners or children, and indeed there is life beyond work and care even for
those that do. The word ‘reconciliation’ is used instead of the commonly used ‘balance’,
because the latter implies something that is good or satisfactory. A reconciliation is
simply an arrangement, it does not have to be fair or unproblematic. Indeed, as this
research will show, it often is not.
The starting point in delineating this set of policies is that families with children have
certain needs. Parents need to earn enough money to meet their physical requirements,
and they need to arrange enough care to meet their children’s care requirements. A
number of policies can help families to meet these needs. Financial support, such as
family allowances and replacement for lost earnings when a parent is not in employment,
reduces the burden of earning, while the provision or subsidy of childcare reduces the
amount of care that the parents have to provide.
This research will look at how such policies developed in the UK between the early 1990s
and the mid 2000s, and how the substantial changes that occurred (see Chapter 5) might
have affected continuity and change in the reconciliation of work and care. It does so by
comparing the experiences of two cohorts, born twelve years apart, who experienced the
key childbearing years of their early thirties under different policy conditions. The Na-
tional Child Development Study has followed individuals periodically from their birth
in 1958 to the present day, and the British Cohort Study has similarly followed those
born in 1970. The research compares the division of work and care, and mothers’ labour
market outcomes, in 1991 and 2004, when the two cohorts were 33 and 34 respectively,
although it brings in information from across the lifecourse to help understand these
outcomes. The data and strategy for analysing it is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
4
1.1.2 Existing work
In the considerable literature on the topic of gender inequality in work and care, there are
three major theoretical approaches, which map roughly onto disciplinary boundaries. A
very brief sketch of this literature is given here, in order to set the context for the research
aims and questions set out in the next section. Chapter 2 will explore these perspectives
in greater detail.
In economics, what has been called the ‘new home economics’ borrows macroeconomic
ideas about specialisation and trade and microeconomic ideas about efficiency and pro-
duction, and applies them to a household setting. Households are conceptualised as
trying to produce the required income and care as efficiently as possible, maximising
household utility. The division of labour is a decision made along rational lines accord-
ing to relative productivities in work and care activities (Becker 1981). Specialisation is
the most efficient strategy because it maximises output, and gendered specialisation is
likely due to women’s relative productivity in child rearing activities. Gendered special-
isation at the household level results in gender labour market gaps at the aggregate level
(Mincer and Polachek 1974). Thus, the phenomenon of gender inequality in the labour
market is simply an aggregation of all these individual-level decisions.
The sociological challenge to this perspective is that gender inequality is a top-down as
well as bottom-up phenomenon. The household decision-making process is rigged from
the beginning because monetary and ideational sources of power restrict potential out-
comes within a gendered and unequal set of options (Agarwal 1997). On the economic
side, Blood and Wolfe (1960) argued that because men work more and earn more, they
bring more money and status to the household, and this gives them greater power in
decision-making because they are valued commodities. On the ideological side, ideas
about appropriate gendered family roles are transmitted through generations (Kohlberg
1966; Mischel 1966) and shape the work-family options that are acceptable to couples.
These theories are not new, and have undergone some development over the years, but
they still underpin empirical enquiry in this area. The economic theory is still a point
of departure for many contemporary British empirical studies. Ideas about the impact
of mothers’ ‘suboptimal’ labour market trajectories is still a key area of enquiry (Malo
and Munoz-Bullon 2008; Manning and Petrongolo 2008; Connolly and Gregory 2009;
Gangl and Zeifle 2009; Fourage et al 2010), even if those who are using them do not
necessarily consider the situation unproblematic. The extent to which domestic respon-
sibilities themselves are responsible for gender inequalities is also still a fruitful area of
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inquiry (Bardasi and Taylor 2008; Bryan and Sevilla Sanz 2011; Crompton and Lyonette
2011). Similarly, scholars continue to explore the influence of relative wage on household
outcomes (Kalenoski et al 2009) and the relative influence of gender and resource dispar-
ities (Yee Kan 2008). They also look at the transmission of norms (Burt and Scott 2002)
and the way in which couples make recourse to gendered norms in their justification of
their own gender inequalities (Taylor et al 2010; van Hooff 2011), and the difficulties that
they face in adopting non-traditional behaviour patterns (Charles and James 2006; Nixon
2009; Gregory and Milner 2011).
A third dimension to this theoretical picture comes from the social policy literature,
which tries to understand the impact of the institutional context on household arrange-
ments. Work-family reconciliation policies in different countries take different approaches
to easing the work or care requirements, or both, of families. Different policy packages
can make some work-care options more attractive than others; for example free child-
care incentivises dual-earning couples, while well-remunerated leave incentivises stay
at home parenting. The theoretical policy literature identifies regime-level regularities
in these packages and their associated favoured work and care arrangements. Feminist
welfare state theory aims to understand how these packages embody particular norms
about parenting and perpetuate these norms by supporting them with policies (Lewis
1992; Orloff 1993; Sainsbury 1994; Pfau-Effinger 1998).
There is a considerable amount of empirical literature that tries to operationalise these
regime-level differences and their implications for the way that families organise work
and care. This has been made easier by the rise of harmonised social surveys such
as the European Social Survey, which allow analysts to pool information from different
countries and estimate individual-level effects that are nested within countries or welfare
regimes (Geist 2005; Fuwa and Cohen 2007; Mandel and Shalev 2009; Boye 2011; Ejrnæs
2011).
An emerging theme in the theoretical and empirical literature on work and family life
is the use of Amartya Sen’s idea of capabilities; of opportunities constrained by external
factors, in ways that may vary systematically by strata (Sen 1985; 1993). Applied to
work-family reconciliation, it is used to conceptualise the gap between aspirations about
balancing work and care on the one hand, and the situation that arises in practice on the
other (Lewis and Campbell 2007; Hobson and Fahlen 2009; Lewis 2009; Hobson 2011).
This idea seems particularly congruent with the feminist paradox mentioned above; in
an era in which opportunities are ostensibly equal, what factors might prevent them
from being so in reality. It is for this reason, along with other congruences (see Chapter
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3) that this research bases itself on a capabilities approach, albeit in a different way from
the authors mentioned here.
1.2 The research
This section sets out the research aims and questions, outlines the approach that will be
taken to meet them, and discusses the contribution that the research hopes to make in
doing so.
1.2.1 Research aims
The opening section of this chapter outlined the dual puzzle of the continuing gender
disparities in the labour market and the home. The overarching aim of this research is to
say something about the past, and potential future, impact of policy on this inequality,
by examining the impact of the policy changes that have occurred in the UK.
Specifically, the research aims, and a summary of their execution, are as follows:
1. To examine established policy and non-policy drivers of mothers’ labour market
outcomes and the division of work and care in the household.
This will be accomplished in Chapter 2, which constitutes an overview of the theoretical
perspectives on work and care from different disciplines. The associated empirical ev-
idence around these perspectives is also presented alongside, to examine the extent to
which these theories have found empirical support in the literature.
2. To use these theories to develop a framework for assessing impact of UK policy,
from which to derive hypotheses.
This framework is developed in Chapter 3. It brings together the ideas from Chapter
2 and tries to reconcile them through the lens of the capability approach, which leaves
room for the agency that couples exercise over their work-family reconciliation but also
the internal and external constraints they face in doing so. This framework provides
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the theoretical foundation for the empirical work that follows; it forms the basis for the
hypotheses about the likely impact of policy that will be tested in the analysis chapters.
3. To test these hypotheses
Hypothesis testing is undertaken in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. The impact of policy change
is operationalised through the use of two cohorts of parents, who experienced the key
childbearing years of the early thirties under different policy environments. The differ-
ence between them with respect to the division of work and care, and of mothers’ labour
market outcomes, will be a product of a range of environmental factors, but policy will
play a key role among these. This role has been theorised in the earlier chapters; the
question is whether the data supports or rejects these theoretical propositions. The na-
ture of this research framework and how cohort differences can and cannot be used to
say things about the impact of policy is elaborated in Chapter 4.
1.2.2 Research questions
The overarching question that the research seeks to answer is: what is the role of policy
in explanations of gender inequality in the labour market and the home? However, given the
cohort comparison strategy employed, the question should perhaps more usefully be
couched in these terms. Thus, the principal research question is: what is the difference
between the two cohorts with respect to gender inequality in the labour market and the home, and
what can this tell us about the impact of policy on gender inequality?
This overarching research question is further broken down into three sub-questions that
are addressed in the three analysis chapters. The main question is in two related parts.
Firstly, the question of inequality in the home; the unequal division of work and care
in the household and the reasons for this. Secondly, the question of inequality in the
workplace, and the penalties that mothers face. This second point can be further reduced
to questions of behaviour – what impact does motherhood have on women’s labour
market participation – and the implications of this behaviour for the ‘headline’ outcomes
such as the gender pay gap. Thus, an empirical chapter is assigned to each of these
three dimensions; inequality in the home, the impact of motherhood on employment
behaviour, and the impact of motherhood-related adjustments to employment behaviour
on labour market inequality.
Chapter 6 asks how work and care arrangements differ at the intra-household level.
8
Specifically:
1. how are paid work and care divided in the two cohorts?
2. has the gendering of the division of work and care changed (and if so in what
way)?
3. what explanatory factors - policy and non-policy - explain any difference between
the two cohorts?
Chapter 7 asks whether mothers’ employment participation differs between the two co-
horts:
4. do mothers in the younger cohort work more, either by being more likely to work
at all or by working more hours?
5. what explanatory factors - policy and non-policy - explain any difference between
the two cohorts?
Chapter 8 asks whether mothers’ employment outcomes, relative to those of non-mothers,
are better in the younger cohort:
6. what kind of penalty do mothers face in the two cohorts?
7. how is this linked to the division of work and care and the resulting employment
patterns of mothers?
8. what explanatory factors - policy and non-policy - explain any difference between
the two cohorts?
1.2.3 The research process and strategy
To formalise what should be apparent from the description of the aims and questions
above, this research follows a deductive strategy. It begins by drawing on existing work
to inform a set of hypotheses, which are then tested with data. Marsh (1982) calls this
“descending the ladder of abstraction”; moving from the theoretical and more abstract to
the empirical and tangible over a series of steps. The structure of the thesis follows these
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steps in order. Chapters 2 and 3 are the theoretical foundations. Chapter 4 explains
how these ideas will be operationalised and tested in the subsequent chapters. The
first data driven chapter is Chapter 5, which brings together primary and secondary
sources to outline the key policy reforms that are relevant to the comparison of the two
cohorts, as well as the associated socio-economic changes of relevance to the research
question. Chapters 6 to 8 then compare these cohorts and test hypotheses about the
likely differences between them in the division of paid work and care. Finally, Chapter
9 brings the work back to theory again, reiterating the main analytical conclusions and
their implications for theory.
The underlying logic of this kind of deductive research strategy begins from the posi-
tion that there can be any number of theories about a phenomenon, and that what we
observe through empirical research will either falsify them, or allow us to provisionally
accept them until someone presents data that does falsify them (Blaikie 2000:15). This
research operates within this paradigm; it takes a theory, indeed a number of theories,
about the division of work and care, and tests them to see whether they can be falsified.
This approach has its origins in the epistemologically positivist approach of the natural
science, which operates under the assumption that the social world can be objectively
observed and measured scientifically (Bryman 2004:12). It is because these things are
assumed to be objectively measurable that their support or falsification of a theory is
accepted; if facts are in the eye of the beholder, then a theory cannot be falsified.
1.3 Contribution to knowledge
The research aims to contribute to the existing body of theoretical work on the topic,
as well as having substantive, practical implications for policymaking. The first aim is
to contribute to the theory on gender inequality in the workplace and the home; what
Blaikie (2000) calls the discipline contribution, or the “academic” motive for the research. It
tries to move beyond disciplinary barriers, drawing on different perspectives and trying
to reconcile competing understandings of the same problem. Inspired by similar work,
it uses the capabilities approach to make room for opportunities and preferences as well
as practical and normative constraints, and to understand the gap between preference
and reality. It aims to build up some explanation of why, in an era of ostensibly equal
rights, are outcomes so unequal.
The research also seeks to be methodologically innovative, through its adoption of a
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quasi-narrative approach to the analysis of the quantitative survey data, alongside more
conventional statistical approaches. This involves selecting individual cases from the
datasets, and using the rich information about their lives to illustrate the operation of
the conceptual model at the case level. Statistical methods are variable orientated; they
generate information about the general effect of a small number of variables. This is in
contrast to qualitative research, which takes a detailed, holistic look at the case level. The
aim in this research is to replicate this to some extent; to use the data to illustrate the
complex, inter-related way that the theoretical model says that the process of household
allocation works, before leaving this behind to look at variable-level regularities with the
statistical modelling. The approach, its rationale, and the limited existing examples of
its application are considered in greater detail in Chapter 4.
The other kind of contribution that the research seeks to make is what Blaikie (2000)
refers to as the social contribution. It is ultimately an applied piece of work intended to
evaluate the impact of policy and generate recommendations about its future direction.
And from a feminist perspective it seeks to understand the way that policy can help
overcome or entrench gender inequalities, and how it could better facilitate a balance




A considerable body of literature exists on gender inequality in the labour market and
the home, coming from a variety of perspectives across a number of disciplines. This
review is structured around a key cleavage that exists in the literature, between per-
spectives emphasising the role of agency and choice, and those emphasising the role of
structure and constraint. The former originate mostly in economics, the latter in sociol-
ogy and social policy. The review presents each ‘side’ of the theoretical case, and then
reviews the empirical work that has arisen around these key perspectives. Given the
volume of scholarship on this issue, and the rapid changes that occurred in mothers’
labour force participation and division of labour over the second half of the twentieth
century, the review is restricted to empirical literature pertaining to the last twenty years.
It also focuses principally on empirical work relating to the United Kingdom, as this is of
greatest relevance to this research, although some attention is given to the cross-national
policy literature in Section 2.2.4.
2.1 Theories of agency and choice
The first set of theories considered here are those that construct household and labour
market phenomena as nothing more than an aggregation of rational, individual choices.
They assume no inherent gender differences in the ability to compete in the labour mar-
ket for jobs, or in the household for the preferred division of work and care. Thus, any
gender differences in outcomes are either due to different endowments of talent, or dif-
ferent preferences. This section outlines these theories, and considers the extent to which
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the empirical evidence supports the propositions they generate.
2.1.1 Human capital theory
A highly individualistic and agency-centric approach to explaining labour market out-
comes is found in mainstream, neoclassical labour economics. This is referred to here
as the orthodox economic theory, to distinguish it from the heterodox perspectives dis-
cussed here that challenge it but are nonetheless still situated within economics. The
orthodox theory centres around the idea of human capital, as something that individu-
als can invest in and see a return on, through the rewards available in the labour market.
Individuals are naturally endowed with certain talents and abilities, but the process of
education, training and gaining labour market experience is also seen as a choice that
individuals make in how they wish to invest in and deploy their capital.
This second, agentic, aspect of human capital is crucial. Jacob Mincer pioneered the
theory (Mincer 1958) in response to the apparent paradox that the earnings distribution
is different from the distribution of ability, as conventionally measured by instruments
such as IQ. It holds that earnings are a function not simply of ability but of the amount
of human capital investment required to do a job. As education and training require
forgone earnings, the job must compensate for this over the lifecourse through higher
wages, otherwise no rational individual would undertake any training. Therefore hu-
man capital investments are rewarded in the labour market so that rational individuals
will choose to make them. The concept of human capital has been developed and elab-
orated, most notably by Becker (1964; 1975) and Mincer himself (1974). It is taken to
represent a range of wage-enhancing attributes. Some of these are gained through per-
sonal investment, such as education and job training, while some are accrued through
experience in a job and exposure to networks, which enhance the individual’s ability to
use the human capital that they have.
If wages are a function of human capital, then wage differentials are a function of human
capital differentials. The orthodox theory holds that the gender pay gap is the result of
different human capital investments made by men and women, resulting in different
labour market outcomes (Mincer and Polachek 1974). These differences are caused pri-
marily by the labour market interruptions women make due to childbearing. Leaving
employment, often accompanied by returning part-time, is not an equivalent human
capital investment to continuous, full-time participation, therefore it is not as highly
compensated in the labour market. Furthermore, time not in employment is not only
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a lost investment opportunity; a person’s existing stock of human capital is assumed
to actively depreciate during this time, although after re-entry it is possible to catch up
to some extent over time (Mincer and Ofek 1982). The gender gap occurs because it is
women who are disproportionately likely to take this intermittent path.
Childbearing may also mean that women achieve lower levels of compensation for the
same level of human capital, because the impact of childbearing is unequal within the
household, and men and women react differently to union and childbearing events (Po-
lachek 1975). Furthermore, childbearing creates substantial care responsibilities, which
are borne disproportionately by women. Because an individual’s energy is finite, energy
devoted to childcare leaves less to devote to paid work; this results in women not only
doing less paid work than men or childless women, but in them being less productive
while they are there (Becker 1985).
That women alter their behaviour in response to childbearing is a given in this frame-
work. Orthodox economic theory makes the simplifying assumption that outcomes re-
flect preferences, therefore the empirical fact that women take time out of the labour
market is not something the theory seeks to explain. This is made explicit:
That the differential allocation of time and of investments in human capital
is generally sex linked and subject to technological and cultural changes is
a matter of fact which is outside the scope of our analysis. Given the sex
linkage, we focus on the relation within the family between time allocation
and investments in human capital which give rise to the observed market
earnings of women. (Mincer and Polachek 1974:S77)
Therefore interrupted employment is treated as a constant, and childbearing is some-
thing that women plan their lifetime employment trajectories around and even in antici-
pation of. Given the depreciation that they are likely to experience, it is rational to choose
an occupation where this is less important, thus women are likely to choose, say, a cler-
ical occupation over a professional one. Polachek (1981) refers to this as phenomenon
as ‘self-selection’; a term that leaves little room for the possibility of constrained occupa-
tional choice.
Empirical work has attempted to establish the extent to which gender pay differentials
can be attributed to human capital differentials, career interruptions and preferences.
Studies vary in the aspects of this that they focus on, and the methods they employ,
but the overall impression given in this literature is that the economic theory is not
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wrong, but it is incomplete in its understanding of the factors driving pay differentials.
The factors identified in the theory are important, but considerable variation remains
unexplained.
The orthodox theorists discussed above conduct some empirical testing of their own
theoretical propositions, on contemporaneous data from the United States. Mincer and
Polachek (1974) find that 70% of the wage gap between married men and women can
be explained by differences in the length and continuity of their work history, but the
remaining portion is not explained by any of their theoretically important variables. Po-
lachek (1981) simulates what the occupational distribution would look like if women
had continuous labour force attachment. Although this difference in attachment ex-
plains some of the gender difference at the professional and managerial level, consider-
able disparities remain, such as the concentration of women in clerical and men in craft
occupations.
Perhaps more relevant for this research is whether this broadly, but not completely,
supportive picture holds for data that is British and more recent. As per the boundaries
discussed in the introduction to this review, attention is paid to empirical work from
the last twenty years; the theoretical framework above was devised and tested in a very
different social context, the question is whether it still holds relevance for contemporary
British mothers.
Joshi et al (1999) distinguish between the wage gap due to family interruptions, and the
gap due to gender. They find that mothers’ employment breaks and their concentra-
tion in part-time work does create an earnings gap between them and childless women.
However, these discontinuities are only part of the explanation of the gender pay gap,
as women with continuous employment histories are still paid less than men. Joshi et
al (2007) look at the impact of levels of education and experience on wages for a cohort
of men and women over time. They find that at age 33, human capital differences ac-
count for just 10% of the difference in wages. At this point the average difference in
full-time work experience is just over two years. By age 42, the proportion of the differ-
ence explained by human capital has increased to 39%, due to women having taken time
out; average difference in full-time work experience is now over five years. However,
it should be noted that the portion not explained by human capital differences remains
larger than the portion that is.
Some studies focus specifically on the impact of part-time working on women’s labour
market outcomes. For mothers, or indeed anyone, seeking part-time hours, the jobs
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available are qualitatively and systematically worse than full-time opportunities, and
may involve a downward occupational shift (Blackwell 2001; Connolly and Gregory
2008; Manning and Petrongolo 2008; Mumford and Smith 2009). In effect, they are jobs
that offer lower compensation for the same amount human capital; and furthermore, the
accumulation of human capital during the time spent in these jobs is lower than in a full-
time position, which affects future earnings trajectories. The actual impact of part-time
work on human capital, and therefore potential wage, is complex and heterogeneous.
Connolly and Gregory (2009) find that part-time work can mitigate the penalty to child-
bearing by facilitating employment continuity and leading back to full-time work at a
later stage, thus minimising depreciation and disruption. However, it depends on the
kind of part-time job, as women can also end up trapped in a pattern of insecure, low-
paid part time work that alternates with periods of non-employment. A recent working
paper by Neuberger et al (2011) suggests that it may be possible for mothers not to suf-
fer adverse wage effects in the short term if they can switch to part-time hours in their
existing jobs. It is when mothers have to change job and employer on return to work
that they experience downward shifts in wage and status. However, in the long run all
part-time work has a potentially negative impact on wage, as it may limit opportunities
for promotion and wage growth. This is consistent with the idea that part-time hours
are, or are treated as by the labour market, a lower human capital investment than the
equivalent full-time experience.
Empirical work can shed light not only on the theoretical propositions regarding out-
comes, but to some extent on the underlying mechanisms it claims lead to these out-
comes. There are several things we might expect to observe empirically if the proposition
that women seek out opportunities to work fewer hours (occupational self-selection), or
to do jobs that require less effort while they are there (the work effort hypothesis) is
correct. The first is a selection effect; that mothers are more likely than non-mothers to
choose shorter hours or less intensive occupations. This would support the hypothesis
that women choose their occupational paths in anticipation of childbearing interruptions.
Malo and Munoz-Bullon (2008) use longitudinal data from the British Household Panel
Survey to examine occupational prestige before and after childbearing. They find that
women who ultimately end up taking career breaks were in lower prestige occupations
before they took the break than those who did not 1, thus offering evidence in support
of the hypothesis advanced above. However, longitudinal data also shows that strategic
human capital investments (i.e. low aspirations in anticipation of childbearing) are only
a partial explanation. For some mothers, care responsibilities have thrown them off oth-
1The negative impact of a break on prestige as measured on a (logged) Hope Goldthorpe Scale is between
3.6% and 5.9%
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erwise high-human capital trajectories, which they subsequently seek to rejoin as their
responsibilities diminish over time (Blackwell 2001; Connolly and Gregory 2008).
The second empirical question is whether we can observe a negative association between
the amount of unpaid work a person does and their wage, controlling for the other hu-
man capital factors that are assumed to affect wages. This would suggest that, although
their human capital suggests a higher potential wage, they do not have the same energy
to devote to paid work as someone with fewer responsibilities, and are therefore less
productive and less rewarded. Most of the empirical work in this regard is based on
data from the United States, but there is a recent UK study by Bryan and Sevilla-Sanz
(2011), who do find evidence of a small but significant negative effect of housework on
wages. Using a fixed effects model to control for heterogeneity in employment orien-
tation as well as the standard human capital variables, they find that an extra hour of
housework reduces married women’s wages by 0.28%.
Finally, if employment aspirations or expectations can be measured directly, we might
see whether these are correlated with employment outcomes, and whether this supports
the hypothesis that the gender pay gap is a result of women being systematically less em-
ployment orientated. Chevalier (2007) finds that the proportion of the wage gap among
recent graduates explained by human capital increases from 20% to 84% when infor-
mation on attitudes towards and expectations about work are included. Especially im-
portant are childbearing expectations, more so than personality attributes; career break
expectations are found to explain 10% of the gender pay gap. Manning and Swaffield
(2008) find that some personality attributes are significant – competitiveness, self-esteem,
empathy and career orientation – although systematic gender differences in these explain
no more than 5% of the gender pay gap.
2.1.2 Allocating time in the household
The above account of mothers’ human capital decisions is quite atomistic; it does not
conceptualise the process by which work and care decisions are made. Orthodox eco-
nomics does actually offer such an account, bringing together the ideas about human
capital and employment behaviour outlined above with theory on time allocation and
comparative advantage in time allocation. This section outlines this theory, its empirical
success and the criticisms that have been levelled at it.
Gary Becker had developed the economic concept of utility maximisation by incorpo-
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rating the idea that time is allocated in a utility maximising way as well as money or
consumption (Becker 1965). Although he acknowledged at the time that there are impli-
cations for household division of labour, he did not fully develop this insight until his
later work on family economics (Becker 1981; 1985). In this formulation of household
decision-making, the household has two complementary functions of income production
and household reproduction, and a heterosexual cohabiting couple specialises in these
according to their comparative advantage. These advantages are determined by each
partner’s potential productivity in the labour market and home spheres, which is where
ideas of human capital become relevant. Specialisation is assumed to maximise total
household ‘output’, in the same way that countries maximise total income by specialis-
ing in particular goods, as per Adam Smith’s theory of comparative advantage (Becker
1981:18).
Productivity in paid work is estimated by reference to the average wage for men and
women; because of the human capital disparities outlined earlier, and because the aver-
age male wage is calculated across a more diverse and experienced workforce, the male
partner is likely to have the comparative advantage in paid work (Becker 1981:26). Even
if potential wage were the same for both partners, women will always have the com-
parative advantage in childbearing due to the intrinsic biological differences between
the sexes and the ‘investment’ women make in pregnancy and nursing (Becker 1981:21).
Thus the aggregate outcome of these household-level decision-making processes is a
gendered division of labour across society as a whole.
This theory of household allocation has inevitably received considerable criticism. Any
theory that offers an account based on free choice and biological essentialism, whilst
ignoring the potential role of norms and constraint, is bound to attract the attention of
sociologists and feminist academics. Theories of the structural constraints on house-
hold roles are discussed in the second part of this review. For now we will accept the
possibility of rational maximisation in this context, but investigate the theoretical and
empirical case against the rationality and inevitability of specialisation that the above
theory assumes.
Some have questioned whether it specialisation really confers the gains it is assumed to,
or whether it is in fact a rather myopic and narrow understanding of the gains from mar-
riage. Specialisation is not the only potential advantage to marriage; there are economies
of scale of living together, and externalities consumption, such as the additional enjoy-
ment of undertaking joint activities such as holidays (Blau and Ferber 1986). Further-
more, there are externalities generated in production, by the investments parents make
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in caring for their children. This creates a ‘free-rider’ problem, as these externalities are
enjoyed by society as a whole, but there is no mechanism with which to negotiate an
efficient outcome in the presence of these externalities, as per Coase’s theorem (Folbre
2004).2 Women lose out because they predominantly make these investments in care, but
they cannot reap the full benefits; as Folbre points out, mothers have no claim on their
children’s future income stream, and no claim on the profits of the companies that use
their children’s future labour.
Similarly there are costs that are not taken into account in the economic framework.
Oppenheimer (1997) argues that, in an era of high female labour force participation,
the prevailing standard of living is that of a dual earning couple and a single earning
couple is relatively disadvantaged. This casts doubt on whether Becker’s work is re-
ally applicable to any era other than that in which it was developed, given that this
kind of specialisation is historically anomalous.3 The theory also ignores the costs or
risks involved in specialised roles; the implications of death or separation, the isolation
and boredom of the homemaker role, and the long run losses of a woman taking large
amounts of time out of the labour force if she wishes to re-enter it (Blau and Ferber 1986).
This raises an issue that the neoclassical framework cannot effectively deal with; that the
man and the woman may have competing interests, and that what is socially efficient or
beneficial at the aggregate or household level is not necessarily optimal at the individ-
ual level. Household allocation involves “co-ordination problems that cannot be solved
entirely by the independent decisions of individuals” (Folbre 2004:7), as per the neoclas-
sical theory. Perspectives on the nature of how these competing interests are reconciled
will be discussed below.
The orthodox economists’ general response to any criticism that their theories are in-
complete is that theories should be as simple as possible and judged on their ability to
predict (Friedman 1953). However, in this case the empirical evidence suggests that the
theories are able to predict household outcomes, but only to some extent, suggesting
that they are in need of some elaboration. Several studies have attempted to establish
the contemporary applicability of the idea of rational specialisation, using a longitudinal
or selection model to control for unobserved heterogeneity (including in preferences for
domestic outcomes). This work generally concludes that there is something standing in
the way of non-traditional or egalitarian household arrangements, even when relative
2This is the theorem in neoclassical economics that an efficient outcome can be reached even in the
presence of externalities, through negotiation between rational individuals.
3Although it may seem unfair to criticise a theory for being outdated fifty years after it was devised, it
should be noted that many of its criticisms discussed here were made at the time.
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human capital suggests that this is the most rational outcome.
Kalenoski et al (2009) find that, for British mothers, an increase in their partner’s wage
is associated with more childcare and less paid work during the week, while an increase
in their own wage is associated with more paid work during the week. However, men’s
market work time does not vary with their own or their partner’s wage, and an increase
in their partner’s wage leads to more childcare time but only at the weekend. Thus the
responses are asymmetrical; women react in a way consistent with the orthodox theory,
whilst men are almost unresponsive to similar changes.
This pattern is remarkably stable across other national (Western) contexts. Another fairly
consistent pattern is the observation that rational considerations challenge traditional ar-
rangements only in a certain subset of high human capital couples. Wang and Bianchi
(2009) find evidence that US fathers with an employed wife do more childcare, partic-
ularly when children are young, suggesting that wives are able to use their economic
power to some extent. However, they suggest that families in which mothers work when
children are very young are a special type in which women are especially committed to
the labour force and likely to be in good jobs that afford them an unusual amount of
economic power. Connelly and Kimmel (2009) find spousal time use to be a poor predic-
tor of a parent’s time in caregiving. The small effects found suggests that mother’s work
time increases the amount of childcare her partner does, suggesting that some rational
substitution is possible, but only in higher earning couples. Bloemen et al (2010) find
that, among more educated and dual-earning Italian couples, there is some evidence
of a more balanced division of labour, with fathers caring more and mothers working
more. However, the broader picture is that Italy is a context in which women do the
vast majority of the unpaid work, and the burden of additional children is found here
to fall predominantly on mothers, with little variation by spousal characteristics. Pailhe
and Solaz (2008) find that French mothers and fathers do not replace each other in a
response to a change in employment circumstances, even when it is rational for them
to do so. Parental time is only partially substitutable, flowing much more from men to
women than vice versa, and varies with prestige of task, suggesting that men are able
to be selective about their domestic contribution. And despite the fact that unemployed
parents spend more time with their children, there is still a positive association between
paternal education and paternal time.
Overall, this empirical work suggests that, although rational, human capital based con-
siderations drive the division of labour to some extent, there are other factors at work.
The orthodox theory does have something to offer in explaining the division of labour
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in the household, even in contemporary societies, where it seems to apply as long as
the male partner earns more. However, although there is evidence that human capital
can give women a more equal place in the household, it seems that this is not sufficient.
Even when an egalitarian or non-traditional outcome is rational given a couple’s circum-
stances, barriers appear to remain to its achievement. The work presented here thus
far cannot illuminate what these barriers are; that is the task of the second part of this
literature review.
2.2 Theories of structure and constraint
Sociologists might regard the following quote with some ironic humour:
Of course, if division of labor in the family is equated with discrimination, all
of the gap is by definition a symptom of discrimination. Otherwise, the anal-
yses of existing wage gaps and of their changes over time remain meaningful,
not tautological. (Mincer and Polachek 1974:S104)
To those of a more structuralist perspective, the orthodox economics approach to ex-
plaining gender disparities is completely tautological. It can be reduced thus; human
capital disparities exist because they exist, and because they exist, people act in ways
that assume they exist, so they continue to exist. This account assumes a level of choice
that many have argued is impossible, due to the constraints that women, and particularly
mothers, face in accumulating and using human capital, and in negotiating egalitarian
arrangements in the household.
This section addresses perspectives that argue for the importance of structure and con-
straint for understanding maternal employment and the division of labour in the house-
hold. Although the agency-centric perspectives do not discount the possibility of con-
strained choice, they may underestimate the extent of these constraints, assuming that
mothers have choices that they in fact do not. Furthermore, their ontological individ-
ualism eschews the operation of these at any higher level than the individual. The
perspectives here that emphasise structure can still leave room for agency, but concern
themselves mainly with the identification of constraint. They seek to establish the extent
to which mothers experience barriers in accumulating and using the human capital that
makes them employable, the way that household decision-making is shaped by more
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than just rational choice, and the way that the context in which decisions are made can
have a profound impact on their outcome.
2.2.1 Discrimination against women and mothers
The agentic perspective on mothers’ differential human capital accumulation is that it
is driven by women’s own investment choices. However, some have argued that it is
misleading to attribute human capital investment and occupational attainment purely to
personal choice or agency, on the grounds that is not in fact necessarily a process people
have much control over, due to the barriers created by employers and their organisational
processes. This may take the form of direct discrimination, but also the less obvious
processes and practices that work to disadvantage women. These barriers mean that
women become scarce in certain jobs and concentrated in others.
Tomaskovic-Devey et al (2005) take issue with human capital theory over its assumption
that the human capital variables ‘explaining’ the wage variation are fixed or prior. They
argue that these variables are themselves endogenously determined within a person’s
labour market interactions. The experience and training a person has access to and re-
ceives is not fully within their control, as it is ultimately up to employers themselves
who to hire, train and promote. Reskin (1993) reviews a range of theoretical propo-
sitions about organisational barriers; particularly relevant here are gendered personnel
practices and the advantages of incumbency. Whether a firm uses informal or formal
recruitment practices matters; because those already in good jobs have better access to
more good jobs, this perpetuates men’s advantage if they are disproportionately in bet-
ter jobs. Even formal recruitment is not an equal playing field if women cannot get the
relevant experience to be eligible for promotions.
Empirical work by Manning and Swaffield (2008) on labour market entrants suggests
that these gendered processes operate, independently of any considerations of family
responsibilities and labour market interruptions, through looking at the gender wage
gap that appears in the first ten years after labour market entry. Tracking the wage
growth of a sample of young men and women, they find that human capital explains
about half of the gender difference. Within this, the main disparity is in on-the-job
training, which is potentially subject to the factors beyond individual control discussed
above. Most of the remainder of the difference is unexplained. Limited support is found
for the importance of job mobility and certain personality attributes, both of which may
be related to the ideas of gender norms and socialisation discussed below.
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Perhaps the biggest organisational or demand side barrier to human capital investment
and deployment is discrimination. Mainstream economics does not deny that this exists,
but it is either grounded in ‘fact’ and therefore efficient, or based on prejudice and thus
inefficient, imposing a cost that employers will not choose to bear in the long term. One
orthodox perspective on this is the idea of taste-based discrimination (Becker 1957;1971),
which holds that an employer chooses not to employ people from a certain group be-
cause they, or their employees or their customers, simply do not like that group and get
disutility from contact with them. The favoured group is therefore more in demand,
and can command a higher wage. If a firm is operating in a perfectly competitive mar-
ket, then this discrimination should erode over time, as choosing a candidate on any
basis other than productivity is a sub-optimal decision and will ultimately hand an ad-
vantage to rival firms that do not discriminate. However, competition is imperfect in
reality, thus allowing the discrimination to perpetuate. This differential may in fact be
further widened because the disfavoured group may be crowded into the occupations
that will employ them, increasing supply relative to demand and pushing down their
wage (Jacobsen 1999).
An alternative economic perspective is statistical discrimination (Phelps 1972; Arrow
1973); the theory that employers discriminate against any member of a group that is
on average less productive, regardless of that individual’s personal abilities. Assuming
the group in question really is less productive on average, then this is in fact a good
business decision, as it is an efficient sorting mechanism for choosing between potential
candidates. However, it can then become self-perpetuating, as the less productive group
is never given a chance to gain the relevant experience and prove themselves in the
job. In order to break the cycle, an employer would have to employ a member of the
less productive group, and there is no incentive to do so if their rivals do not. This
explanation of discrimination is thus more stable in the long run than the taste-based
perspective.
Few studies directly examine the link between competition and discrimination, although
there are two relatively recent studies that have done so. Hellerstein et al (2002) find
that employing a relatively high proportion of women increases profitability in US firms
with high market power, but not those with low market power, suggesting that firms
can be sheltered by their market power in the short run. Although those employing
fewer women are less profitable, they are not going to go out of business immediately.
However, this does not disappear over time; discriminating firms grow just as fast as
non-discriminating ones, and there is no evidence that they are pushed or bought out
by non-discriminating firms. Heinze and Wolf (2010), taking a firm’s relative size as an
23
indication of its market power, find that market power is associated with a larger within-
firm gender wage gap in Germany. This suggests that firms insulated from competition
are able to exercise discrimination thanks to their monopsonistic power. Both of these
studies suggest that discrimination can persist where employers are sufficiently insulated
from competitive forces to get away with it.
At the individual level, discrimination is very difficult to verify empirically, as it is not a
variable that can easily be measured. One approach is to take the unexplained residual
in human capital models as evidence of discrimination, although this does not constitute
direct evidence. If there are no unobserved differences in productivity, then all of the
unexplained portion can indeed be attributed to discrimination, however at the other
extreme it could be the case that none of the residual is due to discrimination and it is
all down to unobserved productivity differences. There is no way to determine where
reality lies on this scale. Nor can this method capture the way in which discrimination
affects the human capital variables that are included (Altonji and Blank 1999).
The most direct way of testing for discrimination is through the audit study. This entails
an experiment in which two candidates ‘apply’ for a job, having identical qualifications
but differing on a key grouping variable, usually race or gender. This can take the form
of two real people posing as interview candidates and attending an interview, or the
creation of fictional applicants with fabricated CVs. Any difference in success between
the two candidates can therefore be put down to the only difference between them,
and taken as evidence of discrimination on this basis, although matching is necessarily
imperfect because not all the relevant variables can be observed, and employers may
become suspicious if two applicants are too alike (Riach and Rich 2002). Riach and
Rich (2006) found evidence that women are discriminated against when applying for
male-dominated jobs, while men are discriminated against when applying for female-
dominated or mixed jobs. On the other hand, Booth and Leigh (2010) find a pro-female
bias in heavily female-dominated occupations (over 80% female), but no bias in other oc-
cupations. This apparent pro-female bias in employment is consistent with the existence
of a gender wage gap if these occupations are systematically lower paid.
Another experimental approach to measure discriminatory attitudes is the laboratory
study, in which participants are asked to evaluate hypothetical people on various di-
mensions of employability or productivity. Randomly assigned groups are presented
with identical biographies, differing only on the grouping variable of interest; in this
case, motherhood. This research is based almost entirely on samples of American un-
dergraduates, therefore some care should be taken in generalising it to the context of the
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British labour market. However, they offer some insight into the way gender norms and
attitudes shape perceptions of labour market productivity. Results have suggested that
mothers are perceived as less competent and committed than men and childless women
(Cuddy et al 2004; Fuegen et al 2004; Correll et al 2007). Even when study participants
are offered ‘proof’ that mothers are competent, they are still evaluated less positively
than men; doubt is cast on their interpersonal skills in a way that it is not for equally
competent fathers (Benard and Correll 2010).
Segregation and undervaluation
Some have also argued that women are not only discriminated against in access to jobs,
but in the way their contribution is valued when they are in a job. Although the Equal
Pay Act makes it illegal to pay a woman less than a man for the same job, occupational
segregation means that women are not necessarily in the same jobs. The UK labour mar-
ket is characterised by a high degree of horizontal gender segregation; the concentration
of men in some types of occupations and women in others. Segregation in the labour
market as a whole can be measured using a Gini coefficient, where 1 represents complete
segregation and zero represents perfect integration. The 2001 census suggested that this
number in the UK was 0.69, which is less than the 1991 figure of 0.78, but still represents
considerable segregation (Blackwell and Guinea-Martin 2005). Specifically, this manifests
itself as in the following patterns:
60 percent of women workers are employed in just ten out of 77 recognised
occupations, with the heaviest concentrations being in what have been called
‘the five Cs’: caring, cashiering, catering, cleaning and clerical. The 2001
census showed that women formed 84 percent of the workforce in personal
services, 78 percent in administration and secretarial work, and 71 percent
in sales and customer services. (House of Commons Trade and Industry
Committee 2005)
If these types of occupations systematically pay less than male-dominated occupations,
then this difference will be an important driving factor in the gender pay gap. Manning
and Petrongolo (2008) find that the pay gap between women’s full and part time occupa-
tions can be explained partly by human capital and partly by occupation; in fact, within
occupations, there is almost no pay gap between full and part-time employees. Mum-
ford and Smith (2009) also find that differences in occupation and industry are associated
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with the earnings gap between full and part-time workers, and the gender earnings gap
for part time workers, even after controlling for individual characteristics.
However, some have argued that the pay disparities do not reflect human capital differ-
ences; that these occupations are undervalued for the same level of human capital. One
theory centres around the nature of the skills involved, and the perceived effort required
to learn and execute them. Jobs done more commonly by men use ‘technical’ skills,
which are considered to require training and learning (in other words, human capital
accumulation), whereas those more commonly done by women use ‘relational’ skills,
which are assumed to be intrinsic and not requiring as much training (Daune-Richard
2000). This assumption may be misplaced as in reality, some, such as nursing, require
extensive training. However, even those that do not still require ‘emotional labour’; the
management of the self and the situation when dealing with a customer or service user
in a frontline role. Some argue that this should be considered a skill in itself (e.g. Bolton
2004), although Payne (2009) argues that it is not necessarily meaningful to simply con-
ceptualise all frontline roles as ‘skilled’ because there is so much variation in the amount
and type of emotional labour required within this category of job.
Another perspective on the undervaluation of female-dominated jobs focuses on the way
the care sector is perceived and rewarded relative to other sectors of the labour market.
Financial remuneration in this sector is low because the sector itself is not profitable; its
consumers are usually those in society who are least able to pay, typically the very young
and the very old (England et al 2002). Furthermore, there is little sense that society’s
resources should be diverted from more profitable sectors to reward those in caring roles.
Care work may be associated with unpaid mothering and housekeeping roles, despite
professions such as nursing and teaching requiring high levels of education and skill, and
there may be a certain squeamishness about its commodification (England and Folbre
1999). It may also be assumed that there are intrinsic rewards to caring occupations, and
that this is a compensating differential that merits lower financial reward (England et al
2002).
In addition to the possible undervaluation of female-dominated occupations, part-time
workers (who are predominantly female) may also be undervalued relative to a full-
time employee with equal human capital. A government survey of employers suggests
a widespread perception that part-time workers are less productive, purely because of
the hours they work. 60% of employers said that it would be acceptable in all or nearly
all cases for a woman to switch to part-time after returning from maternity leave, and of
these, 65% said she could keep her existing job or seniority (Woodland et al 2003). Thus
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for a substantial minority of employers, women who were valued at one level before they
wanted to go part-time suddenly become less valuable, even though the only thing that
has changed is the hours they wish to work.
Despite the potential undervaluation of the types of jobs that women, and particularly
mothers, do, it is clear that time spent working part-time as opposed to full-time will
eventually lead to the kind of human capital disparities that ‘justify’ pay gaps. Therefore
the next question to address is why it is mothers that work part time rather than fathers,
besides a simple choice-based explanation; what is it about the household allocation
of responsibilities that makes mothers the principal carer, and the policy environment
that does not help them reconcile this with full-time employment. This is what the
rest of the review concerns itself with. The next section considers the interaction of
competing interests within the household, and how power and dominance is achieved in
the decision-making process of dividing paid work and care. The final section considers
wider societal level influences on this process, and how meta-structures shape the lives
of the individuals within them.
2.2.2 Relative resources and bargaining power
This chapter has already considered the orthodox economics reasoning of why the gen-
der division of labour is unequal; essentially that it boils down to comparative advan-
tages conferred by biology and the rational utility maximising decisions that flow from
this. A single head of household is assumed to carry out this maximisation in a way that
is in the interests of all household members, and any resulting disparities in wealth are
not problematised as long as they maximise the total utility of the household. This con-
ceptualisation has been criticised by those who suggest that the head of the household
may not be benevolent, and in fact may take the opportunity to use his resource advan-
tage to achieve the outcome that is most desirable to him. Competing models have been
proposed that attempt to understand how competing interests are reconciled within the
household, and how human capital disparities are more than ‘neutral’ ways to decide
outcomes, but can actively be exploited as a source of power, in a way that typically
advantages men.
Materialist conceptions of power relations in the household seek to understand how
tangible resource-based factors influence household outcomes; it is not about gender
ideology, as outcomes could theoretically be counter-normative, but about the distribu-
tion of resources that happens to be gendered. Blood and Wolfe’s (1960) resource theory
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of household power explicitly tries to move beyond ideological explanations, based on
their empirical work, which concluded that, even in 1960, there was no explicit ideolog-
ical commitment to a patriarchal household set up in which a male head of household
makes all of the decisions. Instead they found strong links between male dominance and
the inter-related aspects of education, income and social status, which men brought to
the household in far greater proportions than women. Blood and Wolfe saw these as giv-
ing men greater power mainly because they are valued commodities, but other theorists
have gone further to consider why these things endow power. Marxist feminists see the
imbalance of these valued commodities as far less innocuous than do Blood and Wolfe,
who see gendered outcomes as a result of mutual recognition that this is the best thing
rather than the exertion of brute force. However, theorists such as Walby (1986) and
Delphy and Leonard (1984) see clear parallels between this relation of economic inequal-
ity and others in society, in the wider class system. Housewives become a subordinate
class, with all the potential for exploitation that this entails. England and Farkas (1986)
argue that what men exploit is the hypothetical position of an economically dependent
woman in the event of a relationship breakdown. Men’s contribution to the household –
income and status – is fungible and transferable outside of the marriage, while women’s
– domestic work – is far less so. Thus women are in a weaker position to negotiate for
their own interests.
This idea of a couple’s respective options outside a relationship is the key explanatory
factor in the models of household decision-making found in strategic economics. Well-
established formal theories of how competing agents arrive at outcomes given a set of
payoffs and preferences have been applied to the issue of household division of labour
(Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy and Horney 1981; Amilon 2007; Andaluz and Molina
2007; Rainer 2007; Beblo and Robeldo 2008). In these game theory models, power oper-
ates through the mechanism of the breakdown position, which is defined as what would
happen if no co-operative arrangement can be reached (in this instance, the termination
of the relationship). Therefore the relative power an agent has to negotiate their pre-
ferred outcome depends on the strength and credibility of the threat of breakdown; the
relative position of the couple in the event of relationship breakdown, and the likelihood
with which they would invoke this option. This in turn depends on factors such as the
support that the person can draw from themselves, through their own earning capacity,
and from others such as other family members and the welfare state. Bargaining oc-
curs between the couple until either breakdown occurs, or a solution is reached that is
Pareto efficient; it cannot make one person better off without making another worse off.
At this point, equilibrium occurs. The concept of Pareto efficiency helps to explain the
persistence of apparently unfair outcomes. For example, the difficulty faced by a wife
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in a homemaking role to negotiate a more equal division of labour if any change in that
respect would make her husband worse off, thus she remains in this role even if she does
not like it or perceive it as fair because it is an equilibrium.
These models, although still abstractions, arguably represent something more akin to a
household time allocation process than the orthodox models outlined earlier. However
several criticisms have been levelled at such models. Although they allow for spouses
to have different utility functions, they still assume that these functions are well defined,
which involves the implausible assumption that agents are fully aware of their own
interests and able to act on them (Woolley 1999). Also slightly implausible is the idea that
the threat of divorce is repeatedly invoked every time a couple negotiates (Seiz 1999),
although it is perhaps more likely that an implicit threat of relationship breakdown
encourages an agreement to be found. The models are also restricted in their ability to
make predictions by their inability to distinguish between different types of household
work (Seiz 1999), and indeed different types of market work. Their static formulation
also does not allow for different allocations in different time periods, which is likely as
young children age, for example (Gordon 1979). Finally, although bargaining is assumed
to take place, there is no analysis of the bargaining process itself, with agents assumed
to arrive instantaneously at the outcome (Woolley 1999).
These materialist perspectives generate two main empirical predictions. The first is that
couples with higher resource disparities will have a less egalitarian division of household
labour than those in which the partners’ contributions are more evenly matched. The
second is that the division of labour will be related not only to the instantaneous resource
distribution in the household, but also to women’s potential earnings. For example, a
mother may contribute no income when her children are small, but she may have left
a high paying job to look after these children, to which she could return were she to
lose her husband’s income. These two predictions are borne out to some degree in the
limited empirical work on this topic, although there seems to be an independent impact
of gender for which materialist explanations cannot account. There is no recent British
empirical work that focuses on relative resources, although their partial impact has been
demonstrated in both the USA and Sweden.
Most of the game theory models referred to above are purely theoretical exercises, but
Amilon (2007) tests the propositions of her own bargaining model, which takes as its
dependent variable the sharing of parental leave in Sweden. She finds that, as the model
predicts, relative education and income in a couple are significant explanatory factors for
leave sharing. However, there is also a statistically significant difference between cou-
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ples who are both lower income and those who are both higher income, suggesting that
absolute level of household income is also important. This is consistent with other ex-
planations that are not explored empirically, such as the greater ability of those on high
incomes to contract out household tasks, and the potential link between income and gen-
der. Another Swedish study (Evertsson and Nermo 2007) examines longitudinal data to
establish whether a change in relative resources affects the ability to negotiate outcomes
and thus leads to a renegotiation of arrangements. They find that if a woman’s relative
resources increase, and economic dependency decreases, she performs less housework,
and this is transferred rather than simply contracted out. However, women still do more
housework than their partners, even when they earn more or are more educated. Datta
Gupta and Stratton (2009) consider the impact of relative power, as measured by relative
earning potential, on the division of leisure time, as they argue that the association with
housework is weak because of heterogeneity in preferences and skills regarding house-
work. The find that in the USA there is a strong association between earning potential,
as operationalised by education, and leisure time, although a comparison with Danish
data suggests that the relation does not unambiguously hold there.
Thus, the empirical evidence suggests that relative resources are potentially important,
but they do not offer a particularly satisfying account of gender disparities in household
labour. Although support is given to materialist understanding of gender relations, there
still seems to be an independent effect of gender itself. These theories offer no account
of this gender effect, and indeed on a theoretical level, outcomes that violate gender
norms are possible within these understandings of household allocation. However, the
data suggests a strong adherence to gender norms, which suggests that gender ideology
is itself a potential explanatory factor. Agarwal (1997) argues that power needs to be
understood as ideational as well as monetary, and that gender is highly relevant in a
household bargaining situation. Gender norms set limits on how bargaining can occur
and even what outcomes can be bargained over; so an egalitarian outcome may not even
be in the list of potential outcomes in the first place. There may also be gendered differ-
ences in each partner’s perceptions of their own needs, rights and responsibilities. The
next section considers several possible ways in which gender can influence household
outcomes.
2.2.3 Gender
The key contribution of structural perspectives to the question at hand is to move be-
yond ontological individualism and explore the possibility of a two-way relationship
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between individuals or households and the context in which they are situated. Thus,
context is conceptualised as more than a mere aggregation of micro-level behaviours,
but something that shapes behavioural outcomes themselves, and reinforces behavioural
continuity.
This review considers three approaches to explaining the potential causal impact of gen-
der norms on household outcomes, and the extent to which they can explain deviations
from what is apparently rational if we consider only relative resources and the division
of paid work. The first is the way in which our understandings of appropriate roles
for men and women are formed in childhood, passed on from passive observation and
direct influence of one’s own parents, and then confirmed by the societal status quo. The
second is the way in which gender is valued and actively reproduced in everyday activ-
ities, and the way in which the need to display gender is part of the household calculus
along with the materialist aspects of time and labour allocation. The third aspect is the
way in which men and women may perceive the same activity or situation differently,
and how this makes ostensibly unfair arrangements perceived as fair by those within
them.
Gendered socialisation
The process of socialisation into gendered roles begins in childhood as norms are trans-
mitted to children by their parents. Part of a wider process of inducting new humans
into the values and acceptable standards of their society, gender socialisation is the pro-
cess through which individuals learn to become feminine or masculine, and learn and
internalise norms about gender roles and inequalities (Mackie 1987). Theories of how
norms are transmitted to children fall into three camps. The social learning perspective
(Mischel 1966) holds that sex-typed behaviours are learned through observation, and
then reinforced by rewards for conforming and sanctions for deviation. Parents have a
key role to play in administering these sanctions and rewards, although other agents do
so as well. Thus sex differences in behaviours are a result of systematic differences in
the behaviours to which boys and girls are exposed, and their different experiences of
the consequences of adopting these behaviours.
A somewhat different perspective on this process is that of developmental cognition
(Kohlberg 1966), which almost reverses the sequence. The starting point is the cognitive
organisation of social role concepts around physical dimensions. The child categorises
themself physically as male or female, then positively values the associated acts and
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objects and acts consistently with this gender. Parental behaviour plays a role insofar as
a child is likely to identify with like-sex figures, particularly the like-sex parent, but the
development of masculinity or femininity occurs even in the absence of a like-sex parent.
As Kohlberg puts it:
The social-learning syllogism is: "I want rewards, I am rewarded for doing
boy things, therefore I want to be a boy". In contrast, a cognitive theory as-
sumes this sequence: "I am a boy, therefore I want to do boy things, therefore
the opportunity to do boy things (and to gain approval for doing them) is
rewarding" (Kohlberg 1966:89).
A third perspective is derived from psychoanalytic theory. Parsons (1956) takes Freud’s
stages of psychosexual development as a starting point but links it to family struc-
ture specifically, to consider the development of gender roles and identity as children
progress through these stages. The upshot is the direct but not necessarily conscious
impact of parents on their children’s gender identities. The nuclear family contains a
father, who is the ‘instrumental’ member providing income and status, and a mother,
the ‘expressive’ member who is responsible for caring and household work. The nuclear
family socialises children into taking on the appropriate role; thus boys are socialised
into becoming instrumental fathers, girls into expressive mothers.
These somewhat different approaches all imply that children reach maturity with pref-
erences that are not simply intrinsic to their personality but systematically different by
gender because they have internalised the gender system. To establish empirical evi-
dence of this type of socialisation, we would expect to see some correlation between
parental behaviours and attitudes and those of their children. The only relatively recent
British example of this type of study is by Burt and Scott (2002), who use data from the
British Household Panel Study collected between 1994 and 1997. As this study inter-
views all adults in the household, as well as children over 11, inter-generational links
can be made between the adults’ attitudes and those of their children. The results sug-
gested an association between parental and child attitudes, although greater similarities
were found within generations than between them. Interestingly, the generational shift
towards greater egalitarianism is stronger in girls, who are more dissimilar to boys in
their attitudes than women are to men in the adult sample. It should be noted, however,
that the study does not make use of any of the possible control variables such as parental
education or household income, which may also exert an effect.
Recent studies from other countries have suggested some association between parental
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attitudes and behaviours and the gender role attitudes of the next generation. Van Putten
et al (2008) investigate the impact of mothers’ employment on their daughters’ employ-
ment in a sample of Dutch women. They find that maternal employment affects the
number of hours worked but not whether a woman participates or not. However, the
effect is small, with maternal participation yielding a positive coefficient implying an
extra 1.9 hours per week; the main determinants of a woman’s labour force participation
are her own educational level and the number and ages of her children.
Most of this research has taken place in the United States, which generally finds some
inter-generational association of gender role attitudes and behaviours. Cichy et al (2007)
find associations between parental and offspring gender attitudes, but a generational
shift that, like Burt and Scott, they find to have occurred more strongly in girls. The im-
pact of parental behaviours has also been found to be important. Fan and Marini (2000)
find that the educational level of parents and whether the mother is in employment in-
fluences their children’s gender role attitudes in later life, and Cunningham (2001) finds
parental division of labour to be a predictor of their children’s subsequent division of
labour in their own households. Marks et al (2009) look at both parental attitudes and
parental behaviours, and find both to exert an independent influence on their children’s
gender role attitudes. Most of these studies employ data with quite small sample sizes,
and sampling methods that are non-random, and geographically and demographically
restricted. However, the benefit of these datasets is that they contain much richer in-
formation on gender attitudes and household division of labour than a larger, more
nationally representative sample might have, which allows a better operationalisation of
theories of role transmission.
Gendered display
The gender display perspective emerged as a counterpoint to theories based on ideas of
exchange and relative resources, based on the contention that gender adds to this cal-
culus, or even potentially subverts economically rational outcomes. The ‘doing gender’
approach (West and Zimmerman 1987) is the conceptualisation of gender as something
that is actively produced and reproduced through the performance of stereotypically
gendered behaviours. In the household division of unpaid domestic work, the perfor-
mance of housework is feminine, and its avoidance is masculine:
It is not simply that household labour is designated as “women’s work",
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but that for a woman to engage in it and a man not to engage in it is to draw
on and exhibit the “essential nature" of each. What is produced is...the mate-
rial embodiment of wifely and husbandly roles, and derivatively, of womanly
and manly conduct (West and Zimmerman 1987:144).
Berk (1985) argues that the idea of gender as something that is produced can help to
explain apparently inefficient outcomes and the perception of these as fair. If gender
is a valued household good in itself, then it should be included in the output from
the division of labour. In this way, the masculinity and femininity produced by the
performance of particular household activities enters the calculus of costs and benefits
in dividing household labour, alongside the more material aspects of relative potential
wage and productivities. The performance of housework has also been conceptualised
as a way to neutralise gender ‘deviance’; as women take on paid work and contribute
economically to the household, they might do more housework, and men less, in order
to maintain or re-establish gendered household roles (Brines 1994).
If gender enters into the household calculus in this way, we might expect to see out-
comes that are irrational from a time allocation point of view, but are consistent with the
performance of gendered tasks as a competing priority. Kalenoski et al (2009) look at the
2000 United Kingdom Time Use Survey to examine how men and women’s time in paid
work and care responds to a change in their partner’s wages. They find this response
to be highly gender asymmetrical; while women respond to men’s wage increases by
doing more childcare and less paid work, an increase in women’s wages only leads to
men doing more childcare at weekends, and the increase is only in passive, secondary
care activities. This is consistent with the proposition that they avoid what might be
a rational increase in care work, in order to maintain their masculine role and identity
in the household. On the other hand, Yee Kan (2008), analysing data from the British
Household Panel Survey, does not find any evidence that routine housework is under-
taken or avoided to compensate for non-traditional earnings arrangements, although the
author admits that the questionnaire-based estimates of housework in this survey are
potentially less accurate than the diary-based estimates in the Time Use Survey.
Similar studies in other countries find a similar lack of parental substitution. Pailhe and
Solaz (2008) find that French mothers and fathers do not replace each other even when it
is rational for them to do so. Parental time is only partially substitutable, flowing much
more from men to women than vice versa, and varies with prestige of task, suggesting
that men are able to be selective about their domestic contribution. Wang and Bianchi
(2009) find evidence that US fathers with an employed wife do more childcare, partic-
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ularly when children are young, suggesting that wives are able to use their economic
power to some extent. However, they suggest that families in which mothers work when
children are very young are a special type in which women are especially committed to
the labour force and likely to be in good jobs that afford them an unusual amount of
economic power. Also in the USA, Parkman (2004) finds that, although both spouses re-
spond to a change in relative earnings with changes in performance of household tasks,
men’s response is smaller. Even in Norway, a country associated with a high level of
gender equality in parenting, men’s response to their partner’s working hours is limited,
and suggests that couples substitute external services rather than fathers’ time when
women reduce their time spend caring for children (Kitterod and Pettersen 2006).
Qualitative research is a useful complement to the survey-based research described
above, as it better placed to uncover couples’ motivations and feelings about the di-
vision of household labour, and get to the heart of why they divide tasks in the way they
do.
Two studies of employment disruption in working-class households illustrate the way
that couples respond when a previously ‘optimal’ gendered division of labour is no
longer economically rational. Charles and James (2005) examine the impact of sole earner
men losing their jobs due to de-industrialisation in South-West Wales, and becoming de-
pendent on their partner’s income. Although in practice their households took on egal-
itarian or even female-breadwinner patterns of behaviour, this was seen as a pragmatic
and temporary response to circumstances rather than any shift in gender roles. Both men
and women within the couples maintained considerable attachment to the ideology of
man as breadwinner, with a change in circumstances seen as an aberration to this rather
than a reason to question the underlying logic. Legerski and Cornwall (2010) interview
families in a similar situation in the United States. They found that men’s increased
involvement in the housework was minimal, and constructed as something different; for
example “picking up” groceries on the way home rather than planning and shopping
for them, and “preparing food” rather than cooking. This research suggests a great deal
of discomfort with performing opposite-gendered tasks, to the extent that couples may
even understand the same task in a different way. When men cannot avoid housework,
it is constructed as different from the housework that women do, and similarly female




A third perspective on the role of gender in household decision-making centres around
the gendered differences between objective and subjective perceptions of fairness and
satisfaction. This ‘gender justice’ perspective (Thompson 1991; Major 1993) holds that
inegalitarian or unequal domestic arrangements may not be perceived as such by women,
who then do not agitate for any change, thus perpetuating the inequality. This is because
of the different way that each partner’s contribution to the household is perceived; men
get disproportionate credit and gratitude for the household work they do, from both
themselves and their partners, and their participation is not compared to their partner’s
but to that of other men. Furthermore, women need only perceive that they have a voice
in household decisions to perceive these as fair, even if what resulted in practice was
profoundly unequal.
Most of the empirical work around perceptions of household arrangements has not been
conducted in the UK. One exception is van Hooff (2011), who does not directly work
from the gender justice framework outlined above, but the results of the study are rel-
evant here. Dual-career couples between the ages of 20 and 35 were interviewed about
their household arrangements and how these arose. Strikingly, there seems to be little
examination of the assumptions underlying the division of household labour. Unequal
sharing of domestic tasks was justified on the grounds of the male partner working
longer hours, without questioning why it is the man who works long hours. Simi-
larly, women do more housework because they claim to be better at it or to have higher
standards, without considering the way in which women are socialised into performing
household tasks and being judged on their performance.
A number of studies from other countries have found a similar subjective blindness to ob-
jective inequalities. A Canadian study by Beagen et al (2008) found, like van Hooff (2011),
that couples accept justifications such as men’s longer work hours without considering
their underlying gendered dimensions. Baxter (2000) finds that, in Australian couples,
it is not how much housework a man does that predicts satisfaction with arrangements,
but whether he does any at all, lending support to the idea that men get disproportion-
ate credit for a small household contribution. Cross-national studies (Braun et al 2008;
Greenstein 2009) also find evidence of national level comparison referents, finding a link
between overall gender equality in society and perceptions of fairness in the household.
Women in egalitarian countries are less likely to accept inegalitarian household arrange-
ments as fair. In Sweden, a country with fairly high overall egalitarianism, Nordenmark
and Nyman (2003) do find a link between actual and perceived fairness, however couples
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still find ways to justify inegalitarian arrangements through gendered conceptualisations
of their housework contributions.
2.2.4 Policy
This final section will look at the theoretical and empirical work on the impact of policy
on the division of paid work and care in the household. The reconciliation of work and
care occurs within an institutional context of family policy support and the normative
understandings that both underpin, and are reinforced by, these policy provisions. The
empirical literature has shown considerable variation across European countries in the
extent to which gender equality is supported by the insitutional arrangements; indeed,
in some countries equality is actively undermined. However, what this literature also
suggests is that the role of policy plays out alongside the other aspects of the household
decisionmaking calculus that have been discussed here, and that a supportive policy
environment is not in itself enough to facilitate gender equality.
A key preoccupation of the theoretical social policy literature has been to understand the
way in which the welfare state mediates the individual’s relationship with the market. A
key concept often used to understand this is Esping-Andersen’s idea of decommodifica-
tion; the extent to which they depend on market work to meet their needs, and the extent
to which these needs are met by the state (Esping-Andersen 1990). However, feminist
theorists have criticised this concept as being inadequate for understanding women’s
well-being, because ignores the implications of women’s unequal care burden on their
ability to participate in paid work, and their resulting dependency on men (Lewis 1997).
Feminist welfare state literature (e.g. Sainsbury 1994; Sainsbury 1996; Pfau-Effinger 1998)
seeks to specifically understand women’s relationship to the market and the welfare
regime, and how the practicalities of work and care intersect with cultural norms, which
in turn underpin the policies themselves. On a practical level, family income under
different arrangements depends on the state support available in these arrangements.
The extent to which the state contributes financially towards the cost of care impacts the
extent to which mothers are able to engage in market work. On a normative level, the
welfare state is organised around certain assumptions about the division of work and
care, and its support for these arrangements can help to perpetuate them.
Methodologically it is very difficult to translate these complex theoretical concepts into
empirical measures of welfare state ‘performance’ (Lewis 1997). However, the aim of the
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research being carried out here is not to try and identify regime types, or say whether
these theories are adequate descriptions of cross-national variation in welfare states. The
aim is to link these key practical and normative aspects of the welfare state to the division
of paid work and care, and women’s employment outcomes. In essence, the welfare state
can be thought of as adding an additional dimension to the household calculus of rel-
ative resources and gendered practices, by privileging certain arrangements over others
through the way in which it supports families. A considerable body of literature exists
that attempts to analyse the impact of these different policies, by exploiting national or
regime level variations in social policy to see whether these are related to outcomes in
these countries.
There are considerable cross-country variations in mothers’ employment and the penalty
to motherhood, and to some extent these can be related to features of the policy regime
that either encourage and facilitate or discourage and disincentivise mothers’ labour
force participation. Countries with the greatest institutional support for working moth-
erhood generally have lower penalties to motherhood; in France and the Netherlands
this is facilitated by extensive childcare (Davies and Pierre 2005), and Sweden’s employ-
ment supportive policies tends to put it in the lead for maternal employment, although
this lead is diminishing as other countries begin to catch up (Kenjoh 2005). However,
low penalties to motherhood can also be seen in countries with more limited policy pro-
visions. For example in the USA, perhaps because a lack of institutional support forces
them to return quickly and work full-time (Gangl and Zeifle 2009), and in the Southern
European welfare states, perhaps due to the assistance of family networks in facilitat-
ing maternal employment (Davies and Pierre 2005). It certainly seems to be the case
that generous maternity leave, however well-intentioned, can have a depressive effect
on women’s employment prospects if mothers take long leaves (Rhum 1998; Fuwa and
Cohen 2007; Stier and Mandel 2009).
A number of studies look at the other side of the coin from mothers’ employment, that
is to say the division of labour in the household, and policies that might increase fathers’
participation in childcare. Working motherhood itself does not necessarily translate into
a more egalitarian division of labour in the household. For example, France has good
institutional support for working motherhood but a gendered household division of
labour, while the UK has less support for working motherhood but a less gendered
division of labour than France (Crompton and Lyonette 2005). The policy environment
can also influence the way in which couples divide work and care, in conjunction with
prevailing gender norms.
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The most obvious example of policies aimed at addressing directly the gender inequali-
ties in the household are found in the Scandinavian countries. In Sweden and Norway,
parental leave is transferable, and income replacement whilst on parental leave is high.
This high remuneration is crucial because a lack of remuneration may well be a reason
why in, say Germany, which has had shared leave since 1986, fathers’ uptake is still very
low (Geisler and Kreyenfeld 2011). In the Nordic countries, an example of regimes with
strong defamilialisation, policies are explicitly designed to support dual-earning families
and gender equality (Duvander et al 2010; Bernhardt et al 2008). To encourage men to
participate more in childcare – recognising the importance of this for gender equality –
both countries have introduced a special quota that researves a portion of parental leave
just for the father. This was a month initially, and then extended ten weeks in Norway
and two months in Sweden (Duvander et al 2010). This quota has had some impact,
but it has not precipitated a fully egalitarian division of labour. Evidence from Norway
suggests that fathers use the leave reserved for them in the majority of cases, but most
men do not take more than this and the way they use it may be quite different from how
mothers use it, as they still see their role as different (Brandth and Kvande 2009;1998:
Lappegard 2008). The proportion of men using parental leave is higher in Sweden than
it is in Norway, although this may be due to the fact that the employment requirements
are less strict (Duvander et al 2010).
The limited impact of policy may be because it is just one aspect among many in the
household calculus, and not even the strongest influence at that. Gershuny and Sullivan
(2003) find that, although there is cross-country variation in the division of household
labour, the trend over time is towards convergence in patterns of division of labour.
Despite considerable regime differences, policy making at the EU level may be bring-
ing about a degree of homogeneity in family policy provision. Furthermore, there is
evidence that policy may be eclipsed in importance as an explanatory factor in the di-
vision of labour, by the other influences discussed in this chapter. Geist (2005) finds a
regime-level effect of less equal sharing under conservative welfare regimes, but the key
theoretical perspectives discussed earlier of human capital, relative resources and gen-
der all have explanatory power as well. And to take a specific contrast, although Sweden
has a more institutionalised system of policies to promote gender equality than Norway,
and indeed a more equal division of household labour, the same financial and normative
factors still influence division of labour in both countries (Bernhardt et al 2008).
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Summary
This survey of the literature has identified two very different conceptualisations of the
division of work and care, and of the reasons that mothers face labour market penalties.
One perspective sees these phenomena as a result of rational actions taken by individu-
als, acting alone or at the household level. The individual chooses the investments they
make in their labour market potential, and the labour market rewards them for these
investments. It is not in the interests of employers to employ on any basis other than
human capital considerations, therefore no structural barriers exist in the accumulation
and conversion of human capital. At the household level, the division of earning and
caring tasks between partners is based on their comparative advantage in each type of
task, part of which is their earning potential in the labour market, and the other part of
which is their efficiency in childcare tasks.
A competing perspective sees these processes very differently. It argues that human
capital accumulation is not completely voluntary, but subject to a number of barriers
and inconsistently rewarded. In imperfectly competitive markets, or in sectors such as
the care sector, there is plenty of scope to discriminate and undervalue, and there is
evidence that this occurs. At the household level, the division of labour is shaped by
power relations and normative factors as well as rational considerations, and this is why
time allocation perspectives are only partially supported empirically. There is also the
strong influence of the prevailing policy environment, and the way it not only alters a
family’s costs and income, but itself perpetuates normative ideas about parenting roles.
At the heart of the theoretical debate, then, is the well-established ground of structure
versus agency; in this case, the extent to which mothers control their own economic
futures, and the extent to which they are prevented from doing so by external constraints.
The next chapter takes this tension as its point of departure, and tries to reconcile the




This chapter will draw on the perspectives outlined in the previous chapter to develop
a framework for the analysis of gender inequality in the home and the workplace.
It attempts to bring together the agency-based and structure-based approaches using
Amartya Sen’s capability approach (Sen 1985; 1993; 1999), in order to develop a model
of constrained choice that leaves room for insights from both perspectives and circum-
vents the deadlock between them. This chapter starts by outlining the main tensions
between the two schools of thought, before introducing the capability approach and ex-
plaining how it attempts to resolve these. It then develops the framework from which the
hypotheses for the subsequent empirical work will be derived, outlining the theoretical
basis for the overarching hypothesis of stalled change that runs throughout the thesis.
3.1 Points of contention
The previous chapter suggested a range of policy and non-policy factors that have been
put forward to explain the dual problem of mothers’ labour market disadvantage and
higher unpaid work burden in the home, and roughly divided these into those em-
phasising agency as the key driving force, and those identifying structure. The two
types of perspective both make contributions to understanding the problems under con-
sideration, but they clash on some key issues, mostly around the assumptions about
freedom and choice that are made in the economic models of labour force participation
and household decision-making. This section outlines these disagreements and identi-
fies the points of theoretical stalemate that emerge when the empirical evidence becomes
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consistent with two very different interpretations.
3.1.1 The agency/structure conflict
According to the agentic perspectives, mothers’ labour market outcomes are the result of
a trade-off between market remuneration and the time and flexibility to fulfil domestic
care responsibilities. The outcome is arrived at by rational decision-making, accord-
ing to the relative productivities and preferences within the household. The empirical
research presented in the previous chapter does support the implications of a rational
time-allocation process to some extent. This research (e.g. Blackwell 2001; Joshi et al
2007; Connolly and Gregory 2008; Malo and Munoz-Bullon 2008) shows that employ-
ment history characterised by time out of the labour market to care for dependants and
part-time or flexible working does carry a penalty in terms of salary and status; however,
it also shows that the situation cannot be fully explained by purely rational considera-
tions. This is because agency-centric theories assume the absence of certain practical and
normative constraints on freedom of choice, and therefore their understanding of the
phenomenon is incomplete and their explanatory power is limited.
Such assumptions put these perspectives in direct contrast with structural perspectives
that highlight such constraints. Those of a more structural persuasion question why
mothers would choose the disadvantages they face, and point to the practical and norma-
tive barriers to choice, both in the labour market and in the way they arrange work and
care in the household. The main points of contention with the orthodox human capital
account of labour market outcomes can be roughly summarised in three key challenges.
The first takes issue with the assumption that human capital investments are choices;
it can be argued that these are in fact also shaped by practical barriers that mothers
face in combining work and care, and normative barriers in the form of discrimination
(Cuddy et al 2004; Fuegen et al 2004; Correll et al 2007; Benard and Correll 2010) and
the segregation of men and women into particular occupations (Manning and Petron-
golo 2008; Mumford and Smith 2009). Secondly, the assumption that women choose to
take the damaging time out of the labour market does not take into account the way in
which leave entitlements are gendered; only women can take the leave in the UK, and
it is on them that the career penalty subsequently falls (Rhum 1998; Fuwa and Cohen
2007; Stier and Mandel 2009). Similarly, the assumption that working mothers choose
reduced or flexible hours because this is what they want in combining their work and
care responsibilities ignores the fact that these responsibilities fall to them by default,
and cannot be avoided unless the state or their partner is willing to share them (Baldock
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and Hadlow 2004). Thirdly, the assumption that these rational processes operate at the
level of household division of labour has also been challenged, as the prevailing policy
and normative climate affects the options that are practically expedient and normatively
acceptable (Sainsbury 1996; Pfau-Effinger 1998).
Therefore the key matter to consider here is the extent to which mothers’ career trajec-
tories are the result of rational decision-making and division of labour, and how much
they are shaped and limited by the prevailing policy and normative climate. The latter
is what problematises the whole issue of work-family reconciliation; if the present situ-
ation is a result merely of choice then there is no need to change the policy provisions.
However, if structural factors are responsible for the present situation then there is po-
tentially something that policy could do to give couples options that they desire but do
not currently have. The underlying framework needs to allow for the consideration and
empirical examination of both sides. This is attempted in the next section through the
use of the capability approach.
3.2 The capability approach
The theoretical framework that will be developed here aims to reconcile these insights
through the concept of situated agency that Amartya Sen has developed in his capability
approach (Sen 1985; 1993; 1999). This is a recognition of the existence of agency, but
in way that incorporates the likely existence of constraint, and attempts to understand
the extent to which genuine choice is available. This kind of choice implies not just
the absence of the most formal, visible or tangible constraints, but a more nuanced
understanding of constraint and a recognition of the need for positive support to achieve
desired outcomes. This then provides a normative yardstick in the assessment of policy;
the aim is to establish the extent to which policy enables or restricts genuine choice. This
section aims to demonstrate that this approach is not simply an abstract philosophical
device, but that Sen’s own work and the applications of his ideas demonstrate a clear
relevance and usefulness to the analysis of this topic. It will first of all give a general
summary of the approach, and then relate it directly to the topic of gender inequality in
the labour market and the home.
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3.2.1 What is the capability approach?
The capability approach conceptualises a series of steps from the individual and their
personal resources, to the outcomes that they eventually choose, via the constraints they
face in making this conversion from resources to outcomes. It is by incorporating these
multiple stages that the approach can usefully reconcile the different theoretical ap-
proaches in the division of work and care. However, as a preface to understanding these
‘building blocks’ of the capability approach, it is helpful first of all to contrast it with
the explanatory paradigms to which it claims to offer an alternative. The conceptuali-
sation of choice and well-being departs from the conventional economics understanding
of these terms, by positing something that is both a better reflection of well-being and a
superior basis for interpersonal comparison.
What is it trying to move away from?
The capability approach challenges the philosophical and conceptual heart of economics;
the central concepts of utility and preference, which are ubiquitous throughout eco-
nomics, including the human capital theories discussed above. The central concern of
economics is not equality, but efficiency, preferably Pareto efficiency; a situation in which
no person can be made better off without making someone else worse off and is there-
fore an equilibrium. This implies that there is a conceptualisation of what makes some-
one better or worse off, and indeed the metric used is generally ‘utility’, which broadly
speaking is a level of satisfaction with an outcome. Economic rational choice implies that
individuals choose the outcome that gives them the greatest utility given the possibilities
available to them; the exact outcome will depend on their preferences.
Sen (1985) argues that, despite utility having several possible definitions or operationali-
sations, none satisfactorily capture well-being. It cannot be defined as choice, as these are
not necessarily made solely on the basis of one’s own well-being. Nor happiness, which
ignores the other dimensions or mental states that are relevant to well-being. Nor can it
be understood as the fulfilment of desire, as it is impossible to compare desire between
individuals, as they represent a compromise with reality. This is Sen’s key issue with
any understanding of utility that relies on the individual’s own subjective evaluation of
their position; this evaluation is so heavily conditioned by the situation to which they are
habituated that it cannot possibly be compared against someone in a different situation.
There are many reasons why someone who is objectively speaking deprived may not
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be unhappy in the utilitarian sense, none of which imply high levels of well-being; they
may be used to their present situation, unaware of anything different or the possibility
of anything different, or they may realign their feelings about their situation to avoid
feeling unsatisfied or disappointed (Sen 1990).
To illustrate the inadequacy of a utilitarian approach, Robeyns (2005) contrasts the util-
itarian and capability based understandings of the gender pay gap. Under utilitarian
metrics, a gender pay gap is only problematic if women are dissatisfied with being paid
less, but the capability approach eschews this total reliance on subjective mental states
because they are so conditioned by external factors. It is not enough to simply measure
women’s happiness at their situation or, worse, as much economic theory seems to do,
assume that they have achieved maximum utility by virtue of the fact that they have
‘chosen’ the prevailing outcome. Outcomes must be objectively and intrinsically valu-
able, not merely viewed as valuable by those experiencing them, and representing the
least worst possible outcome.
Thus, Sen has devised the capability approach as a better way to measure well-being,
in a way that provides this objective and interpersonally comparable evaluation of well-
being. Furthermore, it is explicitly committed to equality of well-being as the desired
distributional outcome. In this conceptualisation, equality is defined as equality in ob-
jects of value, which Sen calls functionings. These “represent parts of the state of a person
– in particular the various things that he or she manages to do or be in leading a life.”
(Sen 1993:31). Well-being is not defined by a particular functioning; rather, an individ-
ual’s well-being is defined by the size of the set of functionings available to them from
which they can choose. Interpersonal comparison is made on the basis of people’s “free-
dom to live well”, or “well-being freedom” (p201), which is measured by the extent to
which they can choose valuable functions. It is the process of listing and comparing these
potential functionings that forms the evaluative space for measuring inequality. For Sen,
there is no single list of valuable functionings; it is context specific and something that
should be decided by democratic process (Robeyns 2003). The quest to identify, rank
and measure valued functionings is the aim of the exercise.
What does it offer instead?
The capability approach conceptualises a process by which individuals convert the re-
sources they have into the desired functionings, via intermediate stages of constraint and
preferences, as summarised in figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: The building blocks of the capability approach
The starting point is the inputs an individual has. These are the resources they have
at their disposal; the means through which they achieve valued functionings. This en-
compasses a range of goods and services that includes but extends beyond the purely
income-based.1 For some approaches to measuring welfare, such as income-based ap-
proaches, this resource stage represents the end point as well. However, Sen sees these
inputs as only the means to achieving valuable ends, and crucially there may be a great
deal of variation in the extent to which individuals can turn these means into ends. Thus
he argues that:
...an index of opulence, or of primary goods, cannot be seen as an index of
well-being as such. Nor can the "advantage" of different persons (or groups)
be ranked on the basis of the primary goods index, because of interpersonal
variations in what people can do with primary goods, depending on biologi-
cal, social, and other parameters (Sen 1985:200).
These parameters represent the next stage of the process, which Sen calls conversion
factors. As with functionings, the relevant conversion factors are context-specific, but
they represent the complex multi-level and interacting factors that act as barriers to the
achievement of functionings. Crucially, they will vary from person to person, and may
even vary systematically by groups in society. This leaves room for both individual het-
erogeneity and group-based disadvantage in the extent to which any given individual is
free to achieve valued functionings. The set of available functionings that an individual
can truly achieve, given the inputs they have and the conversion factors they face, is
called the capability set. It is at this point that the individual can exercise choice in select-
ing their most preferred functionings from the capability set. It is important to incorporate
choice into the model at this point, because individuals “differ a good deal from each
1The more complex the functioning, the more likely it is that the necessary resources will be more than
income based; for example money cannot necessarily buy successful inter-personal relationships.
46
other in the weights they attach to these different functionings – valuable though they
may all be” (Sen 1993:31).
3.2.2 Relating the capability approach to my work
My use of the capability approach’s framework has two main rationales. In the abstract,
it is a way to understand situated agency and reconcile the key structure-agency tension
between the theoretical perspectives, and provides the first principles from which the
research departs. More tangibly, it has much congruence with the two primary aspects of
the work here; understanding co-operative conflict in the household, and understanding
the role of policy in people’s lives.
Several studies of work-family reconciliation have used the capability approach as their
theoretical foundation. The rationale given for this centres around its simplicity, its neu-
trality with respect to actual outcomes, and the way in which it can encompass agency
and structure in its conceptualisation of how outcomes are arrived at (Lewis and Camp-
bell 2007; Hobson and Fahlen 2009; Lewis 2009; Hobson 2011). These are all aspects of
the rationale for using the approach here. These studies starkly demonstrate the way in
which capabilities fall short of aspirations, and how policy across the EU fails to varying
degrees to address this disparity. Similarly, this research aims to understand the extent
to which the UK policy environment helps families to achieve the reconciliation of work
and care. A related endeavour in other studies is to use the approach to consider the
link between inequality and the extent to which the ideological foundations of a policy
incorporate Sen’s positive conception of freedom (Deakin 2005; Carpenter 2009). This
also relevant here, and Shapter 5 considers the implications of a laissez-faire approach to
family policy as contrasted with a more interventionist one, which nonetheless still does
not facilitate certain work and care options. These other studies have taken a different
analytical approach from that pursued here; their move from theory to empirical enquiry
is different. For example, Hobson and Fahlen (2009) compare data on aspirations and
actual outcomes to make a direct measurement of the gap between them. By contrast,
the approach here is to use the theoretical framework to guide variable selection in re-
gression modelling, and interpret the resulting estimates. Thus, the research here builds
on, but also departs from, the existing work.
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Philosophical foundations
The capability approach posits a different understanding of choice to the orthodox eco-
nomic literature; it holds that agency does exist, but only insofar as it represents an
active choice between genuinely available alternatives. Although economic theory does
not assume unlimited choice, it does assume that the constraints on choice are tangible
and uniform. That is to say that a given level of resources results in the same set of
options for everyone with that level of resources, and any differences in their outcomes
are due to heterogeneity in preferences. Any normative influences are assumed to op-
erate through preferences; counter-normative options exist, but it is in most individuals’
preferences to act within normative boundaries. The capability approach challenges this
understanding, by offering an intermediate stage between resources and preferences; the
stage at which many apparently available options are in fact made unavailable due to
practical or normative constraints.
Therefore in applying the approach to this research, there is scope to augment rational
or choice-based explanations, such as human capital and time allocation theories, with
the wide range of theories about the form that constraints on choice might take. So for
example, human capital theory might see part-time employment as a rational way for
mothers to reconcile work and care responsibilities, but this approach has been criticised
for ignoring a normative system that makes it virtually impossible for her partner to
choose this option instead. Indeed, they almost certainly do not, even if this is apparently
both desired and rational from a human capital perspective. The capability approach
would argue that this apparent paradox occurs because a couple are not equally free to
choose between all the possible earning and caring options; normative conversion factors
mean that the latter is not truly within their capability set.
It is this space between what is theoretically possible given a set of resources, and actu-
ally possible given a set of constraints, that is both analytically interesting from a social
science point of view, and relevant from a policy perspective. If outcomes are purely a
matter of choice or entirely predetermined, then there is nothing to analyse and noth-
ing policy can do about them. However, in the case of work-family reconciliation, the
capability approach allows for the possibility that there is scope to understand the gap
between aspirations and reality, and potentially to narrow it through policy intervention.
It is this positive conception of freedom on which this research is based. Human cap-
ital approaches can never fully explain the gender pay gap or the unequal division of
household labour because they understand choice in a negative way, as the absence of
formal constraints, rather than something that may need to be facilitated. This research
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proceeds, as the capability approach does, from the assumption that external support
may be necessary in order for people to have the true capability to achieve their desired
functionings.
Conceptual links
The overarching aim of this research is to understand the role of policy in the way that
couples reconcile paid work and care. Therefore there are two inter-related aspects to
this; to understand the way in which labour is divided in the household, and to under-
stand the way that policy impacts decision-making. The capability approach provides
a theoretical lens for both of these; a model of co-operative conflict with which to char-
acterise household decision-making, and an evaluative space in which to examine the
impact of policy. This section will deal with each of these in turn.
The bargaining approaches to household organisation discussed in the previous chapter
(e.g. Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy and Horney 1981) started from an assumption
of competing interests and presented a way in which these might be reconciled until a
solution is reached. Sen draws on these, using the idea of co-operative conflict as a way to
characterise household interactions (Sen 1990). He argues that bargaining theories repre-
sent an important aspect of household decision-making; the mixture of co-operation and
conflict. In other words, finding a collusive agreement because this is better than break-
down, but also acknowledging that not all solutions will be equally in both partners’
interests. However, he argues that, although these models represent an improvement
on the economic models that ignore conflict, they make the false assumption that both
agents in the ‘game’ have a clear and unambiguous perception of their own interests. In
reality, these perceptions are affected by social norms regarding the value and appropri-
ate division of household tasks.
The theoretical perspectives discussed in the previous chapter can shed much light on
the way that agents’ perceptions may be influenced, and how household outcomes are
potentially affected by the couple’s gendered perceptions and interpretations of what
they contribute to the household and what they deserve in return for this contribution
(Thompson 1991; Major 1993). This is related to Sen’s idea of “social technology” to
describe household activities that are essential to achieving any economically productive
outcomes, but are constructed as parasitic on wage labour and of low financial value (Sen
1990). This leads to women perceiving their own deserved share of household resources
as lower than it is, and therefore they do not bargain for the share they truly deserve,
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but rather the share they believe they deserve.
This discussion emphasises the importance of finding an objective measure of well-being,
rather than relying on women’s own perceptions of their interests and preferences. It is
precisely these gendered ideas of entitlement that make subjective mental states and
preferences so inadequate in understanding well-being equality. And this is why it is
important not to proceed directly from resources to preferences to outcomes, but to un-
derstand the options that are truly available to couples, taking into account the way that
these options may be constrained by gendered norms about parenting. The idea of a
capability set can also help us to make sense of the impact of policy on the constraints
couples face in balancing work and care, by providing a simple research question; does
this policy expand the capability set of work-care functionings? It is focussed not on
outcomes directly, but on the choices available and the extent to which choice is facili-
tated through policy. Thus it provides provides the evaluative space in which policy can
meaningfully be analysed, without prioritising any particular outcome.
3.2.3 Potential pitfalls
Although the above discussion has demonstrated the relevance of the approach and the
key benefits of using it, there are some potential pitfalls that also need to be considered.
Conceptually, the main problem is with having freedom as a goal, when equality may
in fact demand the opposite. The main practical problem is how to operationalise an
abstract concept, especially with quantitative data.
The normative goal of the capability project is the freedom to achieve valued function-
ings; that this freedom should be as large and as equal as possible. However, this is
problematic because in a world of finite resources, one person’s freedom to achieve val-
ued functionings may in fact impinge on another’s. This problem might be compared
to the similar ones that arise with the application of human rights; for example that
one person’s right to freedom of speech might impinge on another’s right to practice a
religion. Gasper and Staveren (2003) argue that distributive justice may in fact depend
on the restriction of freedom for some, in order to facilitate others’. Specifically to the
problem at hand, if the goal of work-family reconciliation policies are to give mothers
the freedom to choose their most preferred arrangement, this may not be possible with-
out restricting men’s freedom in the choices they currently have. This almost returns
full circle to the concept of Pareto efficiency in economics; if the current situation cannot
be improved for women without making men worse off, then an equilibrium has been
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reached and will not change without some kind of exogenous shock through interven-
tion. Unfortunately for the capability approach, it both demands such intervention to
achieve distributive justice, and provides no answers to the question of what to do when
people’s freedoms become mutually exclusive.
Gasper and Stavaren (2003) argue that this problem undermines the use of the capabil-
ity approach in feminist economics, because freedom is not the answer to the issues it
concerns itself with, in fact is it arguably the problem. Furthermore, parents can never
enjoy complete freedom because someone must assume responsibility for meeting the
financial and care needs of their offspring (Lewis and Guillari 2005). The only way out
of this dilemma is to abandon any attempt at absolute freedom maximisation and start
from two assumptions. The first is that a child has a minimum level of needs that must
be met, and that this is the position from which parents are beginning. The second is
that the normative goal is not absolute freedom but gender equality of freedom, even
though freedom will be constrained for both parents and gains in freedom for some may
come at the cost of some freedom for others.
The other major pitfall of the approach that is particularly relevant to this research is
that, although the capability set is a suitable theoretical construct, it is difficult to op-
erationalise in practice. It is by definition hypothetical, as it is not just the observed
outcome, but all the possible outcomes a person could have chosen. These possibilities
are not observable to anyone except the individual themselves, and their assessment of
these possibilities is subjective, which is something that the capability approach is trying
to avoid. Thus we are in danger of losing the rationale of the approach to the practical-
ities of operationalisation (Gasper 2007). The actual empirical exercise either has to use
subjective valuations of possibilities, or objective data that is only on actual outcomes
and not possible ones.
The question is therefore how plausibly obtainable data, and in particular quantitative
data, can illuminate the extent to which an individual enjoys the freedom to choose
valued functionings. The specifics of the operationalisation here will be outlined in the
methodology chapter, but briefly here I argue that the data can live up to its promise.
The research compares two cohorts of mothers. There is extensive data on the input
stage of the process, so I can establish differences in outcomes between those who are
apparently identical in terms of the resources they have at their disposal. The capability
approach can be used alongside the other available information to understand why these
differences exist; why their ability to convert these resources may not be the same, and
if the differences occur at the stage of choosing among available functionings. There is
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data on their attitudes towards the division of work and care, so the shortfall between
aspiration and reality can be shown and used to indicate valued functionings that are
not in the capability set, as per Hobson and Fahlen (2009). It can also indicate whether
there are systematic differences between the two cohorts in what they want from family
life, and thus what they choose from available functionings. This information can be
combined with what we know about the prevailing policy and socioeconomic factors that
influence the available options, and how this differs between the two cohorts. Therefore a
picture can be constructed of why outcomes are different, taking into account differences
in resources, constraints and attitudes as potential explanatory factors.
3.3 My framework
This section sets out the capabilities-based framework on which the rest of the thesis will
be based. It sets out the process by which internal resources and external constraints play
a role in determining outcomes, applying the generic process sketched out above to the
specific issue of work-family reconciliation. It also explains how the model contains
within itself both explanation for continuity and the potential for change, through the
alteration of its constituent parts. Finally, it explains how the ensuing empirical work is
derived from this framework; the questions that are generated, the answers the theory
suggests, and the data that will test this.
3.3.1 The conversion of inputs to functionings
This exposition begins by considering the relevant functionings, as these are specific to
the context and determine the relevant inputs and conversion factors. Thereafter the pro-
cess by which individuals achieve functionings is set out, moving from relative human
capital in the household, to the practical and normative conversion factors that prevent
these resources from being used to their full potential, and the preferences according to
which outcomes are eventually selected.
Functionings
The research focuses on a very specific set of functionings related to the reconciliation
of paid work and care responsibilities in families. The valued beings or doings in this
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case are the potential solutions that couples can reach in dividing these responsibilities
between them and thus discharging their familial obligations. Thus the two key outcome
variables are the division of paid work – the proportion of the required paid work time
that each partner contributes – and the division of unpaid care – the proportion of the
required childcare that each partner contributes. There is no single solution to this opti-
misation problem, but rather a range of theoretically possible options. It is assumed here
that all arrangements that meet a family’s needs can be considered valued functionings.
However, not all arrangements are necessarily available to couples. Therefore the next
step is to consider the preceding steps in the process, and how these may vary within
and between cohorts; the relevant resources that couples need in order to achieve these
functionings, the things that constrain their conversion of resources into capabilities, and
the role of preferences in selecting among functionings in the capability set.
Inputs
The relevant inputs are essentially the human capital resources discussed in the previous
chapter, both in absolute and relative terms. The absolute level of household resources
is crucial for the size of the capability set; the couples with the most resources can afford
functionings that those with less cannot. For example, a couple who both have profes-
sional jobs are more likely to be able to buy childcare services, or to be able to survive
on a single income, than a couple with manual jobs. Thus the better-off couple has much
more choice in their work-care reconciliation options; they are better able to afford the
dual full-time/dual-carer option, and better able to afford the single breadwinner op-
tion. Meanwhile the worse off couple may not be able to afford either of these options,
and may only have the option of a dual earner compromise in order to meet their needs.
Thus earning potential is key to the options a couple has, and this is a function of human
capital variables such as education and employment experience.
However, the relative level of human capital within the couple is also important in deter-
mining what options are available. The household is not a single homogeneous entity,
and feminist perspectives (e.g. Folbre 2004) have stressed the importance of not consid-
ering it as such. As well as maximisation occurring at the household level, there is an
internal situation of co-operative conflict between partners, who each wish to achieve
the outcome that is in their own best interests, but vary in their ability to perceive and
achieve this outcome. This ability depends on the ownership of resources; the relative
earning potential in the household, and the de facto situation of who earns the money.
Therefore an adequate understanding of resources needs to include information on the
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total human capital resources the household has at its disposal, and the way in which
these are distributed between partners.
Finally it is worth mentioning that there is potentially interaction between absolute and
relative resources. The extent to which bargaining is required, and thus relative re-
sources come in to play, depends to some extent on the absolute level of resources in the
household. For example, there is no need to negotiate over childcare if there is plenty
of money to purchase childcare and both partners are happy to do this. Thus scarcity
of resources intensifies the need to bargain over them, and therefore the salience of the
distribution of resources in the household.
Conversion factors to capability sets
The extent to which resources can be converted into capabilities varies both within, and
potentially systematically between, the cohorts. Certain conversion factors may prevent
resources from being deployed to their full potential. The previous section considered
the importance of the absolute and relative resources in the household for the number
of functionings that are theoretically possible. However, they are still only theoretically
possible at this stage, as the extent to which resources can be converted into functionings
may be subject to a number of restrictions. Thus the question is, for two people with
the same level of resources, how does the way in which they can deploy these resources
differ, and what are salient differences between them. As with functionings, the relevant
conversion factors are specific to the issue at hand. The literature review outlined many
such factors around mothers’ ability to realise their potential in the labour market and
bargain for their interests in the household; factors that they face by virtue of their gender
and parenthood status, as well as their own personal situations. What is particularly
interesting for this research is how these gender and parenthood related conversion
factors vary between the two cohorts; what options might be closed to the older cohort
that are open to the younger cohort, or vice versa.
It is conventional to group these factors according to some useful analytical typology,
such as the level or source of influence on behaviour. Sen (1985) tentatively suggests a
three-way classification of biological, social and other, in an attempt to distinguish be-
tween that which is to a great extent prior and unchangeable, and that which is a product
of social design. Robeyns (2003; 2005) uses similar headings – biological, social and envi-
ronmental – which distinguishes between macro-level factors that are pliable and those
over which there may be little control. However, her study examines general issues of
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inequality rather than that specifically related to work-family reconciliation, and thus
many of the conversion factors she mentions are not particularly relevant to the issue
here, particularly those relating to environmental factors such as climate. Hobson and
Fahlen (2009), in looking specifically at work-family reconciliation, distinguish between
macro-level factors that are societal and those that are institutional, in an attempt to
capture the different way that social norms act on behaviour compared with institutions
such as the labour market and the welfare state.
The distinction I make here is a two-fold one between factors that impose practical re-
straints on the realm of possibilities, and those that impose normative barriers. A func-
tioning that is theoretically possible for a given level of resources may be practically
difficult or impossible; a functioning that is valued but impossible because of some prac-
tical obstacle to achieving it. Alternatively, the barrier may be normative; the functioning
is valued and practically achievable, but unavailable because it is not normatively accept-
able. Within this twofold distinction, there are a range of policy and non-policy factors
that influence the extent of practical and normative barriers.
The policy environment plays a key part in raising or lowering practical barriers to work-
family reconciliation functionings, through the way that government support to families
in reconciling their responsibilities incentivises or discourages certain arrangements. The
relevant policies in this situation are those that facilitate some temporary exit from the
labour market in order to fulfil care responsibilities, and those that facilitate the combi-
nation of working and caring, by assisting with child care and making workplaces more
tolerant of care responsibilities with flexible working and anti-discrimination mandates.
The way in which these policies have an impact has two dimensions; how much assis-
tance is available, and to what extent is it gendered. If a government does not provide
much support to families, then arrangements are likely to follow the gendered status
quo, as there is no impetus to change. However, generosity does not necessarily enhance
opportunities if it simply incentivises the status quo. Government support to families
may be generous but gendered. So for example, a policy package may be very generous
to mothers, by providing long and well-compensated leave packages, but this may only
be available to mothers and not fathers. Thus, although the assistance helps families to
meet their needs by relaxing the requirement for the mother to engage in paid work,
it facilitates gendered specialisation. Policy that is both generous and gender neutral
facilitates the widest range of possible work-care outcomes for a given level of resources.
However, this is of course dependent on the nature of the normative barriers to these
options.
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Although policies can have a dramatic impact on incentives and disincentives, they are
not the only thing that influences the practicalities of different solutions. Policies exist
alongside markets and other institutions that shape our way of life. Key among these
for the purposes of reconciling work and care are labour markets and the nature of the
demand for employment. These influence what a person can expect to earn given their
human capital resources, and how these earnings relate to the general cost of living. This
is crucial for a couple deciding how many hours of paid work are required to provide
a sufficient income. Thus potential earnings are not simply a function of human capital
resources, but of the opportunities to deploy that capital, and how much you can expect
to earn from it. This in turn depends on the buoyancy and structure of the economy.
A stronger economy means that there are more job opportunities and potentially higher
rewards, although the down side of this is that costs of living can spiral during good
times. The structure of the economy is also relevant because it determines what sectors
the jobs are in, and what skills and behaviours carry the greatest reward. The literature
review suggested that occupational segregation and the premium to full-time continuous
labour force attachment both mean that women are paid less than men with the same
level of human capital. Therefore the conversion factor of the labour market impacts men
and women differently in their conversion of human capital to labour market reward.
There is of course some potential interaction between policy and the labour market and
economy. For example, the difficulties of those with care responsibilities who seek paid
employment can be mediated by policies such as anti-discrimination legislation and
mandated flexibility. And even at a far more general level, the government has some
scope to influence the health and structure of the economy itself, and may choose to
do so to varying degrees. Chapter 5 considers the differences between the two cohorts
with respect to the economic and policy environment in which they made decisions, and
the potential impact of these differences on their outcomes. It also considers the role
of the prevailing social and normative climate, which of course sits alongside the more
practical considerations outlined here.
Even if an outcome is practically possible – in that it is supported by the prevailing
policy arrangements and the economic conditions are such that it allows a satisfactory
standard of living – it may not be normatively acceptable. This is not the same as a couple
choosing not to take up an option because it does not accord with their normative beliefs
about raising children, in fact it is the opposite; it is an option that a couple might choose
but feel unable to because it is counter to normative attitudes and behaviour. Although
it is difficult to separate these two things analytically, as personal beliefs are inevitably
influenced by prevailing attitudes and a desire to conform, what it does is allow room
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in this framework for the idea of structure and constraint whilst still allowing for some
agency on the part of couples in the choices they make. Section 2.3 of the literature
review considered a range of theories about the gendered social and cultural inhibitions
on personal choices and behaviours, and it is important to allow for the existence of
these barriers to the adoption of counter-normative behaviours.
Policy can also act as a normative as well as a practical conversion factor. The welfare
state theories discussed in the previous chapter considered how policy is both based on
the existing normative system and potentially reinforces this system. It may be based
on an explicit idea of who should earn and who should care, and therefore set out to
privilege particular divisions of work and care, which are then taken up because they
are attractive but become entrenched as a norm in doing so. On the other hand, there
may be no explicit commitment to a particular set of gender roles, but ostensibly gender
neutral policies fail to take into account the way that life is gendered, and will thus
inevitably operate in a gendered way, and continue to do so because there is no impetus
to change. Either way, policy embodies and strengthens a particular set of norms, which
can discourage the adoption of any other arrangement. However, if it has the potential
to reinforce norms, then it also has the potential to challenge them. This potential source
of change is discussed in more detail below.
After all the conversion factors have had their effect, the resulting set of available func-
tionings is the capability set. This is the set of options that are genuinely available to
couples, given their level of resources and the conversion factors they face. Which func-
tioning they ultimately choose is down to preferences.
Preferences
The capability approach recognises that people have different conceptions of the ‘good
life’, and respects this heterogeneity in preferences by incorporating a decision stage in
the conversion of resources to functionings. Once the available functionings have been
delineated by the level of resources and the salient conversion factors, couples are faced
with a set of functionings from which they choose according to their preferences.2
In the case of work-family reconciliation, this involves a multi-way tradeoff between
income, cost, unpaid household work and leisure time, as different work-care options
involve different levels of each of these elements. Table 3.2 shows the way that different
2This of course assumes that conversion factors have not completely eliminated all but one functioning!
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Figure 3.2: The key options in the work-care tradeoff and their implications
options involve different levels of each element.
The functioning chosen depends on how couples value these different elements. To
take an example, if both parents work full-time, this is likely to involve the purchase
of childcare (unless sufficient informal care is available) and less leisure time, but it
maximises income and has the potential to be the most egalitarian division of labour.
Thus parents who value home care of their children more highly than the income or
other benefits of paid work are unlikely to choose this option if they do not have to, but
others who value paid work and are willing to make the accompanying sacrifices may
do so. Therefore couples with the same capability set may choose different outcomes,
and the capability approach makes room for this and does not have any particular goal
in mind with respect to outcomes.
3.3.2 Circularity, continuity and change
The framework developed here can be used to consider not just the instantaneous link
between resources and outcomes, but how outcomes are determined over time, why they
endure and how they might be changed. This is important because household decisions
are not one-off events, but are constantly re-negotiated over time, and as internal and
external circumstances change. The weight of previous outcomes, at both the household
and societal level, give impetus to continuity, as functionings in one period feed back into
resources in the next. However, changes in conversion factors also open up the possibility
of change in household behaviour, and it is in this potential for change that the research
is really interested, as it seeks to establish the impact of changes in conversion factors on
outcomes.
Continuity results when practical and normative incentives towards certain outcomes do
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not change, and in fact become stronger over time. It is easy for household outcomes
to become more and more rational the longer they occur. If a mother’s human capital
was the same as her partner’s before she took time out to have children, then a year
later her partner’s will be higher because he has continued to work during her time out.
This makes it rational for her husband to claim primary earner status, and for her to
claim primary carer status, particularly if she has done the bulk of the childcare during
this time out. Therefore this disparity, whose origin is partly biological but to some
extent a product of social norms, gets wider the longer specialisation occurs, making
gendered specialisation highly self-perpetuating. A small degree of initial specialisation
is difficult to reverse, as the benefits of continuing in specialised roles increase over time.
This idea is in fact found in rational time allocation theories of household division of
labour. However, perhaps the difference between these and more structural theories is
that the former do not recognise the profound implications of these ‘rational’ decisions
for societal norms and understandings of appropriate gendered parenting roles. It is this
normative environment that further increases the impetus to continuity in traditional
gendered roles, and if nothing happens to challenge this, the situation will reproduce
itself.
Change occurs when the capability set is expanded, due to either an increased level of
resources, or a change in conversion factors. By increasing the set of possible function-
ings, the opportunity arises for couples to choose something that has not always been
an option. As discussed above, the size of the capability set depends both on resources
and conversion factors. Thus at the resources stage, anything that increases mothers’
absolute and relative human capital within the household will expand the options avail-
able and give them greater ability to negotiate for their most preferred one. At the
conversion factors stage, change in non-policy factors such as economic conditions and
prevailing attitudes can remove barriers to previously impossible options. An example
of this might be a structural change in the economy that makes a lot of previously bread-
winning fathers unemployed, but provides better opportunities for women to earn, thus
removing the practical obstacles to a female breadwinner household. However, what is
arguably more interesting is policy changes, as these are something over which the gov-
ernment has considerable control. An increase in the generosity and gender neutrality




Finally, this chapter will outline the direction in which the research will proceed from
here. The analysis is organised under two loose headings; continuity and change in
the household, and continuity and change in mothers’ labour force participation. This
section looks more specifically about the questions that the capability approach raises,
and the answers it might suggest. It concludes with a brief outline of the empirical
strategy.
The first question that will be addressed is that of capabilities in work and care options,
and how policy affects this. It will compare two cohorts of couples at an intra-household
level, to establish the link between relative resources and outcomes. This is important
because, although at an aggregate level women appear to be accumulating more and
more human capital, this has not necessarily translated into a stronger relative position
in the household. It is this relative position that is so important in securing some choice
over the division of work and care. However, it is also important to establish the extent
to which this has actually occurred; whether, if there is a difference in relative resources,
this has translated into changes in outcomes, through a potential expansion of the capa-
bility set.
The second question that will be addressed is that of the potential impact of policy
changes on mothers’ labour market activity. This will be assessed in two areas; whether
they are working more, and whether they are engaged in different types of work. The
capability approach means that a distinction is made between changes that have encour-
aged employment by offering mothers better opportunities, and those that have occurred
by making non-employment less attractive or impossible. Both types of influence have
the same effect, but they are not both capability enhancing, and are therefore not equally
desirable. Furthermore, employment itself is not necessarily a valued functioning, or
something that will enhance mothers’ capabilities; for example it may be badly paid or
dull. Again the emphasis is on the difference between the two cohorts with regard to
their capability set, and the extent to which they exercise choice in the labour market.
In order to answer these questions, data will be brought together on the differences
between the two cohorts with respect to their resources, preferences, outcomes and con-
version factors. The methodology chapter that follows this one will introduce the cohort
datasets that contain information on the first three of these items. Thereafter the policy
chapter will present the data on the differences in policy and other conversion factors
between the two cohorts. The analysis chapters will synthesise this information, and
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attempt to demonstrate the differences between the two cohorts with respect to their




This chapter will set out the empirical strategy that will be employed in the subsequent
chapters. It begins with a conceptual outline of the comparative method that will be
used, and how this will generate knowledge about the impact of policy on households.
It then discusses how this analytical framework will be represented statistically in the
analysis, and explains the models that will be used and how their results should be
substantively interpreted. It will then introduce and evaluate the data that will be used
to test these models.
4.1 Methodology
The main aim of this research is to say something about the impact of work-family rec-
onciliation policy, in a context of narrowing but persistent gender gaps in the workplace
and the home. My approach to this is to compare two cohorts of parents who experi-
enced a similar lifecourse stage on different sides of a policy discontinuity. The specific
characteristics, strengths and weaknesses of this data will be explored in the second
part of this chapter. This first part will outline and evaluate the comparative, quasi-
experimental approach, the statistical realisation of this framework, and the narrative
avenue that is pursued alongside it.
62
4.1.1 A comparative, quasi-experimental approach to understanding policy
The empirical strategy employed in this research takes a quasi-experimental approach
to understanding policy impact and making causal propositions about the link between
policy and household outcomes. In social research, true experiments – the random assig-
nation of participants to a treatment or control group – are held up as a ‘gold standard’
because the randomisation allows the elimination of rival explanations for any correla-
tions observed (Bryman 2004). If groups are randomly assigned, for example between
being exposed to a policy or not, the only possible systematic difference between them
is whether or not they have been exposed to this policy, and therefore any difference
between them can be attributed to this. However, opportunities to construct this kind
of experiment with policy are limited, for practical and ethical reasons. Thus, the ‘fall-
back position’ is a quasi-experimental design that approximates an experimental scenario
(Blaikie 2000).
The cross-national analyses of the impact of policy outlined in section 2.4 of Chapter 2
can be thought of as one type of quasi-, or natural, experiment; the exposure of a subset
of a population to some exogenous variation (Cameron and Trivedi 2005:54). Citizens
of the different countries are exposed to different policy environments, and the research
design aims to relate these differences to the outcomes of interest, whilst attempting to
replicate randomisation by controlling for other potentially relevant variables. However,
this approach has some limitations, primarily related to the difficulty of making cross-
cultural comparisons of a phenomenon such as the division of paid work and care, which
is itself driven to a large extent by cultural norms as well as more practical policy-driven
considerations such as maternity leave and state childcare support.
In light of these considerations, the comparison made here is between two cohorts of
British parents at different points in time. The parents are surveyed at approximately
the same age; 33 in the case of the older cohort, 34 in the case of the younger cohort.
However, the younger cohort had access to a much greater degree of government support
in reconciling their work and care responsibilities than the older cohort did at the same
age. In the interim period, a new government introduced a range of policies of much
greater scope and generosity than their predecessors. Therefore there is one cohort – the
younger – that has been ‘exposed’ to these policies, and another that has in effect not
been exposed to these policies, as there was very little of such provision for them at the
same age. Thus, a natural experiment can be exploited here. The detailed examination
of these different policy eras is the subject of the next chapter.
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Despite the elimination of cross-country differences between the two groups, and despite
the fact that they are the same age, there may still be systematic differences between
them. If two cohorts are studied at the same age, there are two potential, and necessarily
conflated, sources of difference between them; one is the ‘period effect’ – the influence of
that particular period in time – and the other is the ‘cohort effect’ – the influence of being
a member of that particular cohort (Glenn 1977). In this analysis, it is the period effect
that is of interest, as this contains the impact of the prevailing policy environment, but
attempts to understand it are frustrated by the existence of a cohort effect that is difficult
to isolate statistically because it cannot be operationalised as a separate variable. There
may be systematic differences between the characteristics of the two cohorts, which are
themselves related to the outcomes of interest. If these are not controlled for, their in-
fluence will be falsely attributed to the effect of policy. The theories outlined above
suggested several such relevant differences. For example, human capital theory posits a
positive relationship between the amount of education an individual receives and their
subsequent labour market value (and thus also their likelihood of participation). How-
ever, if mothers in the younger cohort are better educated, then they may have better
employment outcomes that have nothing to do with policy designed to facilitate their
employment. Therefore these differences need to be controlled for as far as possible, to
avoid policy ‘taking credit’ for change that it is not responsible for, although this can
never be perfectly achieved in practice.
Even if comparability can be achieved between the two cohorts, questions remain about
the extent to which a comparison of two snapshots can be anything other than a descrip-
tion of two points in time. The two cohorts are themselves two populations – everyone
born in two particular weeks – and formally, no statistical inference can be made beyond
these two populations. The extent to which the findings can be intuitively generalised
beyond these two weeks depends on an assumption that individuals born around the
same time are similar. This may be a safe enough assumption for those born in the
neighbouring weeks, but it is not clear how far this can be extended. Furthermore, it is
something of a leap of faith to use just two data points to draw conclusions about what
happened in the intervening period, or to extrapolate beyond this period. However, the
deductive nature of the research means that its conclusions are not driven by the data
and its potential idiosyncrasies. This research begins with a theoretical account of the
changes that should have occurred in the division of paid work and care, given existing
theories about its determinants and the way in which policy has developed, and then
establishes whether the differences between the cohorts are consistent with this account.
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4.1.2 The statistical approach
To ensure that differences are capturing policy effects and not differences in individual
characteristics, the latter need to be controlled for statistically. This will be accomplished
in this research using multiple regression models, which show the impact of the main
variable of interest – cohort membership – holding constant the other potentially impor-
tant differences between the cohorts, whilst also providing some additional interesting
information about the impact of these other factors on the outcomes of interest.
The only continuous dependent variable in the analysis is wage, which is investigated
in Chapter 8 in relation to the wage penalties experienced by mothers in the labour
market. Most of the outcomes with which this research is concerned are modelled as
binary variables; they are discrete states such as whether a mother is in work or not, and
whether she works full-time or part-time. The rationale for the selection of categorical
dependent variables is partly data-driven; some variables, such as the division of child-
care and partner’s work hours, are categorical in the datasets. However, for those that
are not, categorical operationalisation means that the analysis captures qualitative differ-
ences between types of household arrangement or labour market participation, and tries
to identify the factors that lead mothers down certain typical paths. The disadvantage of
this approach is that it does not capture the nuances in things like part-time work, which
can vary between almost full-time and very short hours, with different implications for
the balance of work and care in the household. The rationale for dependent variable se-
lection will be elaborated in the analytical chapters themselves, as the statistical models
are being presented.
Model form, evaluation and interpretation
For modelling wage, a linear, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model is employed
to estimate the effect of the independent variables on the dependent. This type of model
is so ubiquitous, and its usage so rare in this analysis, its specification will not be covered
in great detail here. To summarise, the model takes the form:
y = α + β1x1 + . . . + βnxn + ε
where
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y is the dependent variable
x1 . . . xn is a vector of covariates
β1 . . . βn are the corresponding coefficients
α is the model intercept
ε is the error term
The coefficient on an independent variable represents the amount of change in the de-
pendent variable resulting from a unit change in that independent variable, holding all
other independent variables constant.
If a dependent variable is binary, as most of them are in this analysis, the most appro-
priate type of regression model is a logistic regression model. There are several reasons
why an OLS model is not appropriate for binary variables (Pampel 2000). Firstly, it will
result in predicted values that cannot logically occur, because they are more than 1 or
less than zero. Secondly, the marginal effect of the independent variables will not be
linear across their whole distribution; their impact will be greatest around the middle
of the relationship, and smaller towards the extremes, forming an S-shaped curve rather
than a straight line. Thirdly, the effects of the independent variables are not additive, as
the impact of one will depend on the level of the others. These problems are overcome
by transforming the dependent variable into logged odds, or the logit:
logit(p) = ln
p
1 − p = α + β1x1 + . . . + βnxn
where
p is the predicted probability of the dependent variable taking the value 1
α represents the baseline odds of the outcome when all other covariates are zero
x1 . . . xn is a vector of covariates
β1 . . . βn are the corresponding coefficients
Taking the odds rather than the probability eliminates the floor of zero, while taking
the natural log of these odds eliminates the ceiling of 1. The resulting relationship
between the logit and the independent variables is now linear, and the coefficients on
the independent variables represent their additive effect on the dependent.
When interpreting the coefficients obtained from this type of model, they are usually
first of all exponentiated, in order to give their impact on the odds, rather than the
logged odds, as the former gives a more intuitive understanding of their effect. Once
exponentiated, the coefficients represent the multiplicative effect of the variable on the
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odds of the outcome; for example, a coefficient of 1.3 indicates that a one unit increase in
the independent variable increases the odds of the dependent variable taking the value
1 by 1.3 times. An alternative way to express this is as a percentage change in the odds,
calculated in this way:
%∆ = (eb − 1) ∗ 100 = (1.3 − 1) ∗ 100 = .3 ∗ 100 = 30%
In other words, a coefficient of 1.3 means that a one unit increase in the variable increases
the odds of the dependent variable taking the value 1 by 30%. Any coefficient higher
than 1 represents an increase, while coefficients less than 1 represent a decrease in the
odds. Thus, if the obtained coefficient were 0.8, the percentage decrease would be:
%∆ = (1 − eb) ∗ 100 = (1 − 0.8) ∗ 100 = .2 ∗ 100 = 20%
Therefore, a coefficient of 0.8 means that a one unit increase in the variable decreases the
odds by 20%.
In the models estimated here, the most important independent variable is the one repre-
senting whether the individual belongs to the older cohort or the younger cohort. This
variable indicates the impact of cohort membership on the odds of key employment out-
comes such as whether a mother is in employment. This effect encapsulates the impact
of policy on maternal employment, alongside other environmental influences, plus any
individual-level differences between the two cohorts that have not been controlled for
in the model. These individual-level differences are controlled for as far as possible by
including a range of other theoretically important influences on maternal employment.
Although the primary function of these variables is to act as controls, the coefficients on
them can also say something interesting about the theoretical perspectives that prompted
their inclusion. For example, the human capital perspective suggests the importance of
controlling for education; the coefficient on this variable will indicate the impact that
education has on maternal employment.
There are a number of ways to judge the statistical significance of the results, both of the
overall model and the individual coefficients themselves. Measures of model fit indicate
how well the statistical model, and therefore the underlying theoretical framework in-
forming its specification, explains the patterns observed in the data. The starting point
in evaluating this is the log-likelihood value, which “reflects the likelihood that the data
would be observed given the parameter estimates.” (Pampel 2000:45). It is expressed as
a negative number; the further it is from zero, the less likely and therefore the worse the
model. However, its absolute value is not particularly meaningful; it is most meaning-
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fully interpreted when the log-likelihood value from the model is compared with that of
an intercept-only model. A chi square test determines whether the difference between
these two values is statistically significant; if it is, the null hypothesis that the coefficients
are all zero can be rejected (Menard 1995:21). This is roughly analogous to the F test in
an ordinary least squares regression, albeit calculated in a different way. A crude ana-
logue to the the R-squared statistic in OLS regression can also be constructed, although
it does not represent the proportion of variance explained and cannot be interpreted
in this way. In logistic regression, this ‘pseudo’ R-squared represents the proportional
reduction in log-likelihood than can be attributed to the independent variables. Thus
it ranges from zero, which would suggest that the model has no predictive power, to 1
if the model perfectly predicts the dependent variable (Menard 1995:22), and therefore
provides some indication of the quality of the model within a clear scale.
There are two ways to establish the significance of the individual coefficients within
the model. One is to conduct a log-likelihood test of the kind outlined above for each
variable, to see whether its inclusion creates a statistically significant difference in log-
likelihoods. A much quicker but less reliable method is to use a Wald test, which eval-
uates significance on the basis of the size of a coefficient relative to its standard error
(Pampel 2000:30). However, because standard errors for large coefficients may be very
large, this is likely to result in some ‘false negatives’; i.e. the acceptance of the null
when it is in fact false (Menard 1995:39). In this analysis, where the significance of the
coefficient is of central importance – for example in judging whether the impact of co-
hort membership is significant or not – a likelihood ratio test will be used. However, as
it would be extremely long-winded and time consuming to do this for every variable,
Wald tests are used where the significance of variables is not of central importance, as
their inclusion is primarily for control purposes.
Evaluating these models
The statistical models used here have two main weaknesses. The first is that they are not
the most effective type of model at controlling for individual heterogeneity. This is poten-
tially quite an important issue in this case, as there are many unobservable, individual-
level differences that are likely to make a difference to employment outcomes; intangible
factors, such as orientations to work and family, and innate abilities and talents. A
fixed-effects model could control for this by taking observations from the same person
over time, and including a person-specific dummy to capture these intrinsic differences
between individuals. Some studies have done this, using panel data with outcomes
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recorded over a number of years (e.g. Budig and England 2001; Avellar and Smock
2003). However, the logic of the empirical analysis being undertaken here is that the
outcomes are not observed over time, but at specific points in time, chosen because they
correspond to particular policy environments. Thus, the datasets cannot be reduced to
‘person-years’ as fixed-effects techniques require.
The second problem with straightforward logistic regression models is that they only
go part of the way to addressing the potential endogeneity and selection bias that inter-
feres with attempts to understand the true difference between the two cohorts. In this
research problem, there is potential selection into motherhood that may bias estimates
of the effect of motherhood. The analysis compares mothers with non-mothers, and em-
ployed mothers with stay at home mothers. However, these groups are not randomly
selected; certain factors make selection into motherhood more or less likely, and these
things are in addition likely to be associated with the very employment outcomes un-
der consideration. For example, women who become mothers may be less employment
orientated than those who do not, and would perhaps have been in lower status jobs
even if they had not had children. Therefore, to attribute the entirety of any status gap
to motherhood would be to overstate the impact of motherhood. However, typical sta-
tistical procedures to correct for selection bias are difficult to implement. For example
it is not clear what the ‘instrument’ might be in a Heckman selection model (Heckman
1979); it seems unlikely that anything correlated with the explanatory variables will be
uncorrelated with employment outcomes.
A related issue is around the direction of causality that is assumed in the models used
here, which designate at the outset a dependent variable and a set of explanatory vari-
ables. Although maternal employment outcomes are taken here as the outcomes of
interest, there may well be a degree of simultaneity or even reverse causality in their de-
termination with other family formation and division of labour decisions. The analysis
here does not untangle this issue of temporal ordering, or attempt to model outcomes as
simultaneous; this is perhaps something that would merit further investigation.
4.1.3 Using narrative
In addition to the statistical models presented above, the analysis attempts to take the
novel additional step of using the data in a more qualitative way, by constructing life
histories from individual cases. These stories are used to illustrate the linkages between
the concepts that the theoretical framework has proposed, and to help understand the
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impact of policy on individual families and how this depends on their particular circum-
stances. Although the results of this analysis come from the statistical models, the cases
are central to the development of the theoretical framework, the selection of variables in
the statistical models, and the interpretation of the results obtained.
Rationale
The idea of focussing in on individual cases in large datasets was pioneered by Singer et
al (1998), who used a large quantitative dataset to construct life histories about selected
respondents within it. They wanted to see whether individuals in different mental health
types experienced commonalities in their paths through life and the major events within
it, and whether the types could be statistically distinguished on this basis. The anal-
ysis here does not go as far as this final step, but it does involve selecting mothers in
different types of families and seeing whether they experience common sets of factors
that lead them towards their position at the time at which they were sampled. A similar
approach is taken by Bynner et al (1997) who, having identified links between economic
outcomes and other lifecourse events at the aggregate level, use individual ‘portraits’
from the dataset to illustrate how these paths through life operate in practice. Bynner et
al (1997) use the same cohort study data that is used in this research. These datasets are
particularly conducive to this type of analysis, as they allow the researcher to tell a very
detailed story about individuals’ life trajectories, including the order in which the events
occurred and their location within a specific historical context (Elliott 2008).
Three elements of Singer et al’s (1998) rationale for case-level analysis seemed particu-
larly potentially fruitful, and relevant to the issue at hand here. The first was the ability
to see the bigger picture; by taking the case as the level of analysis, lives can be exam-
ined as a whole, potentially in great detail. This is relevant to mothers’ employment
outcomes, which are influenced by a range of past and present, interacting, factors. Sec-
ondly, case-level analysis illuminates linkages between concepts at the individual level,
not just the aggregate, to show that the linkages identified in quantitative analysis are
relevant to people’s experiences. Thirdly, they allow the researcher to move away, even
temporarily, from a story about the world that emphasises the average, and constructs
individual variation as fluctuation around the norm.
The case analysis operates as a sideline to the main empirical work, which is constituted
by the statistical models outlined above. Ultimately, the aim of the research is to draw
broad, generalisable conclusions about the impact of policy on mothers as a whole.
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However, the aim of using the case studies is to illustrate this impact in a more intuitive
way than reporting the relevant odds ratio, and to consider the heterogeneity of this
impact that the regression model cannot capture. The cases are used a priori to aid
the formation of hypotheses about potential policy effects (Chapters 6 to 8), and post
hoc to interpret the results and suggest the impact of any future change (Chapter 9).
They are used as a testing ground for the way that the theoretical framework in Chapter
3 conceptualises individual behaviour and the way it responds to policy. Indeed, this
longitudinal, individual-level analysis gets closer to identifying the capability set itself
than the quantitative analysis can.
Another option, rather than using real cases, might have been to invent some typical
cases, as Joshi et al (1996) do. However, the aim of using case studies was precisely
to show idiosyncrasy rather than iron it out. It is these exceptions that make the life
histories interesting; the mother in a male dominated field, a higher earning mother
who adopts a homemaker role, or the different impact of the first and second children.
Understanding the exceptions as well as the rules is part of the value that case analysis
adds to the overall analysis; that the cases ultimately still related well to the overall
theoretical framework squared this circle in a satisfying way.
Taking a more qualitative approach to a quantitative data augments the basic quantitative
paradigm in some ways. Quantitative research typically seeks explanations of phenom-
ena that are incomplete but widely generalisable. Analysing cases at the individual level
allows room for telling a story of a complexity that a statistical model cannot possibly
capture. It brings an idiographic element to research that is primarily nomothetic, whilst
still ultimately providing these generalisable answers to the research questions. How-
ever, the nature of the construction of the stories means that the underlying research
paradigm is not really challenged. The fact that the instrument of data collection re-
mains the same means that the underlying approach of the objective measurement of
pre-selected concepts to test theoretically-derived hypotheses remains unchanged. The
stories constructed from the data can never be true narratives because the researcher
decides what information is important and what it means, rather than the respondent
themselves. A chain of events exists on paper, but lacks the evaluation or summing up
that might be expected from a narrative (Elliott 2005).
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The cases
Case selection in this analysis was partly driven by a few key variables, and within
this at random. Like the other studies mentioned here, case selection begins with the
identification of theoretically important ‘types’, within which cases are chosen. In this
case, most couples fall into one of three earning types: both full-time; father full-time
and mother part-time; and father full-time, mother at home. Thus, mothers were selected
who were either in full-time employment, in part-time employment, or stay at home
mothers, and who had a partner who worked full-time.
Cases are also chosen on the basis that they are average with respect to the household’s
income and family size, in order to make them broadly comparable, on the basis that
families that are particularly large, rich or poor will have a different set of requirements
and constraints to the average family. The other requirement in the case studies is that
they have a good, complete set of data from throughout the lifecourse, in order to tell the
detailed stories that are the aim of the exercise. Within these criteria, cases were chosen at
random. Figure 4.1 gives a brief biography of each of the cases chosen. Psuedonyms have
been assigned to each case in order to more easily refer to them during the discussion in
the ensuing chapters.
4.2 Data
The second part of this chapter looks at the data that will be used in the statistical models,
and from which the case studies will be selected. It begins with a brief summary of some
key facts and figures, before establishing the relevance of the cohorts to the policy eras
of interest, and the suitability of the variables for the research questions and theoretical
framework proposed. It will outline the relevant content in the datasets under the main
themes identified in the previous chapter as theoretically important, considering the
strengths and weaknesses of the data available. It will also explain the manipulations
that have been carried out on the basic data to produce any author-derived variables
that will be used in the models. This evaluation and transparency is important in order
to demonstrate that the variables constitute valid indicators of the theoretical concepts,



































4.2.1 The British Birth Cohort Studies: vital statistics
The empirical analysis undertaken here is based on the data from two surveys, one of
which has followed a cohort of respondents born in 1958, and another that has followed a
cohort born in 1970. The National Child Development Study initially surveyed all babies
born in a particular week in 1958, and this group has been surveyed eight times since
then. The British Cohort Study surveyed all babies born in a particular week in 1970,
and this group has been surveyed seven times since then. Data was initially collected
principally from the cohort member’s main carer, along with additional information
from medical or educational professionals. Since the cohort members became adults,
the data has primarily been collected through interviews with the respondents, either by
telephone or in person.
In talking about the data and the resulting analysis, several terms are used interchange-
ably to differentiate and draw comparisons between the two cohorts. The respondents
from the 1958 National Child Development Survey are referred to as the older cohort,
or the NCDS respondents, or are referred to by their birth year or the year in which
they were sampled (1991). Similarly, the 1970 British Cohort Study are referred to as the
younger cohort, the BCS respondents, and the respondents born in 1970 and sampled in
2004.
Both surveys began with a target sample of around 17000 children. Inevitably there has
been some dropout over the years; table A.1 shows the sample sizes at each sweep for
both surveys. However, the sample sizes remain quite large; what is most relevant to the
results is the nature of the data that is missing, as this is where bias can be introduced
into estimates. The issue is not simply with unit non-response – those who drop out
of the survey altogether – but also item non-response within surveys. With multiple
regression analysis, missing data for a single variable within a case will result in the
elimination of that entire case if standard casewise deletion is used, as it is here.
The impact that this has on the model estimates depends on the extent to which this
non-response is correlated with other things. Data is said to be ‘missing completely at
random’ (MCAR) if missing values are distributed randomly through the data matrix;
this is highly unlikely in a social survey. As far as the datasets used in this analysis
are concerned, the data is not MCAR. Hawkes and Plewis (2006) find that drop-out
in the NCDS is systematically associated with being male, less educated, in less stable
employment and more disadvantaged. No similar analysis exists for the BCS, but the
situation is plausibly the same.
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Data ‘missing at random’ (MAR) can be correlated with other variables, but not with the
score on the variable itself: “The missing data for a variable are MAR if the likelihood
of missing data on the variable is not related to the participant’s score on the variable,
after controlling for other variables in the study.” (Acock 2005:1014). Thus, for example, a
missing value on a respondent’s educational level might be correlated with their sex, but
within each sex this missingness is not correlated with the respondent’s level of educa-
tion itself. If the data is missing in this way, and missing cases are simply dropped, then
coefficient estimates will be biased – they will not reflect true population parameters,
as the analytical sample will be systematically different from this population. Multiple
imputation methods can be used to correct for this if the data really is MAR, however
their complexity meant that they are not attempted in this analysis; this is an avenue for
future work to test the strength of the conclusions stated here.
Data may not be MAR in reality; to follow on with the above example, those with less
education might be less likely to answer a question about their educational attainment.
Thus the non-response is correlated with the level of the variable and the data are not
MAR. This is impossible to prove either way with observational data, as the true value
of the variable is by definition unknown if it is not recorded. The researcher can only go
on assumptions about the nature of the missingness mechanism and try to correct for it.
4.2.2 Variables
The content of the datasets is highly relevant to the substantive area of the research.
The data collected is general purpose social survey data on a range of aspects, but it is
specific enough to contain a range of relevant variables. It will become clear from the
ensuing discussion that the datasets were not perfect, and lacked some useful variables
for the best possible hypothesis testing. However, this disadvantage is outweighed by
the advantages of what is there; a vast resource, much larger than anything that could
possibly be collected within the scope of this research, which is a good match with the
required variables.
Dale et al (1988) caution that prior to embarking on secondary analysis, the researcher
needs to consider the rationale for the collection of the intended data, and the under-
lying theoretical framework and substantive priorities that informed its genesis. Data
may have been intended to research a particular subject or explore a particular hypoth-
esis, and its transferability to other research questions may be limited if this is the case.
Both of the datasets used here began life as surveys designed to investigate the causes
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of perinatal mortality, and their early focus is on health issues and outcomes. Therefore,
the earlier sweeps of the studies, especially the NCDS, have a huge amount of detail on
health that is irrelevant to the analysis here, and a lack of socioeconomic information
about the households into which the children were born. However, the more general, so-
ciological rationale was present from the start, and the amount of data collected on these
types of variables increased over the life of the survey. In addition to their use as tools to
investigate perinatal mortality, they were intended to be used more generally “to study
the educational, behavioural, emotional, social, and physical development of a large and
representative group of British children” (Shepherd 1995:3). They have developed into
studies that allow the investigation of all these aspects well into the respondents’ adults
lives.
Perhaps the most robust indicator for the suitability of the data for the research questions
under consideration here is the considerable amount of similar work that the datasets
have facilitated. There are several studies using the cohort studies to examine issues of
gender wage and employment gaps (Dex et al 2008; Joshi et al 1996) and the penalty to
motherhood (Waldfogel 1995; Elliott et al 2001), and comparing the two cohorts in this
respect (Makepeace et al 2004; Joshi et al 2007). Most of these studies are, as this one is,
predominantly interested in the cohort members’ early thirties and the period leading
up to this, and make use of the rich employment history data to understand mothers’
trajectories. These employment variables are the outcomes of interest in this research.
Furthermore, the information available on the respondents’ partners makes it possible to
say something about gender gaps at the intra-household level as well as aggregate level
gaps.
Information on outcomes
This research examines a number of outcomes – employment, wage and the division of
household work – over the course of the analysis. Although the datasets contain all of
this information, there are two issues with the available data that need to be considered.
One is the rather inelegant way in which the information about household division of
labour is necessarily expressed given the limitations of the variables. The other is the
amount of missing data on the wage variable, and the complexity of trying to correct for
this.
Although the datasets contain some information about the employment of the respon-
dent’s partner, the cohort member is not asked exactly how many hours per week their
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partner works. Therefore, although the data can say, for example, whether a household
is a dual-full-time couple, or a male breadwinner couple, it cannot be any more specific
than this. It cannot distinguish between a couple who both work 35 hours per week, and
another in which the mother works 30 hours per week and the father works 50. Both of
these would be classified as dual-full-time, despite the conceptual differences between
them; the former arrangement suggests some commitment to egalitarianism, the latter
to a more specialised division of labour.
The information on the division of household tasks suffers from a similar imprecision,
as it covers only a finite number of tasks and is measured only in four categories. The
questions ask who performs the majority of a particular task, and the possible responses
are ‘the cohort member’, ‘their partner’, ‘shared equally’ or ‘someone else’. This does
not allow for any distinction between a situation in which one partner does marginally
more, and one in which one partner does everything. Furthermore, due to the relatively
limited number of questions (3 childcare questions and 6 non-childcare questions) no
comprehensive overview of task sharing is possible, although the questions that are
asked cover what would appear to be the vast majority of household tasks.
Both of these issues have implications for measurement validity. They force the analyst
to draw an arbitrary distinction between couples who are potentially quite similar, and
conversely to group together couples who are not, thus exaggerating difference and
underplaying variety. There therefore is a limit to which the available detail makes it
possible to map the data onto the complex theoretical framework on which the analysis
is based.
The lack of data on partner’s hours means that there is no way of making an intra-
household comparison of hourly wage, which removes a potentially interesting avenue
of enquiry. In this analysis, hourly wage is examined at the aggregate level, comparing
mothers with fathers and childless men and women. It is also used in models of division
of household labour as an indicator of household resources and the relative financial
contribution made by each partner. There is a considerable amount of data missing
on wage; it is missing by definition for those not employed, but even among those
known to be in full-time or part-time employment the wage data is missing in 17% of
cases. Rather than lose all of these cases, a simple imputation procedure is used here
to estimate the wage for those without any data. Following the approach of Joshi et
al (1996), existing wage data is regressed against a set of key explanatory variables,
and the resulting coefficients used to predict wage where the wage is absent but the
explanatories are not. Where possible, a variable indicating the amount of full-time
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employment experience was included as a predictor, but as not all cases included this
information, another regression was run without it to give coefficients for these cases. In
this analysis, real wage data is used where present, and an imputed value is used where
it is not. The resulting partially imputed variable has a mean very similar to the real
wage variable; £4.84, compared with £4.95 for those with data present. Almost all cases
contain some wage data in the imputed variable.1
The problem with this approach is that it gives a false impression of statistical power. The
number of cases with data has been increased, but any model will treat the variable as if
this data has been collected from the respondent, and thus overestimate its precision and
underestimate its standard error. Rather than a single imputation procedure, multiple
imputation should be used to correct for this (Acock 2005:1019), however as mentioned
above this is not something that has been attempted here due to its complexity. These
potentially underestimated standard errors mean that the significance of the coefficients
on these wage variables needs to be viewed with some caution, as there may well be
some false positives. However, this method does reduce the need for casewise deletion,
and the bias in coefficient estimates associated with this.
Outcomes are only one side of the regression model; the datasets also contain consider-
able amounts of information on the side of the independent variables. Chapter 3 outlined
the three main ‘right hand side’ elements; inputs, conversion factors and preferences. In
this analysis, conversion factors are represented by cohort membership; each era repre-
sents a particular set of conditions under which families are balancing work and care,
and which will make it easier or harder for them to do so. Inputs are operationalised
as the indicators of the relative and total household human capital and resources, while
preferences are operationalised by attitudinal variables. The next two sections discuss
inputs and preferences in turn.
Information on inputs
The theoretical framework conceptualises the relevant inputs as the resources that give
a couple options around the division of work and care, with more resources assumed
to enhance capabilities. The analysis makes use of the data on the cohort member’s po-
tential and actual earning power, and that of their partner, in order to represent the size
of this set of options. This information on relative resources also says something about
1Some senstivity analysis, in order to establish the potential bias of using these imputed variables, is not
attempted here but would be an important step in any future analysis.
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the relative bargaining power within the household, and the ability of each partner to
bargain for their preferred outcome. These ideas are operationalised using variables rep-
resenting the human capital factors that endow earning power, and the de facto absolute
and relative situation with regard to job status and remuneration.
The datasets contain extensive information on the ‘schooling, experience and earnings’
with which human capital perspectives are concerned, for the cohort member at least
if not their partner. Their educational attainments are recorded from the earliest age,
and there is potential to go into great depth about the subjects they studied and the
grades they received in each. This is somewhat beyond the scope of this analysis, which
focusses only on the length of time that the cohort member was in school, and the
highest qualification they obtained. For partners, the only such information is the age at
which they left full-time education, which can only be assumed to proxy their eventual
qualifications gained. The analysis also makes use of the information on the cumulative
experience of the cohort members, as it can be used to determine the length of time since
the age of 16 that they have spent in various economic states. Thus, full-time employment
has the highest potential return, whilst periods of part-time employment, unemployment
or family care may have a negative impact. However, this data is complete on the month-
by-month level for just over half of the respondents, due to non-response at previous
sweeps, missing spells, or spells of an indeterminate type. Therefore it is not used as a
variable in itself, but in the calculation of the wage variable, as detailed above.
Some retrospective data on employment history is available for NCDS partners, but there
is no employment experience information available for partners in the BCS, so this di-
mension cannot be added to the analysis. Data on partner’s employment history could
potentially be constructed using information from previous sweeps, but a complete his-
tory would require them to have spent their entire adulthood with the cohort mem-
ber, which is unlikely. Therefore, only contemporaneous information about partners’
employment is included. Much of the contemporaneous information about the cohort
member’s job is available for their partner; the exceptions are hours worked and sector
of employment. As far as education is concerned, the data also lacks detailed indicators
of partner’s attainment; the only information is an indication, in age bands, of when they
left full-time education. This does not imply that they achieved a particular qualification,
and does not incorporate any vocational training and qualification, which may be highly
relevant to their current labour market position. Given this lack of employment history
and education data, key aspects of human capital, there is only a limited extent to which
the analysis can encapsulate partner’s human capital.
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Several key features of the respondent’s job, and that of their partner, are also included
in the analysis. The first is a measure of job status; where the respondent’s job is in the
labour market hierarchy. Although jobs in the highest category are not always the most
highly rewarded financially, there is on average a pay gradient across the classification,
and the status classification captures an element of skill, responsibility and commitment
that is perhaps hard to otherwise capture. The variable used in this analysis is the Na-
tional Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NS-SEC). Although other measures are
available in the datasets, such as the Registrar General’s Social Class (SC), and Socio-
Economic Group (SEG), these measures have all been superseded in official publications
by the NS-SEC since 2001. The rationale for doing so was to replace these old measures
not only with something more modern (SC has its roots in the nineteenth century), but
also with a more rigorous conceptual basis that drew on advances in thinking about
class and occupational hierarchy (Rose and O’Reilly 1998). NS-SEC brings in informa-
tion about the basis on which the individual is employed, in order to understand their
position in the power structures of the labour market, alongside considerations of sector
and size of occupation. The variable is available in the BCS dataset, and was created
manually for this analysis for the NCDS, using lookup tables available from the Office
for National Statistics.2
In addition to status, which captures level of responsibility to some extent, a specific indi-
cator of managerial responsibilities is also included. Both surveys ask about managerial
or supervisory responsibilities for both the respondent and their partner. However, this
variable needs to be interpreted with caution because, unlike most of the variables used
here which are asked in almost identical fashion, the question on managerial responsi-
bilities is not the same in the two surveys (see box below). The response categories are
not the same, although both could be recoded into a binary variable. However, the BCS
question seems to be more specific about the kind of activity about which it is seeking
information. It is perhaps for this reason that the data suggests greater managerial re-
sponsibility in the older cohort; this is contrary to contemporaneous Labour Force Survey
data, which suggests that 34 year olds in 2004 were more likely to have such responsibil-
ities than 33 year olds in 1991. This problem illustrates the difficulty in comparing two
cohorts twelve years apart; there will inevitably be some differences in the way some
concepts are measured, due to the progress of thinking in survey methodology, or the
competing priorities of those who fund and administer the surveys at different points in





Questions on managerial responsibility
NCDS: “Do you supervise other people’s work?", "If yes, how many?”
BCS: “Do you have any managerial duties, or are you supervising any other employees
(Manager/foreman or supervisor/not manager or supervisor)?"
A final relevant input is the contribution of nonwage income to the household finances,
and how this is split between partners, which affects the total and relative resource
distribution in the household respectively. This information is available to some extent
in the datasets. Respondents are asked about sources of state benefit and other income,
and whether this accrues solely to them, to their partner or to both. In the variables
used in this analysis, the respondent is allocated the total amount if it is paid only to
them, and half the amount if it is shared, and similarly for their partner. Thus it is
assumed that shared money is equally split; even if this is not a realistic assumption,
there is no information in the datasets on which to base any other distribution. In
addition to regular sources of nonwage income, data is also collected on savings and
investments, but there is no indication in the BCS data which partner these belong to, so
this information is not included.
As the analysis draws on information about both the cohort member and their partner, it
is worth considering the implications of treating both types of information as equivalent
for analytical purposes, when in fact they are not. Cohort members give the information
on themselves and on their partners, who may not even be present at the time of the
interview. Correct partner information relies on the cohort member knowing and re-
membering exactly what their partner does, their sources of wage and nonwage income,
and so forth. It is plausible therefore that this information will be less accurate than the
information on the cohort members themselves, and therefore there is some threat to
validity. However, the answers about partners are broadly in line with those collected
about cohort members themselves, suggesting that there is little systematic error. For
example, weekly pay among cohabiting male cohort members is £290.71, while for male
partners of cohabiting female cohort members it is £285.27.
Information on preferences
The theoretical framework stresses the importance of preferences as well as opportuni-
ties in understanding final outcomes. The datasets contain some indications of respon-
dents’ attitudes towards work-family issues. A variety of attitudinal questions are asked,
mostly in the format of a self-completion questionnaire administered after the main in-
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terview. In order to turn this large number of variables into a manageable representation
of attitudes, factor analysis was used to identify the main groups of variables. Some of
these groups have little obvious relevance to work-family issues and were omitted, such
as a number of variables on attitudes towards people of different races. The three rel-
evant groups were: one group on general attitudes to family morality (example: “it is
alright to have children without being married); another on attitudes towards working
motherhood (example: “pre-school children suffer if their mother works”); and a third
on personal orientations towards employment (example: “having any job is better than
being unemployed”). Rather than include all the variables individually, which would
cause severe multicollinearity, a single variable was created for each group, weighting
the constituent variables by the factor loading scores obtained in the factor analysis.
There are three main issues to consider with the attitudinal data. The first is that the
views solicited are in the abstract, and are not necessarily the same as what a person
feels is right for their own household. For example, someone may feel it is perfectly fine
for mothers with young children to work, but prefer not to do so themselves. If this
discrepancy is widespread, then the attitudinal data here will not necessarily be a useful
explanatory variable for household outcomes. The second issue is that the attitudinal
variables do not all come from the sweep taken at age 33 or 34; some relevant questions
were not asked here, and have had to be taken from earlier or subsequent sweeps. Al-
though this allows for the inclusion of such variables, the validity of this action relies
on the assumption that attitudes do not vary over time. This may not be the case, as
people’s perspectives may adapt in response to new family formation events. Thirdly,
the datasets do not contain information on the attitudes of the cohort member’s partner.
Therefore, they can only partially illuminate the path from capabilities to outcomes, as
the decision-making process is conceptualised as a complex bargaining problem with
competing interests, but this cannot be operationalised here.
4.3 Ethics
There are few ethical issues involved in the analysis of secondary data, as far as impact
on respondents is concerned. The data used in this analysis has been collected with the
informed consent of the participants, and ethical considerations surrounding appropri-
ate content have been made before the collection stage. Analysing the resulting data
does not further impact the respondents, especially as the size of the dataset and its
anonymisation makes it impossible for the analyst to identify any particular case in the
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dataset. Even though some case-level analysis is undertaken in this research, no case
is linked to any geographical location smaller than one of the 11 government regions,
and the fact that they are chosen because they are average makes them even harder to
identify. Therefore, even though respondents have not explicitly given consent for their
data to be used in this way, there does not seem to be any ethical reason why it should
not.
Indeed, it is perhaps unethical not to analyse the data, so that the respondents have not
given their time and their stories for no reason. What is important, however, is that the
analysis of the data is rigorous and transparent, and that it is not manipulated or partially
revealed to tell a story that suits a particular agenda. Marsh (1982) argues that this is
why quantitative research must always be deductive; it must start with a clear theoretical
framework that is then operationalised, rather than an arbitrary selection of variables to
produce data-driven conclusions. It perhaps also entails avoiding potentially spurious
two-way associations by conducting a more complex statistical analysis that controls for
intervening variables, as suggested by the theoretical framework.
Summary
This chapter has moved from the theoretical discussion in the previous chapter to a prac-
tical exposition of how these concepts will be operationalised. It has outlined how the
theoretical framework becomes a statistical one, in which the building blocks of the the-
oretical framework are represented. The datasets that will be used here contain consid-
erable information at the individual or household level – the resources and preferences
– while the temporal difference between the two cohorts supplies the information on the
impact of external factors. The methodological approach is based on the presumption of
a clear distinction between two policy eras, and that parents in each era are experienc-
ing qualitatively different environment in which to reconcile work and care. The next




This research compares the reconciliation of work and care under two specific policy
eras. The era pertaining to the older cohort is that of the last Conservative government
(1979-1997). Although John Major was the Prime Minister the year this cohort were sam-
pled (1991), the prevailing policy environment is a direct legacy of Margaret Thatcher’s
government and the retrenchments of employment rights made during the 1980s. The
era pertaining to the younger cohort is that of New Labour under Tony Blair, which be-
gan in 1997. These two eras are characterised by strikingly different policy approaches
to the family and the state’s role in helping them to meet their responsibilities, and this
chapter will map out the key policies in each era.
The chapter begins with a little historical context of family policies in the United King-
dom, which takes the account up to the period just before the eras of interest, where
much of the relevant legislation has its origins. It then goes on to consider the Conserva-
tive era, which was characterised principally by a retrenchment of this legislation, before
considering the reforms that occurred during the New Labour era. The chapter also con-
siders the socio-economic conditions that accompanied these policy eras, as these also
have a potential economic role to play in influencing how families meet their work and
care needs. The policy mapping here draws mainly on secondary sources of information
about the policies, bringing in only selected primary sources. Thus, it is perhaps essen-
tially more of a literature review than policy research per se, but a full documentary
analysis of these policy reforms would be a considerable undertaking and beyond the
scope of this research.
It is first of all necessary to delineate the policy area of interest to this research. The
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research concerns itself with the way in which couples with children meet and divide
their earning and caring responsibilities. Policies can affect both sides of this balancing
act. Financial support to families can reduce the need to earn, giving them more time to
care. Child benefit and child tax credits might fall under this category, although the latter
may themselves be conditional on employment. On the side of caring responsibilities,
childcare provision can ease the care requirement on families, allowing them greater
opportunity to earn. Somewhere at the intersection of work and care are policies around
flexibility in the workplace, which can make it easier to fulfil both sets of responsibilities
without having to give up work completely. In reality there are a huge number of policies
that can affect family incomes and time availability, particularly the wider tax and benefit
system and the way it distributes resources towards or away from families with children.
However, in order to retain a manageable scope for this policy survey, the focus here is on
the types of policies described above; what might be termed work-family reconciliation
policies.
This analysis will map the relevant policy developments along a number of key dimen-
sions. Majchrzak (1984) suggests a number of salient features that should be considered
when documenting legislative history, which can be divided into three stages.1 The first
stage is to consider how policymakers perceive a social problem; why and how they de-
fine it as a problem, and their assumptions about its cause and the ‘best’ way to solve it.
The next step is to consider how they approached solving it; where the policy came from
– the departments and individuals involved – and the mechanisms chosen, along with
the stated and probable latent purposes of the intervention. Finally, policies occurring
in the past can be assessed on the effect they have had on people and groups, and their
success or failure to achieve the intended aims, as well as the unintended impact they
have had. These elements will all be considered in the discussion of the policy eras be-
low, to aid subsequent discussion of the actual intended and unintended consequences
of the policies on the two cohorts.
5.1 Legacy
The development of work-family reconciliation policies in the UK should be understood
in the context of the institutional history of the UK welfare state and the enduring po-
litical culture that has been established. The UK welfare state is rooted in certain key
principles that have persisted regardless of who is in power. Kamerman and Kahn (1997)
1This tripartite distinction is not made by Majchrzak.
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identify these as: a laissez-faire, liberal attitude to expenditure and intervention; the
Protestant ethic; the spirit of the Poor Law, with its distinction between deserving and
undeserving and its emphasis on personal and behavioural aspects of social problems
rather than inadequacies of policies, institutions or the economy; and a bias towards the
traditional family, with a reluctance to take on its responsibilities. It will be shown in
this chapter that these themes have recurred over the last century and persist to this day.
Furthermore, there is a gendered aspect, with persistent assumptions about women’s
roles that have relegated them to second class citizens in the eyes of the welfare state.
Women have historically been assumed economically dependent on a male relative, and
morally inferior (Woodward 2006).
Certain assumptions about gender roles and deservingness, established in the very be-
ginnings of the welfare state, have shown great tenacity. The policymakers that drew up
the ‘new’ poor law in 1834 assumed that all families were headed by a male breadwin-
ner and a female homemaker, and that the male breadwinner was capable of supporting
that family. This ignored the realities of industrial low pay, recurrent unemployment
and early death that characterised working class employment, and thus put dependent
women in a perilous situation (Thane 1978). Female dependency only extended as far
as married women; unmarried mothers had no right to sue the father of their child for
maintenance until 1844. Those unable to work were, by virtue of their destitution, enti-
tled to poor relief, but their status did not automatically exempt them from hard labour
in the workhouse.
The Poor Law system was replaced with a national insurance-based model in the early
20th century. This was universal in the sense that all workers contributed and received
the same level of assistance in the event of unemployment or sickness. However, for
women not in paid employment, the situation was remarkably similar to that under
the Poor Law. Those with contributing husbands were entitled to some benefits such
as a maternity grant, but were assumed otherwise to be taken care of. Those without
contributing husbands received varying levels of residual provision depending on their
perceived deservingness. The parliamentary debate at the time illustrates the prevailing
attitudes about who deserves and who does not:
In this Bill we are setting out to help those who are handicapped in life
through no fault of their own – widows and orphans and veterans of industry
who, having reached the confines of old age, are no longer able to maintain
themselves with the vigour of their prime. . . Our object is not to undermine
the self-respect and self-reliance of the people. . . Not only is it a contributory
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scheme but, as a matter of fact, it is not a complete scheme; that is to say,
the State intervention will not relieve even these recipients of the necessity of
making all other provision or effort. (excerpt from second reading of Widows’,
Orphans’, and Old-Age Contributory Pensions Act, 1925 in the house of Lords,
Hansard 28 July 1925)
The message was clear; citizenship, and the social rights that accompany it, are accrued
by virtue of labour market participation. A two tier system is created, whereby those
who contribute through social insurance can make far more claims on the welfare state
than those who claim as dependent, unpaid care workers (Orloff 1993). The ‘ideal citizen’
is the citizen who participates full time in paid work, and those who do not are less than
ideal, even if their labour force participation is constrained by factors beyond their con-
trol, such as a disproportionate burden of unpaid household work. The idea that women
might deserve special help from the welfare state by virtue of their role of mothers was
not entertained at this time. Early maternity provisions were aimed at reducing infant
mortality and protecting children from incompetent mothers. The Maternity and Child
Welfare Act 1918 established some child and maternal health services, but these were
mostly advice based, the implication being that women were mentally or intellectually,
rather than materially, incapable of raising children (Brown and Small 1985). Women
were compelled from 1895 to take four weeks’ maternity leave on the grounds of health
and safety, but this was uncompensated and held no guarantee that their job would be
available after this time, and Britain refused to ratify the 1919 ILO Convention on Mater-
nity that would give women the right to return to work and to maternity pay. Although
women with contributing husbands were entitled to access to some health care, specialist
maternity care was not available for free until the establishment of the National Health
Service.
The health and welfare services established after the war did introduce an element of
universality, but although all women benefited, inequalities between women, and be-
tween women and men, were reinforced by what remained a gendered, two-tier system.
Even the administrative structure reflected the idea of differential entitlements to social
rights, with the contributory scheme administered by the Ministry of National Insurance,
while the Ministry of National Assistance dealt with means-tested benefits and imple-
menting the ‘national minimum’ (Glennerster 2007). William Beveridge, in his vision for
the welfare state, had explicitly assumed a male breadwinner norm, predicting a female
labour force participation rate of just 1 in 8 (Beveridge 1942).
The new provisions represented a step forward for mothers in many respects. All women
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became entitled to free maternity care in 1948, and a family allowance in 1946. This was
a non-contributory benefit paid to the mother, although only for second and subsequent
children. Although this was a flat rate benefit, tax clawback meant that it was less valu-
able to taxpayers, and was in effect a redistribution from rich to poor families (Adam and
Brewer 2004). The fact that it was funded by tax and payable to non-working mothers
also meant that it was effectively a redistribution of family income from men to women
(Blackburn 1995). However, there was still a strong contributory element to mothers’
entitlements. Maternity grants were still only available to women who made national
insurance contributions, or whose husbands did. In 1948, contributing women also be-
came entitled to a maternity allowance for 13 weeks to replace earnings, which was
extended to 18 weeks in 1951 (Cohen 1988). However, along with this extension was
a tightening of the eligibility requirements, amid fears that women were claiming the
allowance and then not returning to work, and were therefore not in need of it (Brown
and Small 1985). This move away from universality meant that the 1952 ILO Convention
extending paid maternity leave to all working women, regardless of hours of work or
length of service, was not ratified by the UK. The tightening of the criteria also came at a
time when the number of nursery places was rapidly declining. After the war there had
been 62,000 nursery places, but two thirds of these had closed within twenty years (Co-
hen 1988). The government was reluctant to provide nursery places as a way of helping
women reconcile work and childbearing. Influenced by psychoanalytic theories about
the consequences of maternal deprivation (e.g. Bowlby 1951), nursery care was seen as
a corrective force against bad parenting but otherwise harmful for children under 5.
Policies aimed at helping women reconcile work and childbearing started to appear in
the 1970s, with the introduction of key labour market policies that gave mothers a more
equal footing in the labour market. The increase in female employment in the 1960s
was facilitated by a particularly high demand for labour during this period, which gave
women greater leverage to push their interests at work (Kiernan et al 1998). Both Labour
and the Conservatives began to demonstrate greater commitment to women’s rights. The
1970 Conservative manifesto pledged to remove sex discrimination in law, and the 1974
Labour manifesto went even further, promising equality in education and employment.
The Equal Pay Act was introduced by the Conservatives in 1970, when the moral case
for equal pay eventually defeated the government’s economic concerns about it. The
Sex Discrimination Act, introduced by Labour in 1975, gave further recourse for women
facing unequal treatment in the workplace.
The increasing female workforce had been agitating for statutory occupational maternity
provision, and the government was also under pressure in this area from the European
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Economic Community after joining in 1973 (Brown and Small 1985). This was introduced
by the Labour government through the Employment Protection Act 1975. After this
was implemented, all women with two years’ continuous employment were entitled to
return to work up to 29 weeks after confinement, provided they fulfilled certain notice
requirements. Despite having the right to an extended period of absence, the low level
of compensation meant that taking the full entitlement was dependent on being able to
afford the loss of income.
However, returning to work meant paying for childcare, as there was very little free
provision until the year before compulsory schooling. The government was reluctant to
provide childcare for young children, except as a corrective force against bad parenting.
This attitude was informed by the Plowden report (Central Advisory Council for Edu-
cation 1967), which had weighed up the evidence for and against nursery provision. It
concluded that, as far as children under 3 were concerned, government nursery provision
was for those with a “social handicap" (para 295), and it is “no business of the educa-
tional service to encourage" (para 330) mothers to work. It recommended that full time
nursery places should only be provided in exceptional circumstances, even if the child
can tolerate maternal separation without harm. Although more positive about nursery
education for 3 and 4 year olds, it recommended that even this should be on a part time
basis only. The 1972 White Paper Education: A Framework for Expansion reflected these
values, and in fact contained little commitment to expansion. It was envisaged that only
15% would be in full time care, and most of these would be those from socially disad-
vantaged or lone parent families. More ambitious targets were set for part time nursery
places – 50% of 3 year olds and 90% of four year olds – but these were not met (Cohen
1988).
5.2 Policy under the Conservatives, 1979-1990
After the gains of the mid-1970s, the period of Conservative government from 1979 was
one of retrenchment of these provisions. The New Right movement, of which Thatcher
was a part, had struck a chord with a public increasingly disillusioned by the inter-
ventionist consensus around the welfare state that had dominated the post-war period
(Lloyd 2002). This gave them a mandate to cut what had come before, the govern-
ment rolled back its responsibilities, expecting the family to take the strain (MacLean
2002). The government needed traditional nuclear families to exercise social control and
take care of their own dependants; any other type of family was therefore problematic
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(Kamerman and Kahn 1997). Moral hazard, the principle in economics that all insur-
ance policies create incentives to act less carefully, was extrapolated to a belief that the
safety net of the welfare state was causing irresponsible family behaviour. Furthermore,
removing the safety net was assumed to reverse this behaviour:
By enlarging the role of the State and diminishing the role of the individual,
they [Labour] have crippled the enterprise and effort on which a prosperous
country with improving social services depends...We want to work with the
grain of human nature, helping people to help themselves - and others. This
is the way to restore that self-reliance and self-confidence which are the ba-
sis of personal responsibility and national success. (1979 Conservative Party
Manifesto)
The outcome of this kind of ideology can be highly gendered, even though everything
is couched in gender neutral terms. The effective functioning of the public sphere – the
state and the market – depends on the maintenance of the private sphere through unpaid
care work. It did not matter to the Thatcher government who performed the child care,
as long as it was accomplished without any need for them to intervene. However, as
this type of labour is done predominantly by women, who arguably lack the power to
change this situation unaided, the status quo is perpetuated through the government’s
apparent gender blindness (Pascall 1997). It was inconsistent with a non-interventionist
approach to give mothers greater economic power within the household by helping them
back into work, or rewarding them for staying at home. Welfare state retrenchment was
selective; child benefits were frozen, while mortgage relief and tax subsidies on pensions
were increased (Pugh 1994). Thus earners, not carers, received financial help from the
government, reinforcing the gendered way in which these activities are divided.
The policy implications of this ideological environment was to push the balance of ma-
ternity rights back towards employers, amid fears that the legislation was placing an
unreasonable burden on employers, and in a general context of hostility to intervention
in the workings of the free market. The Employment Acts of 1980 and 1982 restricted
and complicated maternity rights. A woman was now only entitled to maternity leave if
a company had more than six employees, and had the right only to return to a “suitable
alternative", not her original job, with no automatic right to reduced hours (Kamerman
and Kahn 1997). The procedure for applying for maternity leave also became more
complex and bureaucratic for employees; women had to notify their employers on three
separate occasions of their intent to return, and provide a medial certificate with their
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baby’s due date (Cohen 1988).
Mothers who wanted to return to work still faced the problem of a lack of childcare,
and the government came under pressure to help families meet their childcare respon-
sibilities, although there was considerable disagreement on the form that this support
should take. While childcare experts such as Penelope Leach and Mia Kellmer-Pringle
argued for supported maternal care, organisations such as the Trades Union Congress
and the Equal Opportunities Commission argued that this was incompatible with pre-
vailing patterns of work, and pre-school childcare should be universally available (David
1982). However, the government resisted these calls and childcare remained limited; no
specific commitments were made to funding childcare places, and the idea of tax credits
or deductions for parents to spend on childcare was rejected on the grounds that this is
personal expenditure and ineligible for tax relief on principle (Cohen 1988). A similar
attitude was held towards parental leave, on which the government for a long time re-
sisted pressure from Europe, on the grounds that it was not an appropriate matter for
legislation (Kamerman and Kahn 1997).
The 1988 Maternity Rights Survey (McRae 1991) collected data from nearly 5000 women
with babies born in December 1987 or January 1988, and gives some idea of how mothers
experienced these provisions in practice. 53% of the mothers surveyed had been in work
during pregnancy, ranging from 74% of those having first child to 23% of those having
their third or subsequent. This shows how, by the end of the 1980s, the needs of working
mothers was far from a minority issue, and a world away from the 1 in 8 figure that
Beveridge had estimated. 60% of those who worked during pregnancy qualified, under
the continuous service and national insurance contribution conditions, for the ‘right to
reinstatement’ after 29 weeks of absence for pregnancy. Thus, a substantial minority
had no legal protection within that framework. This is important because while 28% of
employers surveyed said a non-qualifying woman could come back, 57% said it would
depend on the circumstances. Thus, women not meeting the conditions had a precarious
employment situation in the event of pregnancy. 72% of women with the right to return
did so, compared with 47% of those without. This suggests that the latter found it
harder, and found their requests denied by employers, although it is difficult to untangle
the direction of causality, as they may not have anticipated returning and therefore not
attempted to fulfil the criteria.
As far as maternity pay was concerned, 86% of those who appeared, on the basis of
the information requested from them in the survey, to fulfil the criteria for basic rate
Statutory Maternity Pay received it. For higher rate Statutory Maternity pay, the rate of
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receipt was slightly lower at 72%. Thus, implementation fell short of policy in practice,
although the majority of women received what they were entitled to. When asked what
they would improve, 26% of mothers who worked during pregnancy said they wanted
to improve the rights available to them, although most of these complaints were around
length of leave rather than extension of eligibility. The main issue arising was the lack
of childcare, with half saying they wanted improvements such as workplace crèches
and state provided childcare. This is perhaps unsurprising given the limited childcare
provision outlined above.
Although the results of this suggest a certain level of dissatisfaction among mothers,
this was not necessarily expressed at the ballot box. It was perhaps a lack of support
for mothers – along with a preoccupation with typically male issues such as war (in the
Falklands) – that meant that, although the Conservatives held on to power, the tradition-
ally stronger propensity for women to vote Conservative disappeared during the 1980s
(Norris 1996). However, nor were women seduced by Labour’s attempts to appeal to
potentially disillusioned women, by pledging in their 1983 manifesto to strengthen the
Equal Pay and Sex Discrimination Acts, and to reverse welfare cuts, as the party lost
female voters to the Liberal Democrats in that election.
5.3 Post-Thatcherite softening, 1990-1997
The period of Conservative rule under John Major, from 1990 onwards, was charac-
terised by continuity in a commitment to laissez-faire capitalism and labour market
deregulation. However, government policy began to display a tendency towards so-
cial conservatism that had not been there under Thatcher. A growing section of the
population could not adequately be supported by a system based on the assumption of
male-breadwinner sufficiency, whether due to divorce, single parenthood or low income.
The government’s response to this material problem was a moral one; to exhort a return
to traditional family forms through its ‘back to basics’ campaign, a more explicitly moral-
istic approach to family policy. The theme of family breakdown gained real prominence
at the 1993 Tory Party Conference, with the message picked up widely by senior party
figures and the tone of speeches explicitly moralistic (Lister 1996). The government’s
commitment to individual responsibility over state support was also illustrated by Ma-
jor’s brainchild, the Child Support Agency, which cost more to run than it collected and
illustrated the paradox of the need for interventionist policies to ensure the continua-
tion of a policy system based on laissez-faire ideals. The first problem with this ‘moral’
93
solution is that it did not work materially; the section below on socio-economic change
documents the rising levels of single parenthood, poverty and welfare dependency over
this period. The second issue is that it did not work politically, as the campaign was
discredited by revelations of sleaze and domestic scandals among senior Conservative
MPs, further weakening the party’s already diminished support (Lloyd 2002).
Other policy developments over this period included the reform of family taxation in
1990, which carried a mixed message about families and the balance of work and care.
The Conservatives had been talking about tax reform since 1981, with the Green Paper
The Taxation of Husband of Wife, and reform eventually occurred in 1990, with a switch to
individual taxation and the replacement of the Married Man’s Allowance with the Mar-
ried Couples’ Allowance. A move to individual taxation was a recognition of women’s
contribution to their family income and their right to their own tax free allowance, albeit
in the spirit of New Right individualism. The reform was also characterised by a degree
of social conservatism; the move to a couples’ allowance had practical impact only if a
wife’s earnings were higher than the single person’s allowance and her husband’s were
not, and married couples were also still advantaged over unmarried couples by around
£400 per year (Robinson and Stark 1988).
The limited developments that occurred in childcare policy were perhaps the beginning
of an acceptance of childcare as political as well as personal, although the nature of the
policy provisions reflected the prevailing moral climate of non-intervention and female
caregiving. The 1990 Finance Act granted tax exemptions to employers who provided
childcare facilities, but this left the existence of this care up to the supply side rather
than the demand, and did not put any obligation on the government to increase state
provision. The government was prepared to make some investment in after school care;
around £45 million in 1993, which created around 50,000 places (Kiernan et al 1998).
However, this limited provision served to reinforce the idea that it was not the govern-
ment’s job to help women with preschool children into the labour market.
Unlike Thatcher, Major appointed women to his own cabinet, including a female em-
ployment secretary, Gillian Shepherd, who set up a Women’s Issues Working Group.
However, this increased interest needs to be seen in the context of continued labour mar-
ket deregulation and the effect this had on women’s pay and conditions (Lister 1996).
The government did little to help the situation for working women, with no change to
maternity leave until the 1996 reforms under pressure from Europe. The Trade Union
Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993 implemented (in 1994) a directive that brought
UK provision up to a minimum European standard, giving all female employees a right
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to 14 weeks of unpaid leave, with qualifying employees still entitled to 29. However,
the government opted out of the Social Chapter, which would have further strengthened
mothers’ employment rights, and refused to implement a directive on parental leave.
Thus some extension of maternity provision did occur towards the end of the Conserva-
tives’ period in office, although they dragged their feet, refusing to extend any provision
to men or to increase maternity pay.
5.4 Policy under New Labour after 1997
The period of government under New Labour saw considerable expansion in support
for families. New Labour’s financial commitment to families was demonstrably higher
than that of their predecessors; the overall level of financial support to families increased
considerably after 1997. Average child-contingent support per child per week increased
from £24.13 in 1997 to £38.92 in 2006-7, and total spending on child-contingent support
was 61 per cent higher in 2006 than it was in 1997 (Daly 2011). The new system of tax
credits introduced in 1999, the Working Families’ Tax Credit, was more generous than
the Family Credit it replaced; the amount of support available was higher and phased
out more slowly with earnings, and formal childcare costs were met by an additional tax
credit that covered up to 70% of the cost (Brewer et al 2006).
Maternity leave was also extended, both in terms of the time available and through its
extension to more women, although maternity pay remained conditional on employment
history. New Labour inherited a dual system of maternity leave from the previous gov-
ernment, that combined a conditional entitlement to 29 weeks, which had existed since
1975, and a universal entitlement to 14 weeks, which was introduced in 1994 in order to
implement an EU directive. The first stage of reform was through the Employment Re-
lations Act 1999 and the Maternity and Parental Leave Regulations 1999, which unified
these provisions, setting out a more coherent framework that distinguished between dif-
ferent types of maternity leave. Some limited extension also occurred at this stage. The
universal component, now called Ordinary Maternity Leave (OML) was extended from
14 to 18 weeks, and the required service for the conditional leave, now called Additional
Maternity Leave (AML) was reduced from two years to one. The second stage of reform,
through the Employment Act 2002, extended both OML and AML to 26 weeks, with
the qualifying period for the latter reduced to 26 weeks. Thus qualifying women were
now entitled to a year’s leave, and a period of maternity pay that was also extended to
26 weeks. Although the amount of payment received still depended on a woman’s em-
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ployment history, the earnings threshold was abolished, and the flat rate payment was
increased from £60 to £100. A third stage of reform subsequently occurred for babies
born after 1st April 2007; all mothers became entitled to a year’s leave and the mater-
nity pay period, although still conditional, was extended to 39 weeks and the flat rate
payment increased to £123.
More innovative by UK standards was the introduction of parental and paternity leave.
The 1999 Employment Rights Act implemented the EU minimum provision, which is an
entitlement of both parents to thirteen weeks’ unpaid leave in the first five years of their
child’s life. Paternity leave was included in the 2002 Employment Act, and introduced in
2003, entitling qualifying fathers to two weeks’ leave at the birth of their child, compen-
sated at the same rate as the statutory maternity pay. The possible transference of care
responsibilities to men was novel in the UK, where there has long been not only an as-
sociation of fatherhood with breadwinning, but also a reluctance to undermine this role
in case it increases the number of fatherless, delinquent children reliant on state support
(Lewis 2002). However, the actual extent to which the new policies enabled fathers to
take on non-traditional roles remained limited under New Labour. Parental leave facil-
itates time with children on an ad-hoc rather than consistent basis, and the fact that it
is unpaid may make it unaffordable. Although paternity leave is compensated, the low
rate of benefit may make it unaffordable as well. However, even if fathers do make use
of it, the gender disparity between the amount of leave allocated to parents does little to
undermine a traditional division of labour.
Another innovation was the introduction of the right to request flexible working, such
as part-time hours or flexibility over start and finish times. The Work and Parents Task-
force was set up in 2001 by the then Department of Trade and Industry, with the job
of devising ‘light touch’ legislation that could help working families without imposing
too large a burden on businesses. The legislation reflects this compromise; it is not a
guaranteed right to flexible working, but the onus is on the employer to justify a refusal.
The Employment Act 2002 gives an employee the right to request changes to the hours,
timing or location of his employment in order to care for a child. However, there are
several grounds on which an employer can give a business case for refusal, such as the
burden of additional costs, an inability to re-organise work amongst existing staff, and a
detrimental impact on quality or performance.
On the other side of the work-care equation, support for childcare also increased, al-
though the situation remained far from one of universal access to good quality, afford-
able childcare. The government set out their strategy for childcare at the same time as
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their strategy for family policy reform, in the 1998 White Paper Meeting the Childcare
Challenge (Department for Education and Employment 1998). The emphasis was on fill-
ing the gaps and correcting the deficiencies in the market provision of care, rather than
directly providing childcare services. Deficiencies such as low quality childcare would be
addressed with more rigorous and consistent regulation and a new qualifications frame-
work for childcare professionals. Gaps were targeted from both the supply side, through
subsidies for nurseries, and the demand side, by giving parents money for childcare
through the tax credit system. A review of childcare provision in 2004 (HM Treasury
2004) renewed and reinforced the government’s commitment to this indirect investment
in childcare, pledging even more support through the tax credit system.
The manifest rationale for the legislative reform was set out in the 1998 Green Paper
Supporting Families. This promised an expansion in the level of material support to fami-
lies, and contained the genesis of some of the policy innovations that would follow, such
as a framework of rights on flexibility and working time, and improvement of part time
work conditions, and a proposal for parental leave. It was a pioneering document at
the time because it was the first ever explicit statement of family policy from a govern-
ment, setting out their beliefs about families and the issues they face, and crucially a
cross-departmental plan for addressing these issues. New Labour rejected the empha-
sis on the nuclear family of their predecessors. The foreword by then Home Secretary
Jack Straw sums up the government’s attitude, which was one of supporting families
regardless of whether they conformed to the nuclear family paradigm:
Government could not turn the clock back even if it wanted to do so. There
never was a golden age of the family. Family life has continually changed –
and changed for good reasons as well as bad. But what families – all families
– have the right to expect from government is support (Supporting Families,
p2) .
However, although there was a move away from an emphasis on the nuclear family,
that is not to say that New Labour’s strategy had no normative position on family life.
The Green Paper was clear; “Work offers the surest way for families to provide for
themselves” (p24). The strategy was predicated on getting mothers into work, by making
it practically easier, through extending maternity leave and flexible working provisions,
and financially less detrimental by offering tax credits conditional on a certain level
of employment, and more support for childcare. Thus, there was still an idea of the
deserving family – those working but struggling to meet their responsibilities – and the
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undeserving.
For the deserving, New Labour’s intentions represented a clear departure from their
predecessors in the extent to which the role of government is to redistribute towards
families, and what followed was, as detailed above, a substantial increase in state sup-
port for families. What had been seen as private by the Conservatives – arrangements
between employers and their employees, childcare arrangements – became legitimate tar-
gets of state intervention and support under New Labour. For example, the legitimacy
of government spending on childcare is asserted in a 2004 review of childcare provision:
Parents should not be expected to meet all the costs of high quality childcare
services. Government support for childcare is based on the principle of pro-
gressive universalism, with some support for all and most support for those
who need it most. Given that childcare benefits society as a whole, a modern
childcare system should ensure that parents are not prevented from accessing
high quality childcare provision on the grounds of cost. Availability of child-
care plays an important role in tackling disadvantage and child poverty, and
supporting social mobility and equality of opportunity (HM Treasury 2004,
p4).
Also novel in their strategy was an increased willingness to interfere in the operation
of the labour market, by mandating greater flexibility and longer leaves for mothers.
However, this departure from the laissez-faire was only a partial one, and there were
limits to the extent to which they were willing to put pressure on businesses, or mandate
what would represent a cultural discontinuity. This is ideologically consistent with the
principles of the Blairite, Third Way approach, but it is also for reasons of policy efficacy.
The White Paper Fairness at Work, which formed the basis for the first extension of work-
life reconciliation policies under the 1999 Employment Relations Act, argued that the law
cannot create a culture of family-friendliness, but only enhance it. The government were
also keen to stress the business and wider societal case for family-friendly employment
as well as the benefits for families; these rationales were promoted simultaneously and
seen as complementary (Lewis and Campbell 2007). Businesses can retain talent and
have a more productive workforce, while high maternal employment rates are desirable
because they boost economic growth and reduce the need for state support:
...employers can also benefit from having a more committed workforce, and
from being better able to retain and recruit parents. Society as a whole can
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also benefit, since a better balance between work and family should lead to
less reliance for care on the NHS and social services and fewer social prob-
lems such as truancy and marital breakdown (Supporting Families, p24).
One thing that family policy under New Labour had in common with the previous
era was the central role of pressure from the European level in driving forward work-
family policy. The goal of work-family reconciliation, with an emphasis on achieving
this by facilitating female employment through childcare rather than more traditional
options, became more integrated into the European Employment Strategy after 1998
(Lewis 2006). However, the European Employment Strategy is an example of ‘soft law’;
it is not binding like directives. This is perhaps why extensions in maternal and parental
leave, both directives, have been implemented, while childcare provision remains limited
by European standards (Leon 2009). The extension of employment rights through the
implementation of directives raises questions over the extent to which the government
sought to extend these rights on their own initiative, or whether they were given the
impetus to do so by external forces (Mair 2000).
The 2005 Maternity and Paternity Rights and Benefits Survey of Parents (Smeaton and
Marsh 2006) gives an idea of how mothers experienced the first stage of family policy
reform under New Labour. 75% of mothers had worked during pregnancy, and of these,
74% returned to work. If we compare this to the 1988 survey, the proportion of mothers
in employment is around 25 percentage points higher, but the proportion returning to
work is actually quite similar. In 1988, 72% of mothers with the right to return to work
did so. By 2005, all mothers who had been employees had this right, therefore the rate of
return is comparable. Maternity pay was still conditional on meeting certain criteria, but
the vast majority of mothers said they received some form of pay during their maternity
leave; only 10% said they received nothing at all.2 74% of mothers received maternity
pay for 26 weeks, but only half took only this much leave, suggesting that many mothers
took periods of unpaid as well as paid leave. 25% said they would have liked to receive
maternity pay for a longer period, and 28% cited financial strain as a key problem. The
limitations of the expansions in childcare were also evident, as this stood out as a key
concern, with issues raised about the availability, cost and quality of childcare available.
2It is difficult to compare this with the figures for 1988 because different questions were asked around




The development of these policies is bound up in a series of concurrent socio-economic
changes, and their discussion would be incomplete without some consideration of this
context. These changes had an impact on the development of the policy, which had to
change to reflect socio-economic change, albeit that it did so with some considerable time
lag. These policy changes in turn have an impact on the desirability of different work
and care reconciliation options for families, as policy and other social and economic
factors work to privilege some options over others. This research is more orientated
towards understanding the latter part of this equation; the impact of external factors on
household outcomes. However it is necessary to consider the behavioural and normative
changes that characterised the period under the Conservatives, and preceded and pro-
vided the impetus for the New Labour policy reforms. This section will consider these
trends, focusing in particular, where the available statistics allow, on the period between
1991 and 2004, as per the time frame of interest for this research.
As Chapter 1 documented, the second half of the twentieth century saw a steep increase
in female labour market participation (figure 1.1). It was not just childless women enter-
ing the labour market, but also mothers. In 1951, around 1 in 6 mothers were employed;
this had tripled by 2008 (Klett-Davies and Skaliotis 2009). Much of the change in this
respect had happened before the period of interest here; by 1992 maternal employment
among married or cohabiting mothers was 62%, and by 2004 it had increased by around
nine percentage points (Klett-Davies and Skaliotis 2009). Thus, much of the change took
place under a family policy model situated firmly within a male breadwinner paradigm,
with little support for second earners to reconcile work and care, and indeed a period of
active retrenchment of what had been in place.
Indeed, the assumption of nuclear families under Thatcher, and the active promotion
of them under Major, is at odds with the prevailing context of wider shifts in family
and morality. The second half of the twentieth century saw a rise in cohabitation and
births outside of marriage. Someone in the 25-29 age bracket getting married in the
early sixties was unlikely to have cohabited prior to this – just 4.6% of men and 7.7%
of women – but by the early nineties these figures were 66.3% of men and 71.3% of
women, and by the mid-2000s this had further increased to 72.7% and 78.0% (Beaujouan
and Ní Bhrolcháin 2011). Therefore premarital cohabitation was already the norm even
for the older cohort. Births outside of marriage also saw a steep increase, from 8.4%
in 1971 to just under a third in 1991 and nearly half in 2009 (Beaumont 2011). These
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activities, so rare in the 1950s, were not deviant behaviours by the end of the century.
Despite this, the Conservatives seemed to believe that the clock could be turned back
on family life, even as everything else in the world moved forward (Smart 1997). These
trends are what New Labour finally acknowledged in Supporting Families; that families
take different forms, that they are more likely than not to have more than one earner,
and that this is difficult for them to balance their responsibilities in a system that is not
set up for this type of family.
The rise of working motherhood coincided with an increase in earnings opportunities for
mothers, which itself was most likely a product of this increased labour market demand
from mothers. The expansion of the service sector, in which women are more likely
to be employed, created new opportunities for female employment. In 1970, industry
accounted for 44% of employees; this had fallen to around a quarter by the early 1990s,
with the service sector now accounting for nearly three quarters of employees (OECD
2004). As women make up just over half of this sector, it is easy to see how women were
absorbed into the labour market through the expansion of this sector. It is worth noting,
however, that little changed in these respects over the period of interest; the majority of
the changes happened as the older cohort were growing up, and the situation levelled
off as they reached adulthood.
The jobs that were created in the sector were also particularly suitable for women with
care responsibilities because many of them did not fit the full-time, permanent, standard
hours model of employment that is difficult for those with such responsibilities. There
was a growth in ‘flexible’ employment; jobs with part-time or irregular hours, or shift
work, or that were on a temporary or self-employed basis. A quarter of male employees
and just over half of female employees had jobs characterised by one or more of these
things by 1996 (Dex et al 1999). However, this flexibility could be a double-edged sword
for women. Although it offered them the chance to reconcile work and care, these jobs
existed because they were beneficial to employers, who took advantage of the decline
of trade unions during the 1980s and an influx of workers with care responsibilities to
offer positions that were lower in pay and status than their full-time equivalents (Dex
et al 1999). It could therefore be said that the market created its own solution to the
problem of reconciling work and care, albeit one that came at a price for gender equality,
particularly as the Equal Pay Act is irrelevant here; if the work is not identical, the pay
does not have to be the same. The extension of the right to request flexibility to all
employees under New Labour was therefore important because it tried to bring this
flexibility to all jobs, not just the poorly paid or unstable, meaning that mothers should
not have to choose between a good job and one that fits around their care responsibilities.
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As working motherhood became more commonplace, it also became more normatively
acceptable, and attitudes softened towards working mothers. In 1989, 28% of respon-
dents in the British Social Attitudes Survey believed that a woman’s job is to look after
the home and family, and 64% thought that a woman with a pre-school child should stay
at home; by 2002 this had fallen to 17% and 48% respectively (Crompton 2006). Therefore
a change in attitudes can be seen even during the course of the 1990s, over the period of
interest here. The increase in premarital cohabitation and births outside of marriage was
also accompanied by a softening of attitudes towards these phenomena. For example, in
1984, 48% thought premarital sex was rarely or not at all wrong, but by 2006 this had
risen to 70% (Duncan and Phillips 2008).
Summary
This chapter has outlined two eras which, although only twelve years apart, are charac-
terised by quite different policy and socio-economic conditions. A laissez-faire approach
to family policy in the 1980s, characterised by very little support for the reconciliation
of work and care, gave way to a more interventionist approach with the election of a
new government in 1997. Support for working mothers has been considerably extended,
although there is still some way to go before it might be said to facilitate full-time em-
ployment, particularly with respect to the provision of childcare. It is on this difference
between the two eras that the empirical strategy rests, and the ensuing chapters will
establish the extent to which these differences may be related to differences in mothers’
work participation and the division of paid work and care in the household.
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Chapter 6
Turning back the clock? The division
of paid work and care
This chapter is concerned with the intra-household division of paid work and care. It
looks at the first of the two questions raised at the end of Chapter 3; the impact of policy
on the options couples have, and use, in reconciling their work and care responsibilities.
In particular, it is interested in the extent to which the roles and tasks assumed by parents
have a gendered pattern, and the extent to which this gendering has shown continuity or
change over time. By comparing two cohorts of parents raising children in different eras,
it is hoped that this analysis can reveal something about the drivers of continuity and
change, particularly that of the external environment in which decision-making takes
place. The chapter begins by setting out the specific questions under consideration, and
derives hypotheses regarding these questions from the theoretical framework and some
case study analysis. It then carries out some descriptive analysis, before implementing a
logistic regression model of the division of childcare.
6.1 Questions
The point of departure here is one of the key paradoxes encountered thus far; the asym-
metry between the increase of mothers’ paid work and the increase in fathers’ unpaid
work. The statistics presented in Chapter 1 showed the expansion in women’s hu-
man capital and employment experience, both in absolute terms and relative to men’s,
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over the last fifty years. However, the household-level time-use statistics showed that
women’s increased labour market participation has been accompanied but not yet matched
by men’s increased performance of household tasks. This chapter is concerned with what
has happened at the intra-household level.
The first aim is to establish the extent to which the changes in women’s labour market
participation documented in the earlier chapters of this thesis are reflected in changes
in the intra-household gap in paid work participation and remuneration. In order to
establish empirically the difference between the cohorts with respect to the distribution
of human capital and mothers’ economic contribution to the household, the following
questions will be addressed:
1) How large are intra-household human capital disparities in the two cohorts?
2) How gendered are employment outcomes in the two cohorts?
3) What is the relative size of mothers’ economic contribution to the household in the
two cohorts?
The second aim of this chapter is to relate change and continuity in these disparities to
change and continuity in the division of childcare. Thus the key questions of interest
are:
4) What factors are associated with the sharing of childcare?
5) Are couples in the younger cohort more likely to share childcare?
6.2 Generating hypotheses
This section will use the capabilities framework developed in Chapter 3 to develop a
theoretical foundation on which to base the empirical investigation of the above ques-
tions. The household division of work and care is understood through the lens of this
framework, as an interplay of resources, conversion factors and preferences. These ideas
will also be illustrated using case-level analysis of individual cohort members, as per the
approach set out in Chapter 4. From this, hypotheses will be drawn for testing in the
ensuing empirical analysis.
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6.2.1 Continuity and change in the division of paid work and care
Chapter 3 developed a theoretical framework that used a capabilities approach to frame
an understanding of the link between relative resources and outcomes in the household.
The persistence of gendered outcomes, which do not reflect narrowing gaps in relative
earning potential and performance, are not paradoxical at all in this framework. Rather,
they are to be expected because of the existence of barriers – the conversion factors –
between resources and outcomes. The rationality of the division of labour is only part of
what influences its final outcome, as it is mediated by practical and normative conversion
factors. Therefore it is necessary to understand continuity and change in both resources
and conversion factors, in order to understand continuity and change in outcomes over
time. This section will consider each of these elements in turn.
Resources
In the capabilities framework, a higher level of resources increases the set of genuinely
possible options, referred to as the capability set. In the context of the household division
of labour, the key resources are the human capital factors that endow market earning ca-
pacity. The absolute level of human capital in the household affects the options available
to the couple as a household. A high-earning couple may be able to afford the childcare
that would permit them both to work full-time, or to live on a single income, whereas
a lower earning couple may have fewer options for the reconciliation of work and care.
Therefore, at the household level, human capital augments the possible set of options.
However, it is also important to consider human capital from a relative perspective as
well. Most theories outside of orthodox economics construct work-care decisions as a
conflict of interests between the couple to some extent, and the individual’s potential
and actual earnings as a key source of power in achieving their most preferred outcome.
The relative level of this economic power may be as important as the absolute level
in determining which options make it into the capability set. Empirically, we might
expect to see mothers in the younger cohort having more earning power relative to their
partners, given the extent to which women have caught up with men at the aggregate
level. However, the implications of this for household outcomes depends on preferences
regarding work and care.
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Conversion factors
Household outcomes are not merely about the resources that each partner brings to the
table, as these decision-making processes do not take place in a vacuum. Conversion
factors shape the way in which the household as a whole, and each partner within it,
can convert their resources into capabilities. As outlined in Chapter 3, a distinction is
made here between practical and normative conversion factors. The former affect what
is practically possible, the latter affect what is normatively acceptable. A key premise
of this research is that the two cohorts face different conversion factors due to the dif-
ferent policy, economic and social environment in which they are raising their children.
However, the extent to which these differences augment the set of available options is
ambiguous.
Practical conversion factors affect the way in which human capital resources can be
converted into labour market opportunities. There are differences between the labour
market opportunities facing the two cohorts, particularly the mothers. Although fathers’
labour market opportunities are affected by the prevailing economic climate, the key
change is the extent to which those with caring responsibilities can access the labour
market, and this primarily affects mothers. Much of this difference is to do with the
increased policy support available to assist the reconciliation of work and care. As out-
lined in Chapter 5, the laissez-faire approach of the Conservatives in the 1980s and early
1990s gave way to a more hands-on approach by New Labour. This extended policy
provision, although arguably still lacking the necessary generosity to give all families a
wide range of work-care options, represented greater support for working mothers. Ex-
tending the right to return to work, and the right to request some flexibility when they
do, gives mothers greater opportunity to use their human capital. Therefore we might
expect women in the younger cohort to have better opportunities to deploy their human
capital.
However, because these rights are either restricted to mothers or used primarily by
them in practice, the intra-household disparities in the way that mothers and fathers
use their human capital remain, and are perhaps even strengthened. Well-intentioned
policy reform may have had the unintended consequence of undermining the human
capital gains that mothers have made, and tipping the balance back in favour of gen-
dered specialisation. The policy environment encourages mothers to take a long break
from employment, followed by a return that is planned around her childcare commit-
ments. Although she remains formally employed throughout, in human capital terms
this is not the same as continuous participation. Meanwhile fathers, entitled to just two
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weeks’ leave, are encouraged not to take time out, and to take on the role of primary
earner. Therefore, even if a couple have equal earning power before having children, a
gender disparity is likely to appear once they have children.
The material presented so far has suggested both continuity and change as far as the dif-
ference between the two cohorts is concerned. The data reviewed in Chapter 5 suggested
a greater normative acceptance of working motherhood, and less gendered conceptions
of mothers’ and fathers’ roles. However, the qualitative research reviewed in Chapter
2 suggested the persistence of a gendered sense of entitlement in mothers’ evaluations
of their own contributions and entitlements. Mothers’ employment is still constructed
as secondary, and her role as primary carer taken as given, even in couples with very
similar levels of human capital. This is likely to imply continuity in gendered outcomes
between the two cohorts.
Preferences
It is difficult to say from the material presented so far how these preferences might
differ between the cohorts. Although macro trends have been of softening attitudes
to maternal employment and greater endorsement of egalitarianism and role sharing,
there will be individual-level variation within this. The ensuing empirical analysis will
attempt to capture these individual preferences, through variables giving respondents’
personal family attitudes. Ideally this heterogeneity would be controlled for statistically,
perhaps with a random effects model. However, the data here is not amenable to this
type of modelling because it does not measure the same individual at two points in
time, but compares different individuals at different points in time. Therefore there is no
way to distinguish in this analysis between whether continuity in gendered patterns is
because these patterns are impossible to subvert, or because couples simply do not wish
to subvert them.
6.2.2 Case studies
The idea put forward above of the persistence of gendered norms, despite limited gen-
der disparities in human capital and employment behaviour, clearly emerges when the
cases are examined at the individual level, in a more narrative way. It is rarely clear
from a relative human capital perspective alone why specialisation has occurred in the
way it has, and there is a very plausible role of the normative and practical conversion
107
factors outlined above. These elements interact and influence each other, and this can
be illustrated by looking at individual cases and examining the inter-relation of these
factors.
Sometimes the human capital differences are obvious. For example Sam’s (BCS, stay-at-
home mother) husband is a full time software engineer in a managerial position with
good wages. Sam, on the other hand, has never held a professional job, and has not been
in work at all since her first child was born five years ago. Her likely wage, based on
her qualifications and experience, suggests that a part-time position of 15 hours per week
would be likely to earn her £57, which would amount to 16% of the combined household
income.1 If she and her husband do not value this small contribution enough to justify
the costs of her working, or if it is not even enough to cover these costs and results in a
net loss of household income, then gendered specialisation is rational. Indeed, Sam has
very traditional family attitudes, suggesting that she values home care of her children
over the small amount of extra income, or any further personal benefit from working.
However, these differences are not always so clear cut. For example, Susan (NCDS,
part-time) has given up a professional occupation, nursing, to be the main carer and
secondary earner in the household, despite the fact that her husband’s job is in the
Lower Supervisory and Technical category (NS-SEC class 5), with below average earn-
ings. Having invested time and money in obtaining her qualification, she went on to
work full-time as a nurse for over ten years before having children; this suggests con-
siderable commitment to the role. However, her relationship with employment seems to
have changed since having children; she has taken three years out of the labour market
to care for them, and she has never returned to nursing. Any employment since having
children has been intermittent, part-time, short-term and low status. Perhaps she sees
mothering as something that should be prioritised over employment, at least while her
children are young. However, the prevailing policy environment will not have helped her
to gain well-paid, secure employment, and the intermittent nature of her employment
attachment will have further compounded her lack of employability.
Carol (NCDS, part-time) has no post-16 qualifications and has never held a professional
job, but nor does her husband, and yet she has assumed the role as main carer and a very
peripheral earner. Before having children she had worked full time in an intermediate-
level job. Since having children she has taken time out of the labour market and then
returned part time, and this has coincided with a downward occupational shift in terms
of pay and status. Perhaps this was her choice, but it also potentially reflects the lack of
1For details on the calculation of this imputed wage, see Chapter 4.
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opportunities available to women in this position at this time, and the lack of government
support for them. In her current role she works 19 hours per week and earns £51, which
amounts to just 15% of the household income. Despite this, she returned to employment
when her youngest child was only seven months old. This suggests that, although her
job is low status and low paid, and her contribution to household income is very small,
her role as an earner is financially important, symbolically important, or both.
It is a similar story in the ‘one-and-a-half’ couples in the younger cohort. Karen and
Margaret (both BCS, part-time) both have higher status jobs than their husbands and
similar levels of qualification. In particular, Margaret works 21 hours per week and con-
tributes a third of the household income, suggesting that her hourly rate is similar to her
husband’s; yet the resulting division of labour has defaulted to the gender norm of male
breadwinner, female carer. She took a year out of the labour market after her first child
was born before re-entering part time, thus establishing her as main carer and secondary
earner, and making it rational to continue along this path. She is also a practising Chris-
tian with very traditional family attitudes, suggesting that she perhaps prefers the main
carer role. However nor does she appear to aspire to a full-time homemaker role, as she
is highly work orientated, and did not quit her job when her second child was born. By
2002 she would have had the benefit of a more generous system of maternity leave than
her NCDS counterparts. Perhaps this is why, unlike NCDS mother Carol, she has been
able to maintain an intermediate level job and has never had to downshift. This has also
allowed her to make a larger contribution to the overall household income than Carol or
Susan.
Even in couples in which both partners work full-time, gendered patterns can be seen
in the way that roles are assigned, identities constructed, and work and care divided.
Sandy (NCDS, full-time) works 48 hours per week as a radio operator, a profession that
is not male dominated but does have a roughly equal split between men and women
according to the occupational segregation variable here2. She has some managerial re-
sponsibilities, and this combined with her long hours mean that her work commitments
are considerable. This suggests that she is strongly work orientated, and she does in-
deed score highly on this variable. This is a value that may have been transmitted from
her own mother, who had worked when Sandy was young, including before she started
school. Sandy and her husband divide the unpaid household work between them, but
still along fairly gendered lines; both clean and care for children, but she does laundry
and cooking and her husband does the DIY. Her strong commitment to work and almost
equal financial contribution to the household mean that she does not seem to construct
2The derivation of this variable is further explained in Chapter 8
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herself as secondary earner, but the gendered household task division suggests she per-
haps ‘does’ femininity in this way. Furthermore, the fact that she has a higher status job
than her husband suggests she might want to correct for this role dissonance with more
feminine tasks.
By contrast, Angela (NCDS, full-time) does seem to to have assumed the second earner
role, despite the fact that she too earns almost as much as her husband. Despite work-
ing full-time, she does almost all of the unpaid household work, including most of the
childcare. Thus the couple seem to distinguish qualitatively between their roles, even
though the quantitative distinction between her and her husband’s work behaviour is
small. There is a disparity in job status within the couple, which could explain the
differing importance they attach to their work roles. Angela’s husband has a Higher
Professional (NS-SEC 1) job, with considerable managerial responsibilities, while she
works in an Intermediate (NS-SEC 3) occupation. One interpretation of this would be
that Angela chose to take a less demanding job in order to reconcile work with her care
responsibilities. However, she had in fact aspired to a professional job when she was at
school, but despite her continuous work history and strong work orientation, she never
achieved this. Her husband was the one who did, even though he left school at the same
age as she did. Thus this status disparity illustrates the potential impact of gendered
norms, labour market rigidity and childbearing on a mother’s career, especially in the
absence of any state support to help her reconcile work and childbearing. This initial
disadvantage then feeds on itself, and it is difficult to reassert egalitarianism.
Nicola’s (BCS, full-time) situation is positively counter-intuitive. She earns more than her
husband, in a higher status job, but despite this she does most of the unpaid household
work. She seems to be the principal carer in the household. Although general child care
is split equally, ultimately it is she who assumes the responsibility for taking care of the
children when they are ill. Interestingly, she also says that she receives the child tax
credits, not her partner. As these go to whoever the couple designates the main carer, it
would seem that she has taken on this role. Thus in this couple, the norm-challenging
economic status is not reflected in a similarly norm-challenging household division of
labour. This fits with previous work that suggests that fathers do not take on principal
carer roles when their partners earn more than them (e.g Kitterod and Petersen 2006;
Kalenoski et al 2009).
As explained in Chapter 4, these case studies were not chosen because they are partic-
ularly congruent with the theoretical positions outlined in this thesis; they were chosen
randomly from the families in the dataset that are average in terms of size and income
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and have complete data. However, they clearly illustrate the complex interplay between
resources, conversion factors and outcomes that the theoretical framework has tried to
conceptualise. It is from this framework that the next section will derive hypotheses for
the subsequent empirical work.
6.2.3 Hypotheses
The empirical analysis attempts to explain differences in the division of labour between
the two cohorts. Empirically, these differences should be attributable to three key ex-
planatory factors; human capital disparities, contextual factors and preferences. Firstly,
the division of paid work and care should be significantly associated with absolute and
relative human capital, as represented by the education and employment variables that
exist in the datasets. The impact of absolute levels of human capital is unclear; it in-
creases the options available, but what is finally chosen depends on conversion factors
and preferences. As far as relative human capital is concerned, the theory suggests that
smaller human capital disparities should result in more egalitarian outcomes. Therefore:
H1: Higher relative human capital of women has a positive impact on the probability of
sharing childcare.
Secondly, the policy and other contextual factors within which the household exists
should be significantly associated with outcomes. This effect is encapsulated in a vari-
able indicating the cohort to which a couple belongs. This variable should be significant
even after controlling for human capital; in other words, two couples with identical hu-
man capital in different cohorts should have different outcomes because of the effect of
policy and other contextual factors. As discussed above, the impact of this environment
is ambiguous, but on balance expected to be mildly positive. The younger cohort should
have more options open to them in the reconciliation of work and care, thanks to greater
policy support and a less adverse normative climate. Assuming that on average prefer-
ences have not become less favourable to the sharing of childcare, this should result in
more sharing of care. Therefore:
H2: Being in the younger cohort will has a positive impact on the probability of sharing
childcare.
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Finally, there should be a significant association between outcomes and attitudes towards
family and work, as expressed by the variables that elicit the respondent’s own views
on these matters, which may differ from macro-level attitudes. Again these are expected
to be significant even controlling for the other things in the model, as they capture
individual heterogeneity within a societal context of particular incentives and barriers.
Therefore:
H3: Positive attitudes towards maternal employment and strong work orientations have
a positive impact on the probability of sharing childcare.
The rest of the chapter will first of all examine these issues descriptively, and then more
rigorously with a regression model.
6.3 Descriptive analysis
This section will examine some of the key variables in the dataset around labour force
participation and remuneration, and the division of labour in the household. It first
of all seeks to answer the first set of questions posed at the beginning of the chapter
around the distribution of human capital and earning power within the household in
the two cohorts. It examines the relative human capital, labour force attachment and
labour market status within couples, and how this differs by cohort. It also compares
the financial contribution that each partner is bringing to the household, and whether
the gender gap in this respect is smaller in the younger cohort. It then examines what
the data can tell us about the division of work and care on a descriptive level, and how
this differs between the two cohorts.
The analysis here only uses the cases for whom the issue of the intra-household distribu-
tion of work and care is relevant. The cases included are those respondents that are in a
household containing only an opposite-sex partner and their biological, adopted fostered
or step children up to the age of 18. Wherever the term ‘family’ or ‘household’ is used in
this analysis, it is to this type of household that these terms refer. There are 12,209 such
cases in the dataset, representing 62% of the older cohort and 54% of the younger co-
hort. The remaining 8,828 cases are dropped because they are single parent households,
childless households, or contain additional residents such as extended family.
In this chapter, the ‘male household member’ is either a male cohort member, or the
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Table 6.1: Relative education level within the household, by cohort
Cohort
Relative education NCDS BCS Total N
% % %
Man higher 24.6 20.8 22.9 2,510
Same 42.3 46.0 44.0 4,826
Woman higher 33.1 33.2 33.1 3,637
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 10,973
male partner of a female cohort member, and the ‘female household member’ is either a
female cohort member of the female partner of a male cohort member. No distinction is
made in the analysis between data on cohort members and data on their partners; they
are all either the mother or the father for the purposes of the model here. The drawback
of this method is that the analysis loses a lot of the variables pertaining to human capital,
because the information on partner’s human capital is much more limited than that of
the cohort member. However, this approach allows the construction of relative human
capital measures, which are in any case the most central to these research questions, on
what is effectively twice the sample size of the original cohort.3
6.3.1 Relative human capital
The first human capital dimension of interest is educational level, as this is strongly as-
sociated with earnings or potential earnings. Unfortunately, it is difficult to compare
educational level between partners due to the lack of information about the cohort mem-
ber’s partner on this subject. The respondent is asked only at what age their partner left
full-time education, therefore this is what will be compared between partners. Analysis
of the cohort members, on whom there is more information, suggests that it is in any
case a reasonable proxy for qualification; table A.2 in Appendix A shows a clear cluster-
ing of particular qualifications at each age, and a gamma value of .72, which is high and
suggests a strong association.
Table 6.1 shows that households in the younger cohort are less likely to have a more
educated male partner, and it is concomitantly more likely that they are educated to
3One additional point to bear in mind is that, in treating information on the cohort members and their
partners as equivalent, this does not not take account of the fact that the latter are subject to greater error
because the information is solicited from someone else. Therefore the precision of the estimates may be
artificially inflated to some extent, leading to potentially false conclusions of significance.
113
Table 6.2: Household division of paid work, by cohort
Cohort
Household division of paid work NCDS BCS Total N
% % %
Both full-time 17.8 22.9 19.9 2,355
Man full-time, woman part-time 38.3 41.1 39.5 4,661
Man full-time, woman home 33.7 26.8 30.8 3,636
Other 10.2 9.2 9.8 1,153
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 11,805
the same level. While this does represent a shift to women’s advantage, it should be
noted that they had the upper hand even in 1991; a household of this type is more likely
in both cohorts to have a more educated woman. However, this measure of education
does not take into account vocational qualifications or on the job training, which are
other important forms of human capital investment (Becker 1964;1975). If there are
gender differences in these types of human capital, then gender disparities in formal
qualifications will not capture true disparities in labour market value.
6.3.2 Relative attachment and status
Relative labour market outcomes are the second aspect of human capital that needs to be
considered. Aggregate level trends in mothers’ labour force participation cannot tell us
how this has affected the division of paid work at the household level; whether working
mothers are in relationships with working fathers, or with non-working fathers. The data
used here contain information on how couples divide paid work, and about the relative
status of their jobs if they work, as couples are interviewed about the employment status
of their partner as well as themselves. Unfortunately there is no information on the actual
weekly working hours of the respondents’ partners, so a proper comparison of their
relative paid work commitments is not possible. Partner’s economic status is given in
categorical form, which for ease of analysis here is collapsed into whether they work full-
time or part-time, or are unemployed, sick, in education or inactive for family reasons. A
full cross-tabulation of the intra-household relative division of labour is given in table A.3
in Appendix A. However, for further brevity, table 6.2 presented here collapses this into
four combinations, as the numbers in any other configuration are so small.
Most couples – 90% in the NCDS and 91% in the BCS – fall into one of three categories
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of the division of paid work. The most common outcome in both cohorts is the ‘one-
and-a-half’ arrangement; father working full-time, mother working part-time. Couples
in the older cohort are more likely than those in the younger cohort to have a ‘male
breadwinner’ arrangement of father working full-time and mother at home, although
this is still more common than both partners working full-time even in the younger
cohort. Anything outside of these three norms is still very unusual; even the younger
cohort contains just 25 female-breadwinner households out of a sample of 4923; i.e.
around half of one percent of this sample.
Job status
It is also relevant for understanding differences in remuneration to look at job status;
even if both parents work-full time, one may do so in a much less prestigious occupation
than the other, which is likely to imply a pay differential. Switching to part-time work
may also imply a downward shift in status for mothers, and this may be important given
the large proportion of mothers who work full-time. The link between hours worked
and job status is explored much more fully in Chapter 8; here basic intra-household job
status differentials are simply established by cohort. Status is established here using NS-
SEC, the meaning, derivation and rationale for the use of this variable as an indicator of
status is explained in Chapter 4.
Table 6.3 illustrates the status disparities within couples where both partners are in work
(full-time or part-time). The diagonal in each panel represents couples in the same job
status, while cells to the right of this are households with women in higher status jobs,
and to the left are those with men in higher status jobs. Perhaps the most striking
thing about this table is the gender balance, even in the older cohort. Around half of
couples in both cohorts have jobs of the same status, with the remaining half split fairly
evenly between women and men being in higher status jobs. If there has been any
change, it is that the proportion of households in which men hold a higher status jobs is
actually higher in the younger cohort; 27.4% compared with 24.8% in the NCDS. Thus
it would seem that dual-earning couples are quite evenly matched, at least on this fairly
crude three-category measure, which conceals much within-category variation in pay
and prestige.
Related to the issue of status, there is a possibility that stronger labour force attachment
gives women the experience they need to achieve more senior positions. The method-





























































































































































































































































































Table 6.4: Relative managerial responsibilities in dual-earner couples by cohort
Cohort
Managerial responsibilities NCDS BCS Total N
% % %
Both 19.8 19.1 19.5 1,156
Man only 35.3 29.7 33.1 1,961
Woman only 12.3 15.5 13.6 806
Neither 32.6 35.7 33.8 2,007
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 5,930
responsibilities, particularly around its comparability between the two cohorts. How-
ever, bearing this in mind, the relative managerial status within households (table 6.4)
suggests that men are considerably more likely to report managerial responsibilities in
both cohorts. This is what might be expected given the discussion above on the way
in which couples define and prioritise the paid work they do, and the priority that is
awarded to men’s careers, for normative and practical reasons. Encouragingly, the gen-
der gap is smaller in the younger cohort, and a higher proportion of households report
only the woman having managerial responsibilities.
6.3.3 Relative financial contribution
The third aspect of intra-household inequality is financial contribution. Although the
gender pay gap has narrowed, it is interesting from a relative resources perspective to
see how this has been reflected in gaps at the intra-household level. Studies of gender pay
gaps usually focus on hourly pay, which controls for hours worked, but this analysis will
look at weekly net pay because there is no data on the hours worked by the respondent’s
partner, thus relative hourly wages cannot be calculated. However, what is interesting
about weekly income is that it illuminates the de facto financial disparities within the
household. Even if a couple’s potential hourly wage is the same, if a mother works
fewer hours, her relative financial contribution to the household will be lower, and thus
her bargaining position weaker (Amilon 2007; Evertsson and Nermo 2007; Datta Gupta
and Stratton 2010).
The aggregate picture in the two cohorts reflects a general upward trend in income
among both men and women; as with the status variable analysed above, there has
been a general increase in net income over the period and increases in mothers’ income
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Male 230.8 264.0 5,595
Female 78.5 114.4 6,614
Total 170.0 196.8 12,209
Figures are in 1991 prices for comparability
Table 6.6: Mothers’ mean % contribution to household earnings and total household income
by household earning type and cohort










Both full-time 40.5 42.6 44.3 46.6 2,355
Man full-time, woman part-time 21.6 25.7 26.9 31.3 4,661
Man full-time, woman home 7.2 11.5 3,636
Other 46.5 38.7 58.7 49.5 1,153
Total 27.9 23.6 33.6 30.7 11,805
needs to be considered in this context. However, women’s earnings have increased more,
suggesting some closing of the gap (table 6.5).
More relevant for the analysis here is whether this catching up is reflected in intra-
household disparities. Table 6.6 shows the relative contribution that women make in
each of the three main types of household. Mothers who work full-time have comparable
earnings to their partners in both cohorts, but there is still a gap; this has narrowed a
little from 9% in the older cohort to 6% in the younger cohort. However, as with the
aggregate gender pay gap, a stubborn motherhood gap remains. A gap is to be expected
for mothers who work part-time, although it is narrower in the younger cohort; mothers
who work part time in the younger cohort contribute 27% of household earnings, as
opposed to 22% in the older cohort. This may reflect the trends outlined above towards
better part-time jobs and wages.
Table 6.6 also shows mothers’ contribution if we take into account income from non-wage
sources, including state benefits, thus reflecting mothers’ true financial contribution to
the household’s total income. Mothers are more likely to receive income from other non-
state sources such as rent or maintenance payments, but the median amount received is
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higher for men in both cohorts. However such sources are relatively rare for both men
and women, therefore their effect on overall trends is likely to be negligible.
What is perhaps of more interest, from the perspective of the research questions ad-
dressed here, is non-wage income that comes from the state. In couple families with
children, women are far more likely to receive some kind of state benefit; over 90% in
both cohorts, compared with 29% of NCDS men and 39% of BCS men. In both policy
eras, women have been the primary recipients of family-related benefits, and as the pol-
icy chapter outlined, the level of this support has been increased, and the conditions
expanded to incorporate the majority of families. Therefore it might be expected that in
both cohorts the inclusion of other income sources would raise women’s relative share
of total household income, but that in the younger cohort it might do so more.
Table 6.6 shows that, for women who work full-time, the difference between their earn-
ings contribution and their total income contribution is very small. This is perhaps
because dual-earning families tend to be better off, and are thus entitled to a smaller
amount of support, therefore its overall impact is small. State support has a larger im-
pact on the contribution of women who work part-time, but the biggest difference is for
women who do not work. Their share of household income increases from nothing to
11.5% in the younger cohort when other income is taken into account. Although this is
not a large amount, it is not the same as contributing nothing at all to the household
finances, and is therefore relevant from a relative resources perspective. This share is
larger for stay at home mothers in the younger cohort, reflecting perhaps the greater
generosity of the state support to families available to them, and illustrating the impact
that policy can have on the intra-household distribution of resources.
Therefore the answers to the first three questions posed at the beginning of this chapter
are now apparent. As far as the first question is concerned, it is hard to say anything
about the size of intra-household human capital disparities from this data, given the lack
of information on partner’s education and employment history. However men’s key
advantage appears to be not in education but in employment experience. The second
question asked about gender disparities in employment status. The data showed that
households in the younger cohort were more likely to have two earners, and that women
have caught up to some extent in status and responsibility. Finally the third question
asked about the relative size of mothers’ economic contribution in the two cohorts. This
contribution is proportionally larger in the younger cohort, both as a result of higher
relative wages and more generous state support to families. These insights will be taken
forward in the remainder of this chapter in the investigation of the fourth and fifth
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Table 6.7: Division of childcare tasks by cohort
Cohort
NCDS BCS Total N
% % %
Who looks after children in general?
Woman mostly 50.6 54.8 52.5 6,177
Equal 48.3 43.1 46.0 5,421
Man mostly 0.8 1.8 1.2 145
Someone else 0.2 0.4 0.3 30
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 11,773
Who looks after children when ill?
Woman mostly 66.6 57.8 62.8 7,383
Equal 32.3 40.4 35.8 4,216
Man mostly 0.9 1.5 1.2 138
Someone else 0.2 0.3 0.2 27
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 11,764
Who teaches children good behaviour?
Woman mostly 14.4 11.8 13.3 1,564
Equal 82.6 86.3 84.2 9,900
Man mostly 2.8 1.8 2.4 280
Someone else 0.1 0.0 0.1 8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 11,752
questions about the division of care and its determinants. In light of this mostly positive
shift in favour of mothers within the household, we might expect the division of care to
be less gendered in this cohort as well.
6.3.4 Division of unpaid work
The final task of this descriptive section is to establish what the data tells us about the
division of childcare and other unpaid household work. Respondents are asked about
the division of three childcare tasks, the results of which are shown in table 6.7. The
general picture is that most couples in both cohorts either share these tasks or the mother
does them; the proportion of men taking primary responsibility for any of them is very
low. The most equally shared task is discipline, perhaps because it is not as incompatible
with a father’s role as other childcare tasks.
Couples in the younger cohort are less likely to report equal sharing of the general child-
care. This is perhaps surprising given what was established above about their increased
employment participation and earning contribution. It could be a compositional effect;
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men are more likely to report equal sharing, and there are proportionally more men in
the older cohort. However, in fact only a small part of the effect is due to composition; if
the older cohort had an identical sex ratio to the younger cohort, the proportion reporting
equal sharing would be 47.5%. This is still higher than the 43.1% in the younger cohort.
The difference seems to be driven principally by the difference between the women in
the two cohorts, for whom there is a seven percentage point difference in the reporting
of equal sharing.
There is another possible demographic explanation for the effect. The age of childbearing
has been steadily increasing in the UK, which means that the younger cohort on average
have started childbearing later, and therefore have younger children than their counter-
parts in the older cohort at the same stage in life. Having younger children makes a
mother more likely to be the primary carer in both cohorts. However, if we break down
the division of care by number of children under five (table A.4 in Appendix A), women
in the younger cohort are less likely to report equal sharing regardless of whether they
have young children in the household or not.
Therefore it would appear that, as far as the division of general childcare is concerned,
the younger cohort are less egalitarian. On the other hand, women in the younger
cohort are less likely to take primary responsibility for looking after a sick child. This
is important because if one parent is always the one to take time off when a child is
sick, they will face labour market penalties that their partner does not. If this partner
is usually the woman then this will manifest itself in gender inequality at the aggregate
level. Therefore a more equal division of this responsibility is positive from a gender
equality point of view.
The division of care in the household might sensibly be thought of as jointly determined
alongside the division of paid work; for example the decision to be a stay at home mother
logically entails taking primary responsibility for childcare in most cases. However, what
is striking about the results presented so far is that, on this logic, because more women in
the younger cohort are in employment, we might expect fewer of them to report taking
primary responsibility for childcare, but this does not seem to be the case. Table 6.8
shows the division of general childcare broken down by cohort and the division of paid
work.
Households in which both parents work full-time but the mother takes primary respon-
sibility for childcare are just as likely in the younger cohort. Therefore although mothers
in the younger cohort are working more, this has not involved a concomitant shift of
121
Table 6.8: Division of general childcare, by household earning type and cohort








% % % % %
Division of paid work, NCDS
Both full-time 29.6 68.3 1.4 0.7 100.0 1,142
Man full-time, woman part-time 47.2 52.4 0.4 0.0 100.0 2,527
Man full-time, woman home 69.3 30.6 0.1 0.0 100.0 2,205
Other 37.9 58.2 3.6 0.3 100.0 644
Total 50.7 48.4 0.8 0.2 100.0 6,518
Division of paid work, BCS
Both full-time 30.6 66.3 1.7 1.4 100.0 1,105
Man full-time, woman part-time 57.7 41.8 0.4 0.0 100.0 2,012
Man full-time, woman home 78.7 20.9 0.4 0.0 100.0 1,311
Other 31.1 57.3 11.3 0.2 100.0 450
Total 54.8 43.2 1.7 0.3 100.0 4,878
care responsibilities towards fathers. Among couples who choose to reduce the mothers’
working hours, there is a more extreme picture of specialisation in the younger cohort.
In the older cohort, 52% of respondents report equal sharing of care even when the
mother works part-time, whereas in the younger cohort only 42% do. For a father to
share responsibility for childcare even when he works more hours suggests some com-
mitment to equal parenting regardless of who earns the money. However, this seems to
be less common in the younger cohort, who are more likely to choose an arrangement of
role specialisation, with the father specialising in earning and the mother specialising in
caring.
This apparent trend away from egalitarianism in the division of childcare is contrary to
trends in the division of other household tasks. Table 6.9 shows that men are more likely
to be sharing or performing the majority of some traditionally feminine household tasks
such as cooking and cleaning, although this should be seen in the context of women still
being primarily responsible for these tasks in two thirds of households.
The gender division of tasks remains fairly stark, with cooking and cleaning female dom-
inated and DIY male dominated in both cohorts, suggesting a weakening but persistent
association of certain household tasks with male and female roles. There is a slight in-
crease in contracting out the tasks that can be contracted out; cleaning and DIY are more
likely to be performed primarily by someone outside of the couple. However, it is still
highly unusual for someone else to do the cooking, suggesting that there are limits to the
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Table 6.9: Division of selected housework tasks by household earning type and cohort
Cohort
NCDS BCS Total N
% % %
Who does the cooking?
Woman mostly 79.8 65.2 73.5 8,679
Equal 15.0 24.5 19.2 2,265
Man mostly 4.9 10.1 7.2 845
Someone else 0.3 0.2 0.2 27
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 11,816
Who does the cleaning?
Woman mostly 79.0 67.8 74.2 8,761
Equal 17.4 25.0 20.7 2,443
Man mostly 1.2 3.1 2.1 244
Someone else 2.3 4.1 3.1 365
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 11,813
Who does the DIY?
Woman mostly 4.8 6.2 5.4 634
Equal 21.9 20.9 21.5 2,535
Man mostly 69.1 66.8 68.1 8,036
Someone else 4.2 6.2 5.1 597
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 11,802
extent to which a couple can or feel able to contract out their domestic responsibilities,
or that much contracting out is not noticed, for example ready cooked meals.
This section has considered separately a number of potential influences on the division
of childcare in the household. However, in order to understand the extent to which these
factors are influencing the division of care, they need to be controlled for simultaneously.
This is what the regression model in the next section will do.
6.4 Regression model
6.4.1 Variables
The dependent variable in the regression model is a binary variable that takes the value
zero if childcare is performed mostly by the mother, and 1 if is is shared, performed
mostly by the father or outsourced. Thus the model is predicting what makes it more
likely that childcare responsibilities are not performed mostly by the mother. For short-
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hand this will be referred to here as ‘shared’, as this is by far the biggest proportion of
this category, even though it encompasses two other options as well.
The explanatory variables in the model relate to the elements of the theoretical frame-
work set out above. Resources are represented by relative human capital and resource
variables, conversion factors by a variable indicating the cohort to which the household
belongs, and preferences by attitudinal variables. The selection of explanatory variables
is limited throughout by the need to choose data that is available on both the cohort
study respondent and their partner, in order to understand the relative position of the
mother and father within the household. Information on the partner is present but quite
limited; it is a small fraction of the rich data available on the cohort member themselves.
Much of the richness of the human capital data is lost as a result; the next chapter at-
tempts to use more of it, although it loses the intra-household perspective from this
chapter.
The explanatory variables are grouped in blocks representing their theoretical link, in
order to test the joint significance and explanatory power of the key theoretical elements
as well as the significance of the individual variables themselves. The first block is simply
the division of paid work in the household. It is clear from the descriptive analysis that
this variable is strongly related to the division of care, but also that the association is
far from perfect. The division of work and care are likely to be jointly determined to
some extent, but not completely; there are couples in which the father works more but
still takes joint responsibility for childcare. The endogeneity of this division of work
variable means that its coefficients need to be interpreted with caution, but its inclusion
is essential, and enables us to say what the effect of the other variables is, controlling for
earning arrangement.
The second block of variables represents the absolute and relative human capital re-
sources in the household. The model tries to incorporate as much information as is
available on both household members around their schooling, experience and earnings,
although it is limited. The only indication of partner’s educational qualifications is the
age at which they left full-time education, so this lowest common denominator is what
is compared within the couple. Relative experience and labour market history, although
key determinants of present division of labour, cannot be included. Although there
is considerable employment history data available on the cohort members themselves,
there is none for partners in the younger cohort.4
4It might be possible to go to previous sweeps for this information, but this is not only time consuming,
it also loses the case if the current partner has not been present at previous sweeps.
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The measure of earnings used here is an imputed wage variable. The full construction
of this variable is described in Chapter 4, but in brief it is a variable that uses as much
human capital information as possible to create a value for wage using regression-based
imputation, where no actual wage data is available. This means that those in work whose
wage data is missing can still be included in the model. It also means that those not
currently in work can be included, using whatever information is available but without
having to exclude them because there is no information on their job status. Therefore
what this variable is measuring is not the de facto level and division of the household
finances, but the potential contribution each partner could make. It reflects the options
available to a couple, which is what the absolute level of human capital in the household
is assumed in this framework to give them. The block also includes a relative measure
of potential wage, as the size of the mother’s potential economic contribution relative to
her partner’s indicates her power within the household to negotiate her most preferred
outcome.
Block three encompasses two other potential resource disparities in the household that
might affect relative bargaining power. The first is whether the rental agreement or, in
most cases, the mortgage for the household is in the mother’s name or not. This is
assumed to give the mother some security, and therefore a more powerful position from
which to negotiate. The second is the financial contribution each partner makes to the
household from sources other than wages; even if a person is not in employment, they
may still be contributing to the household finances, through private sources of income
such as rent or investments, or from state benefits. This income is assumed to endow
power in a similar way to wages.
If blocks two and three represent the potential options that absolute and relative re-
sources endow, block four represents the conversion factors that affect, for a given level
of human capital, the options that are realistically available. This is represented by a
variable indicating the cohort to which the household belongs, which is assumed to en-
capsulate the impact of the prevailing policy and other factors that have a practical and
normative impact on household outcomes. It is this block that is of most interest, as it
holds the key to the central question of the research; the impact of policy on the division
of paid work and care.
Block five represents the final stage in the process sketched out in the theoretical frame-
work; the selection of one outcome from a capability set of options, according to individ-
ual preferences. This block is the weakest for two reasons. Firstly, as outlined in Chapter
4, the attitudinal data has had to be picked up from different sweeps, and therefore does
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not necessarily represent the cohort member’s opinion at the relevant age, or reflect the
way that preferences change in response to experience. Secondly, there is unfortunately
no attitudinal data available for the cohort member’s partner. Unlike the potential wage
variable, the attitude variable cannot simply be imputed from other variables; indeed, a
key premise of the framework is that this stage is not related to human capital or other
factors, but is something intrinsic and person specific. Therefore the attitudinal variable
is one-sided, and is used on the strong assumption that the cohort member’s attitudes
are similar to their partner’s. Some attempt is made to correct for the gender bias that
this variable will have as a result of only using data from the cohort member. As male
and female respondents have systematically different attitude scores – men are less lib-
eral and more work orientated – the distribution of attitudes in the sample will reflect
the gender distribution of the cohort members. This is removed by adding the average
score for the opposite gender and dividing by two to get an average household attitude
score.
A final block of two variables controls for the size of the childcare burden, which will
inevitably affect how it is divided; a couple with two children under five clearly face a
very different set of costs and constraints to a couple with a single secondary school-
aged child. One variable in this block indicates the number of children in the household,
and a second indicates the number of children under five.
Table 6.10 shows the distribution of these variables between the two categories of the de-
pendent variable. The table shows that equal sharing is most likely among dual-full-time
couples, but it is by no means guaranteed. Furthermore, nearly half of all ‘one-and-a-
half’ couples report equal sharing, despite the disparity in working hours. Therefore
the division of work, although closely related to the division of care, does not perfectly
determine it. Education seems to have little impact, but income seems to have more
of an effect; average male weekly income is higher in couples where the woman does
most of the childcare, and average female income is higher in couples that share child-
care. Although the numerical values on the attitude scores are not in themselves very
meaningful, the lower average score on attitudes towards working mothers indicates a
more favourable position in couples who share childcare equally. The other two atti-
tude variables – general attitudes towards family-related morality, and work orientation
– do not seem to vary between the two categories of the dependent. There are slightly
more children in households where the woman does most childcare, although the dif-
ference is small. More noticeable is the higher average number of children under five in
households where the woman does the majority of the childcare.
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Table 6.10: Distribution of the explanatory variables between the two categories of the
dependent







Household division of paid work
Both full-time (%) 30.08 69.92 100.00 2,247
Man full-time, woman part-time (%) 51.86 48.14 100.00 4,539
Man full-time, woman home (%) 72.78 27.22 100.00 3,516
Other (%) 35.10 64.90 100.00 1,094
Total 52.41 47.59 100.00 11,396
Relative education in household
Man higher (%) 53.44 46.56 100.00 2,429
Same (%) 52.30 47.70 100.00 4,681
Woman higher (%) 52.17 47.83 100.00 3,550
Total 52.51 47.49 100.00 10,660
Cohort
NCDS (%) 50.65 49.35 100.00 6,648
BCS (%) 54.83 45.17 100.00 5,125
Total 52.47 47.53 100.00 11,773
Total household income (£p.w.) 424.08 377.68 400.19 11,937
% household income female 79.34 83.66 81.42 11,937
% accommodation in mother’s name 92 93 92 12,079
Male weekly nonwage income (£p.w.) 14.13 20.13 16.94 11,681
Female weekly nonwage income (£p.w.) 35.62 37.51 36.06 11,186
Attitude to maternal employment 0.10 -0.06 0.02 10,282
Attitude to family morality 0.06 0.05 0.06 10,282
Work orientation 0.03 0.03 0.03 10,282
Number of children 2.02 1.95 1.99 12,209
Number of children under 5 0.94 0.66 0.80 12,209
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Tests of multicollinearity (table A.5 in Appendix A) showed acceptable tolerance statis-
tics; Menard (1995) suggests that a value of less than 0.2 is problematic, but in this case
all of the tolerance statistics exceeded 0.8. Thus it would seem that multicollinearity is
not a serious problem in the model, and all the variables can be included.
6.4.2 Model results
Table 6.11: Regression results: predicting the division of childcare
Variable Childcare is equally shared
Odds Ratio p-value
Household earning type
Both full-time ref -
Father full-time, mother part-time 0.477∗∗∗ (0.000)
Father full-time, mother at home 0.215∗∗∗ (0.000)
Other 0.752∗∗ (0.006)
Relative education
Man higher ref -
Same 0.906 (0.106)
Woman higher 0.837∗∗ (0.006)
Total household income 0.880∗∗∗ (0.000)
Percent female in household income 1.015∗∗∗ (0.000)
Accommodation in mother’s name 1.220∗ (0.036)
Male non-wage income 1.001∗∗ (0.003)
Female non-wage income 1.000 (0.815)
Younger cohort 0.699∗∗∗ (0.000)
Attitudes to maternal employment 0.647∗∗∗ (0.000)
Attitudes to family morality 1.061 (0.210)
Attitudes to work 0.976 (0.617)
Number of dependent children in HH 1.062∗ (0.045)




Hosmer-Lemeshow G.O.F. (p-value) 0.226
% correctly classified 66.3%
Exponentiated coefficients; p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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A logistic regression model was run using the above dependent and explanatory vari-
ables.5 The results indicating the overall quality of the model are mixed. On the positive
side, all the blocks of variables were found to be significant (table A.6 in Appendix A),
suggesting that the elements of the model are all relevant aspects of the division of paid
work and care. A Hosmer-Lemeshow test of model fit gives an insignificant result (ta-
ble 6.11), suggesting that the model is an acceptable fit for the data. However, the pseudo
R-squared is low at .105, suggesting that the explanatory variables explain a low propor-
tion of the variance in the dependent variable. Therefore although the results do not
contradict the theoretical model, they do suggest it lacks explanatory power.
Table 6.11 also presents the coefficient estimates and accompanying p-values for the
model. The descriptive statistics suggested a close but imperfect association between
the division of care and the division of paid work. The division of work was indeed
found to be significant, although even with its inclusion, the pseudo R-square remains
low, confirming that the correlation is far from perfect. As expected, equal sharing
less likely in couples in which the mother works part-time, with reduces the odds by
52%, and even less likely when she does not work at all, which reduces the odds by
79%. However, this result should be interpreted with caution; due to the high degree
of endogeneity between these two variables, it is difficult to draw definite conclusions
about the direction of causality.
Relative human capital has the hypothesised effect to some extent. Relative imputed
wage has a significant positive impact on the odds of equal sharing. Each unit increase
(i.e. an increase in the mother’s contribution by 1%) raises the odds of equal sharing
by 1.5%. This effect is in line with the major theoretical perspectives that inform the
theoretical framework; a more even relative earning power makes equal sharing more
rational and gives a woman more power to negotiate for it. However, relative education
does not have this hypothesised effect; in fact the results suggest that households with
more educated mothers are significantly less likely to split the childcare equally than
households with more educated fathers. The result might reflect economic imperatives
– perhaps more educated women feel less pressure to return – although it is also worth
bearing in mind the weakness of this variable in capturing relative education, due to its
vagueness and imprecision. Economic imperative is also perhaps an explanation for the
negative impact of absolute potential income on the odds of equal sharing. High income
couples are more able to take the option of not both working full-time, therefore more
5The form and interpretation of this type of model is described in detail in Chapter 4.
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do so; women take long periods out of full-time employment and the path to gendered
specialisation is set in motion.
Whether or not the household mortgage or rental agreement is in the mother’s name
was found to have a significant, positive effect on the odds of equal sharing, lending
some support for the theoretical proposition that a woman’s bargaining power is aug-
mented by her financial security. However, a mother’s nonwage income was not found
to have any significant effect. Despite the potential of this source of income to lend some
bargaining power to the mother, perhaps the amounts involved are so small that they do
not have an impact. Father’s nonwage income was found to have a significant, mildly
positive effect on the odds of equal sharing; this perhaps reflects the greater probability
that unemployed men take on some childcare responsibilities.
The second hypothesis advanced above was that policy and other conversion factors
should have an effect on the division of care, and the significant coefficient on the co-
hort variable suggests that this is the case. That this effect exists even controlling for
human capital and family size differences between the two cohorts is consistent with the
theoretical proposition that external factors have a significant impact on the costs and
opportunities faced by parents. However, the other possibility is that there is a system-
atic difference between the cohorts in outlook or preference that the attitudinal variables
here have not controlled for, and that is captured by the cohort variable. The direction
of the effect of cohort is, as suggested by the descriptive statistics, negative; being in the
younger cohort reduces the odds of equal sharing by 30%.
Only one of the attitudinal variables included here was found to have a significant impact
on the division of work and care. Attitudes to working mothers was found to have
the predicted negative impact; the higher the score (i.e. the less favourable towards
working mothers), the less likely is equal sharing of childcare. The more general family
morality variable does not have a significant impact, and nor does work orientation.
Therefore preferences are having the predicted effect to some extent, as attitudes to
working motherhood are found to affect the division of work and care, but other things
that might be important, such as work orientation, are not.
The variables controlling for the size of the childcare burden were found to be signif-
icant, suggesting that this is part of the explanation for the division of work and care,
and reinforcing the idea that these arrangements do not represent an end point, but an
instantaneous arrangement that makes sense for a given family size and age. The results
suggest that each child under 5 decreases the odds of equal sharing by 30%; women
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are more likely to be at home at this stage of their children’s lives. An additional child
actually increases the odds of equal sharing; on the surface this seems contrary to expec-
tations, but perhaps as the overall childcare burden gets larger, an arrangement of only
one parent taking primary responsibility becomes increasingly untenable. As the model
controls for cohort, the effect here is not simply because women in the younger cohort
are both more likely to have fewer and younger children, and more likely not to split
care equally.
6.4.3 Cohort effects and interactions
The above model necessarily pools the two cohorts of women in order to obtain a co-
efficient for the impact of context. However, the results on the other coefficients may
be misleading in this pooled model; their magnitude and significance may in fact differ
between the two cohorts. A likelihood ratio test of the pooled versus separate models
found a statistically significant difference between the coefficients in the models as a
whole, therefore the impact of the important factors identified here may not be the same
for the two cohorts.
Running the models separately for the two cohorts (table 6.12) shows that for some of
the variables, the impact is almost identical for the two cohorts. The impact of relative
imputed wage, and of attitudes to working mothers, are of very similar magnitude and
significance. However, some differences are also apparent. The effect of total house-
hold income is significant in the younger cohort but not the older. This, along with the
stronger impact of a child under five in the younger cohort, is perhaps due to the high
costs of childcare relative to earnings facing the younger cohort. Less well-off house-
holds are forced to take on more of the childcare burden themselves, and are therefore
more likely to have to share it, especially if there are economic imperatives on the mother
to return to work. The effect of education is significant in the older cohort, but in the
younger cohort the effect, although negative, is not found to differ significantly from
zero. However this could simply be an artefact of the smaller sample size in the younger
cohort, so bearing this in mind, along with the inadequacies of the variable itself, means
that this difference is perhaps not so important. Finally, it is interesting to note that the
pseudo R-squared value is higher for the younger cohort, suggesting that the underlying
theoretical model is more relevant to this cohort.
However, it is not enough to conclude interaction effects between cohort and other vari-
ables on the basis of apparent differences between the coefficients. Visual differences do
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not necessarily imply statistical significance, therefore the differences need to be tested
using interaction variables (Jaccard 2001:17). When this was carried out here, none of the
interactions were found to be significant. Therefore the impact of these variables cannot
be said to differ by cohort in any non-trivial way; the effects presented in table 6.11 and
their implications apply to both cohorts.
Table 6.12: Separate models for the two cohorts
Variable Childcare is equally shared
NCDS BCS
Odds Ratio Odds Ratio
(p-value) (p-value)
Household earning type
Both full-time ref ref
- -
Father full-time, mother part-time 0.626∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)









Woman higher 0.783∗∗ 0.930
(0.003) (0.483)
Total household income 0.928 0.853∗∗∗
(0.123) (0.000)
Percent female in household income 1.017∗∗∗ 1.013∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Accommodation in mother’s name 1.073 1.443∗
(0.578) (0.013)
Male nonwage income 1.002∗ 1.001∗
(0.017) (0.031)
Female nonwage income 1.000 1.000
(0.855) (0.970)
Attitudes to maternal employment 0.656∗∗∗ 0.633∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Attitudes to family morality 1.109 0.978
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(0.086) (0.773)
Attitudes to work 0.946 1.011
(0.377) (0.888)
Number of dependent children 1.054 1.081
(0.180) (0.095)





Exponentiated coefficients; p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
6.5 Discussion
6.5.1 Caveats to the results
There are three key issues to bear in mind when looking at these results. The first is that,
throughout the analysis, the results have been presented as factors affecting the division
of childcare. However, the dependent variable strictly speaking records the reported di-
vision of childcare, which is not the same as the actual division of childcare. The latter
would require detailed time-use data, which is not available in the datasets used here,
which provide only a subjective valuation. It is possible that women in the younger co-
hort have systematically different expectations about what constitutes an equal division
of childcare. As a result, the same actual division of childcare may be less likely to be
reported as such by a mother in the younger cohort. If this systematic bias exists, it casts
some doubt on the cohort effect identified here.
The second caveat is a methodological issue that was raised in Chapter 4 but bears re-
peating here; that differences between the two cohorts suggest, but do not prove, change
over time. They provide a direct comparison between two eras, in order to draw con-
clusions about the impact of their respective eras. However, to extrapolate further linear
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change in the same direction is not safe, as there are in effect only two data points from
which to do so. The results here should only be generalised beyond these two specific
cohorts with extreme caution. There is also the related issue, also discussed in Chapter 4,
of inferring policy effects from the cohort variable, which in fact encapsulates a number
of external influences, and potentially any systematic differences between the cohorts
that are not specifically controlled for here. What the variable does is provide evidence
consistent with or contradictory to the effects of policy that have been theorised here.
Finally, the limitations of the model overall should be considered. Although most of the
variables included in the statistical model were found to be significant, thus suggesting
the utility of the capability framework used here for guiding model building, the pro-
portion of the variation that the model explains is disappointing. Therefore there must
be some inadequacies in the design and execution of the model. The possibilities for
theoretical error are infinite, but the empirical issues here are more obvious.
The first is the dependent variable in the model. The issue of subjectivity has already
been discussed. An additional problem with the variable is its lack of detail. There are
many possibilities for the division of work and care, and the restriction of having to
describe this in one of four categories obscures much of this heterogeneity. There is no
distinction in this variable between a couple who split care almost but not quite equally,
and a couple in which the woman does it all; both would be classified as ‘woman mostly’.
To further reduce this to a binary variable artificially divides families into two types,
when there are likely to be some families on the borderline that have more in common
with those in a different type than they do with someone in their own. Therefore it may
be difficult to explain this dichotomy in terms of the family’s characteristics.
The second empirical problem is the impossibility of comprehensive intra-household
analysis due to the lack of data available on the cohort member’s partner. There is lim-
ited information on their human capital attributes, and nothing at all on their attitudes.
Perhaps a fuller account of human capital would have improved the model’s predictive
power, and therefore given more confidence in the underlying theoretical model.
6.5.2 Main conclusions
This chapter set out to say something about continuity and change in the division
of household labour, in a context of rising female employment and substantial policy
change. The key finding here is that the cohort effect, contrary to expectations, is nega-
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tive; the changes that have occurred over the period of interest here have not made the
younger cohort more likely to report shared childcare. It was hypothesised that the in-
creased policy support should have provided families with more options regarding the
reconciliation of work and care, and hopefully facilitated sharing. However this does
not seem to be the case. This is interesting, although not entirely surprising given the
ambiguity of the effect of policy discussed above. The results support the side of the
argument that says that policy reform has encouraged greater specialisation, and has
therefore been regressive from a gender equality point of view. Mothers are encouraged
to take long leaves and participate around their care commitments, which entrenches
their role as primary carer, and the associated labour market disadvantages that this
implies.
As far as the other determinants of the division of care are concerned, the hypothesised
effects did broadly manifest themselves in the results. The division of paid work was
found to be strongly, but imperfectly, associated with the division of care. Thus despite
likely endogeneity in the determination of the division of work and care, these outcomes
are not simply two sides of the same coin. The human capital variables were found to
have the expected effect for the most part, although the coefficient in education was not
in the expected direction. However, although relative potential wage in the household
was found to have the expected positive effect on the odds of shared childcare, there
is still a counter-intuitive difference between the two cohorts in this respect. Mothers’
higher relative financial contribution in the younger cohort does not translate into a more
equal division of care in this cohort. In other words, for a given level of relative income,
parents in the younger cohort are less likely to share childcare. The analysis here offers
little insight into why this should be the case.
It was also found that the sharing of care was more likely among those whose attitudes
are more favourable towards maternal employment, in terms of its perceived costs, ben-
efits and impact on the rest of the family. Therefore preference can be said to be playing
a role in household outcomes, although the significance of the cohort variable indicates
that external constraints are as well. The analysis here cannot determine the extent to
which the division of care is down to preference as opposed to constraint. However, the
results are consistent with the theoretical case that has been made here for the restric-
tions that the policy environment places on dividing care in a non-gender specialised
way, thus the driving factor is unlikely to be preference alone.
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Chapter 7
To work, or not to work? Mothers’
labour force participation
This chapter and the next investigate the second question posed at the end of Chapter
3; the extent to which change has occurred in mothers’ capabilities regarding labour
market participation, and the impact that policy might have had on this. This chapter
looks at the influences on the work decision facing mothers – the decision whether to
work, and if so whether to do so full or part time – within a context of policy incentives,
norms and other environmental factors. The next chapter will consider the implications
of these decisions for mothers’ labour market outcomes, examining the resulting gap
between mothers and other types of worker, and how this has changed.
As with the previous chapter, this one begins with a theoretical discussion of the research
question within the capabilities-based theoretical framework developed in Chapter 3. It
then presents some descriptive analysis before presenting and discussing the results from
logistic regression analysis, and considering their implications for the questions asked
and the theories presented.
7.1 Questions and sample
The focus here is on maternal employment rather than the division of paid work in the
household because, as the previous chapter established, in nine out of ten married or
cohabiting couples with children the father is in full-time employment. The previous
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Table 7.1: Employment status of mothers (cohort respondents) and fathers (their partners) in
the sample
Cohort
NCDS BCS Total N
% % %
Father’s employment status
Full-time work 90.6 91.9 91.1 5,875
Part-time work 1.5 2.5 1.9 125
Unemployed 5.8 1.6 4.0 259
Full-time education 0.6 0.3 0.5 31
Sick 1.1 2.4 1.6 104
Home/family 0.4 1.4 0.8 52
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 6,446
Mother’s employment status
Full-time work 20.8 25.1 22.7 1,484
Part-time work 41.5 44.7 42.9 2,808
Unemployed 1.4 0.6 1.0 68
Full-time education 0.9 0.9 0.9 57
Sick 0.5 1.7 1.0 65
Home/family 34.9 27.1 31.6 2,066
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 6,548
chapter considered all couple households with dependent children, using the available
data on both partners to compare their relative resources and bargaining strengths. This
chapter focuses on a more specific sub-sample of families; couples with dependent chil-
dren in which the father works full-time, and the mother either works full-time, works
part-time, or stays at home to look after the children. Also unlike the previous chapter,
the analysis only uses couples in which the female is the main cohort study respon-
dent. It is mothers’ employment decisions that are the dependent variable of interest,
and only cohort members have the rich data available on their human capital, histories
and attitudes that allows a sophisticated model to be tested; the information on the male
respondents’ partners is too limited.
Fathers who do not work full-time are eliminated because they are so rare, and those
not in employment are almost all classified as unemployed or sick, rather than as carers.
Table 7.1 shows that the mothers report that their partners work full-time in over 90%
of cases. Although this is not an absolute constant, there is very little variation, which
makes it difficult to say anything interesting using a methodology that is logically and
statistically based on the analysis of variation. It is more fruitful to analyse where the
variation does lie, which is in mothers’ labour force participation. Furthermore, concep-
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utally there seems little to be gained from analysing the division of work and care as if it
were a decision made ‘from scratch’; as if it could potentially result in either the mother
or father working or staying at home, when in reality the probability of a stay at home
father is very low. Therefore, all the families in this sample have a father in full-time
employment, and where ‘mother’ is used hereafter, it refers to mothers with partners
who work full-time.
In addition to dropping fathers who are not employed full-time, it is theoretically and
practically expedient to eliminate mothers who are unemployed, sick or in full-time ed-
ucation. Table 7.1 shows that such mothers constitute a very small percentage of each
sample of couple families, and indeed the sub-samples are so small that it would be em-
pirically unsound to make inferences about these groups based on this data. However,
to include them in the same category as stay at home mothers would be theoretically
unsound, as the category would be virtually meaningless, encompassing a range of situ-
ations with very different motivations and consequences. Therefore, the sample includes
only families with dependent children that fall into three particular categories; dual-
full-time (both parents work full-time), one-and-a-half (father works full-time, mother
part-time) and male-breadwinner (father works full-time, mother says at home). There
are 5677 such couples in this combined dataset.
Therefore, the outcome of interest is the mother’s employment status at the time she
was surveyed; is she in employment, and if so whether she works full-time or part-
time. In this analysis, these decisions will be represented in this binary fashion, rather
than expressing work behaviour as hours worked. This ignores any variation in part
time working, which can be anything from a few hours per week to a ‘long’ part time
arrangement that is not far off a full-time position. Nor can it distinguish between full-
time workers who adhere strictly to a 30 hour week and those who work much more
than this in overtime. However, these discrete choices represent a qualitative distinction
between mothers who have chosen to be full-time earners, and those who have chosen
not to be full-time earners.
The analysis aims to understand the impact of policy, and other theoretically relevant
factors, on these employment decisions. The principal research question at hand is that
of the impact of policy, therefore the main research questions centre around a cohort
comparison of work behaviour:
1. What is the impact of policy (and other environmental factors) on the probability
of being in work?
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2. What is the impact of policy (and other environmental factors) on whether a work-
ing mother is in full-time or part-time employment?
However, the analysis can also address some secondary questions around other theoret-
ically important correlates of maternal employment:
3. What is the impact of a mother’s human capital on her employment behaviour?
4. What is the impact of her partner’s human capital and the size of this relative to
her own?
5. What is the impact of a mother’s attitudes to work and care on her employment
behaviour?
6. How does maternal employment vary by number and age of children?
7. Is maternal employment associated with greater sharing of unpaid household tasks?
7.2 Generating hypotheses
This section will develop hypotheses regarding the differences between the cohorts in
mothers’ labour force participation, based on the capabilities framework, the informa-
tion presented on policy reform in Chapter 5, and some case study analysis. These
hypotheses function as a bridge between the theoretical framework, which is based on
the unobservable concept of capabilities, and the empirical work, which is about observ-
able labour market outcomes. This chapter is interested in how the size and nature of
this capability set differs between the two cohorts, given the differences in the prevailing
policy and socio-economic conditions in which they are making employment decisions,
and how this manifests itself in differences in labour market outcomes.
7.2.1 Pull factors, push factors, barriers and capabilities
The literature review identified many factors that make mothers more or less likely to
be in employment, both in terms of their own characteristics, and the nature of the
opportunities they face and the assistance they receive in reconciling their work and care
responsibilities, from their partners and from the state. Rather than simply considering
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these factors in terms of whether they make labour force participation more or less
likely, an additional distinction is made here between factors that enhance choice and
opportunity, and those that do not.
Pull factors make maternal employment more likely by making it more desirable. They
make work attractive relative to nonwork, but without diminishing the capability to
not work, therefore they are capability-enhancing. The gains from employment depend
on human capital, therefore, the more educated a mother is and the more labour market
experience she has, the stronger the pull into employment. However, even if two mothers
have the same potential wage, and therefore ostensibly the same labour market ‘pull’,
they may not both choose to work. Their evaluation of this gain will depend on personal
preferences about money, work, care and the best way to balance these.
If pull factors are the ‘carrots’ to employment then Push factors are the ‘sticks’. These are
the factors of a couple’s situation that make maternal employment more necessary; in
effect, they restrict mothers’ capability to not work. This is partly a function of her part-
ner’s earnings; the higher they are, the weaker the ‘push’ into employment for mothers.
However, the sufficiency of these earnings is also dependent on external factors. If the
cost of living makes it difficult to support a family on a single income, or if the tax-benefit
system does little to support this way of life, then the push factors pushing mothers into
employment will be stronger. They are in effect the other side of the coin to pull factors,
and the distinction is crucial because, although their effect is the same, only pull factors
are enhancing capabilities, and are therefore desireable from a capabilities perspective.
Some factors may act in the opposite direction, to strongly discourage maternal employ-
ment; in effect acting as barriers to it. One such barrier is the financial costs of maternal
employment, such as the cost of childcare. Mothers are also restricted by the need for
flexible working conditions that allow them to balance their often inflexible and un-
predictable care responsibilities with working life; they may not find such conditions
in every job they are qualified for. Mothers are also restricted by normative sanctions
against working motherhood, perceiving a decision to return to work as unusual and so-
cially unacceptable. All such barriers restrict mothers’ capabilities. Policy interventions
or normative changes that remove such barriers are capability-enhancing.
140
Inputs and resources
The key resources here are the human capital factors – education and labour market
experience – that create employment possibilities and the potential for labour market
reward. The more human capital a mother has, the higher the potential remuneration
she can get in employment (Mincer 1958, 1974; Becker 1964, 1975), and therefore the
stronger she is being pulled towards it. This effect is reinforced by the inverse relation-
ship between a mother’s human capital and the extent to which motherhood impacts
her labour market opportunities; the most highly skilled women forgo the lowest pro-
portion of their earnings over their lifetime as a result of childbearing (Davies et al 2000).
Women in higher status jobs are more likely to have occupational provision for mater-
nity that goes beyond the limited statutory requirements (Smeaton and Marsh 2006), and
their higher earnings make it easier for them to afford the necessary childcare to return
to work. Paying for childcare, and other domestic services that working mothers have
less time to perform if they are not at home, represents a barrier to maternal employ-
ment. It is one that women with the most human capital will find easiest to overcome
because it consumes proportionally less of their income. Therefore, the more human
capital a mother has, the better her capabilities will be with regard to her labour market
opportunities.
However, there is a distinction to be made between mothers’ own resources, which are
capability-enhancing, and her partner’s, which may be enhancing or diminishing. The
impact of partner’s human capital is more ambiguous. It is capability enhancing at the
household level; the more he earns, the more options the household has with regard to
how much the mother works. The higher his income, the less the mother has to work in
order to meet the family’s financial needs; equally, the higher the household income, the
easier it is for the couple to buy care and other domestic services. Therefore, a wealthier
couple potentially have a much greater capability set. However, a woman’s resources
relative to her partner’s affects her capabilities to negotiate for her own most preferred
outcome. Therefore, it is important to recognise analytically the distinction between
mother’s own human capital, total absolute household capital, and relative capital, as
these forces may not be working in the same direction.
Chapter 5 outlined the increase in maternal employment over the period of interest
here, and some of the ways in which the path for this trend has been cleared by a
working culture that has – not always voluntarily – become more supportive of it. This
suggests that mothers in the younger cohorts have creater capabilities with respect to
their labour market opportunities. However, the previous chapter showed that, although
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the tangible gap between mothers and their partners is getting smaller with respect to
their earning power, the motherhood gap in the labour market persists. The reasons
for this are likely to be found in the factors that prevent women from converting their
resources into capabilities.
Conversion factors
Although a higher level of human capital gives couples more options with respect to
meeting their work and care obligations, all couples are subject to the same set of ex-
ternal constraints on their ability to convert these resources into capabilities, although
couples with more resources are likely to still have larger capability sets. These external
constraints – what Sen calls ‘conversion factors’ – affect the return on a given level of
resources; the income that will be received, and the costs and unpaid work obligations
of the different work and care options. This section considers the impact on the relative
capabilities of the mothers in each cohort of the three areas discussed in the policy chap-
ter; labour market and economy, policy and norms. The differences between the two
cohorts in these respects imply different pull factors, push factors and barriers.
A key determinant of the expected labour market reward for a given level of human
capital is the prevailing labour market and economic conditions. The difference between
the two cohorts in this respect is likely to have created a stronger push and pull towards
employment for the younger cohort. Economic conditions in 2004 were stronger than in
1991. Figure 7.1 shows the rates of GDP growth and unemployment since 1970. In 2004,
growth was 3.0%, compared with negative growth in 1991 of -1.4%. Unemployment was
also high in 1991, at 8.8%, almost twice as high as it was in 2004, when it was 4.8%.
In strong conditions, labour demand is higher and there is more space for innovation in
ways of working, and greater labour power to demand flexibility. In addition, technolog-
ical change, particularly in communications, has meant that an employer in 2004 would
find it much easier to offer remote and flexible working patterns than an employer in
1991. These trends are likely to have acted as pull factors on mothers in the younger
cohort. The downside of an economic upturn is price inflation, and an increase in the
cost of living that, for most of the labour force, will not be matched by an increase in
wages. The harder it is to meet a family’s financial needs on a single income, the less
choice mothers will have over how much they work. Therefore, the economic conditions
may have pushed the younger cohort into employment as well as pulled them; indeed,
these two forces are likely to be related.
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Figure 7.1: GDP Growth and Unemployment rates in the UK, 1970-2011
Policy affects the ease of maternal employment in three ways: by helping to facilitate
continuity of labour market attachment; by facilitating a more conducive workplace for
those with care responsibilities; and by helping families to meet the costs of employment
and retain its benefits. Policy has changed a great deal in these respects, although the
impact on maternal employment is slightly ambiguous; although it should be easier for
mothers to work, there are also incentives and pressures to take longer leaves.
Human capital theory stresses the importance of time in employment for augmenting
human capital, and the negative impact of time out not only on lost accumulation op-
portunities but active depreciation (Mincer and Polachek 1974). By allowing mothers
to return to the same job after taking some leave, they can not only save the time in-
volved in searching for a new job when they return, but also avoid having to return at a
lower level because they are perceived as less valuable due to depreciation of skills. This
helps mothers to maintain their employment trajectories and thus achieve more relative
to their potential. However, although maternity leave has this positive effect compared
with a situation of no maternity leave, the impact of lengthening leave on maternal em-
ploment is not infinitely positive. The younger cohort are entitled to more leave than
the older cohort, and there are fewer conditions attached to this entitlement. The more
leave that is allowed, the more likely it is that a mother will be able to take her desired
amount of leave, and therefore avoid having to quit entirely. For example, if a mother
wishes to take a year off, but is only entitled to six months of leave, she may decide to
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quit rather than take less leave than she wants to and return to her old job. However,
the longer the leave entitlement, the more likely it is that her preferred length of leave
will be facilitated. However, the longer that women are encouraged to take leave for, the
worse their human capital outcomes will be; even if they do return to the same job, the
lost experience may disadvantage them in subsequent attempts to progress. Therefore,
if policy has encouraged the younger cohort to take longer leaves, they may in fact have
worse labour market outcomes than the older cohort if the older cohort returned quicker.
Furthermore, the asymmetric extension of leave to mothers but not fathers may have had
a normative as well as practical impact, as it may have entrenched rather than challenged
the mother as primary carer/secondary earner paradigm. A year of caring instead of
working establishes them as the carers in their household and their partner as the earner,
creating a gendered division of labour that is then harder to change. If mothers then take
the opportunity to return part time as a balancing strategy, this further entrenches this
division of roles. The jobs with the highest pay and status are often those requiring full
time and unencumbered labour force attachment, and women with care responsibilities
may pay the price for being unable to conform to this male adult worker norm, in terms
of the jobs that are available to them. Therefore, despite a relaxation in attitudes towards
working motherhood (Duncan and Phillips 2008), there has potentially been a concurrent
strengthening of the idea of a mother as carer first, which will have had a negative impact
on mothers’ labour market capabilities.
The return to work after maternity leave is facilitated by a workplace that allows some
flexibility, in order to help parents meet their considerable and often unpredictable care
needs. This may have to be mandated by the government, as employers may not vol-
untarily introduce such provisions, although many do. The policy chapter outlined the
differences between New Labour and their Conservative predecessors in this respect;
the latter did not feel such intervention to be in their remit, whereas New Labour did,
albeit with the interests of employers in mind as well. Therefore, one might expect such
policies to act as a pull factor for the younger cohort, as it should have made work more
attractive for mothers. However, again there is some ambiguity over this effect. The
Maternity Rights Survey data suggested that it is predominantly women that make use
of such policies, particularly the right to request reduced hours. Thus, the institutional
arrangements encourage the role of mother as secondary earner, and mothers deviate
even further from the male worker norm than they might do if there were no such op-
portunities in place. This then adversely affects their human capital and their future
employment opportunities. Therefore, one might find that mothers in the older cohort
who did choose to work did so on a basis much more conducive to human capital ac-
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cumulation than the younger cohort, and therefore their higher potential compensation
acted as a pull factor for them.
The tax and benefit system can facilitate maternal employment by helping families to
meet more of the costs of a mother returning to work, and by increasing and allowing
her to keep more of the gain from it. Unless enough suitable informal care is available,
some childcare will need to be purchased if both parents are in employment. The high
expense of childcare relative to wages in the UK means that this may represent a large
or even complete barrier to returning to work, unless the state offers to either supply
childcare or subsidise the purchase of childcare. New Labour offered far more support
for childcare than their Conservative predecessors, subsidising care for younger children
for lower income families, and introducing free nursery places for 3-4 year olds. There-
fore, this cost will have represented less of a barrier for mothers in the younger cohort,
and we might expect to see more of them in employment. However, the nature of the
employment that was encouraged by the policy reforms was not necessarily full-time em-
ployment. Although childcare subsidy and provision was dramatically increased from
the previous level of almost nothing, it still falls short of providing enough childcare for
all parents that need it. The nursery provision is only for 15 hours per week, which does
not even provide enough for a second earner to qualify for working tax credits, which
require 16 hours of employment per week.
The government can also make work more attractive by increasing the potential reward
from employment. Chapter 5 outlined the way in which the New Labour government
extended the reach and amount of tax credits available, providing some relief on the
income tax of second earners with children. The introduction and extension of the mini-
mum wage may also have increased the potential earnings of many mothers. Therefore,
employment should be relatively more attractive for the younger cohort. In sum, these
policy changes acted to increase mothers’ capabilities; however, the exact outcome in
response to this is not certain as it depends on their underlying preferences.
The younger cohort may also have felt more of a push into employment as a result of
policy reforms. The policy chapter outlined the way in which New Labour’s encour-
agement of maternal employment came not from a gender equality perspective, but as
part of the drive to increase overall employment rates and tackle social exclusion. The
desire to encourage lower-income mothers into work, by making tax credits conditional
on a certain level of employment, acted as a stick as well as a carrot, by making staying
at home more difficult. The household level assessment of tax credits also means that,
the more a mother’s partner is earning, the less government support she is entitled to,
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making employment the only way in which the household can increase its income. The
government is prepared to subsidise childcare, but not provide an equivalent amount
of support to a mother to stay at home, making the impetus to work stronger. There-
fore, the government, knowing that families are in need of the additional support, can
increase maternal employment by making this support conditional on employment.
Preferences
The above discussion has suggested that, in some respects, mothers’ capabilities have
improved with respect to the work options they have; barriers to work have been low-
ered, and it has been made more attractive for some. The impact of these changes on
labour market outcomes is ambiguous. They will only result in more mothers working
if they wish to work but found it impossible or unappealing under the previous social,
economic and political conditions. Whether they wish to work depends on their personal
evaluation of the costs and benefits of different work and care options. However, there
is no obvious difference between the cohorts in these respects; these preferences are not
the same as norms, which it has been established have relaxed to a great extent. Indeed,
a key rationale of the capability approach is to distinguish between norms and personal
preference, by leaving room for both in the decisionmaking process.
However, some of the changes discussed above have not been capability enhancing; they
have pushed mothers into work rather than made it easier or more attractive for them to
do so. The expected impact of such changes would be that there would be more mothers
in the younger cohort in work; they have not just been given the opportunity to work,
they have been pushed into it. Therefore, on balance, the combination of the ambiguous
effects of increased capabilities, and the positive effects of increased push factors, makes
employment more likely in the younger cohort.
7.2.2 Case studies
As with the previous chapter, case studies will be used to illustrate some of the theo-
retical ideas expressed above, and to understand the role of policy by considering the
counterfactual situation. The case study section in the previous chapter focussed on
gender roles and dynamics, and the chapter as a whole confirmed the importance of
gendered ideas about roles and responsibilities in the division of household labour. In
this chapter, the case study section will pay little attention to these issues, and focus
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instead on how economic and policy factors affect the push, pull and barrier factors
described above.
The case studies illustrate the important role of policy in altering the costs and benefits
of maternal employment, which are key to whether a mother returns to work or not.
Being a stay at home mother (SAHM) is something that the case study women do first
of all because they can, and secondly because they wish to, or at least they do not see
sufficient incentive to work. As all the men in the sample here are employed, we can take
husband’s income as a starting point, from which mothers assess the extent to which they
need to augment the family income. She may not need to work at all if her husband’s
income provides sufficient household goods and her own employment is not valued as
highly as caring for her children at home. So for example Janet and Kathy, the SAHMs
in the NCDS case studies, have similar earning potential to Carol and Susan, who work
part time; however, the former have much higher earning husbands.
For a mother who does not have to work, it may make little sense to do so if her expected
earnings are low. Before having children, Kathy (NCDS SAHM) had had a job doing
partly skilled assembly work, which paid just £65 per week for full time hours. Were she
to return to the same job, childcare would cost £15 per week (Meltzer 1994), and because
her husband earns a reasonable salary, she would not be entitled to any of the in-work
benefits available in 1991. Therefore, returning to work would not make the family any
better off, in fact the net financial impact is negative, and therefore she is unlikely to do
so.
For Mandy (BCS SAHM), the policy environment makes work marginally more finan-
cially attractive, to the extent that she could make a net gain from returning to work.
Before having children she had been a sales assistant; returning to this kind of job 16
hours per week would pay a net salary of £87 per week.1 Her 5-year-old is at school
but she would need to purchase childcare for her 2-year-old, at a likely cost of around
£67 per week (Bryson et al 2006). Although tax credits would offset some of the costs
of this, because of her husband’s earnings she would only be entitled to around half.
Thus, although she would make a net gain from returning to work, it is not likely to be
more than £50 per week. This illustrates a couple of the issues raised above with the
way that family policy has been extended; that although it is more generous, it still does
not go far enough, and its household level of assessment means that women are more
encouraged to be dependent than they are to return to work. If earning potential is high
then it is worth maintaining labour force attachment even if the net gain is temporarily
1Note that all prices are at 1991 levels for comparability between cohorts.
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low, for the sake of future earnings. However, this is not the case for either Kathy or
Mandy. Therefore, they are unlikely to work if they do not highly value work in itself,
which they do not; both are less work orientated than average.
The impact of the more supportive policy and economic environment facing the younger
cohort can be illustrated by considering how the situation might have been different for
the NCDS SAHMs had they been raising children during this time. For example, as their
youngest children are all at least three, all would be eligible for a free part-time nursery
place, thus offsetting some of the cost of childcare and allowing them to keep more of
what they earn. Had the minimum wage been introduced at this time, their potential
earnings may have been be higher. For example, Pauline’s former job as a cleaner is one
that is likely to have been affected by the introduction of a statutory minimum wage.
However, the case studies also demonstrate the way that these higher earnings are a
double edged sword for women, as price inflation meant that the cost of living rose
alongside wages. Karen (BCS, part-time) is also in a clerical role and relatively better
paid than Janet. However, she is in work despite having a well-paid husband and being
not particularly work-orientated. This may be because the family live in the South East of
England and have a joint mortgage, and therefore face a much higher cost of living than
Janet did in 1991. This illustrates the way that women in the younger cohort are both
pushed and pulled into employment relative to their counterparts in the older cohort.
Once the decision to work has been made along the economic lines discussed above,
the decision whether to work full-time or not depends much more on preferences and
attitudes, and how these shape the way that mothers respond to the incentives they
face to return. For example, if we compare the working mothers in the older cohort,
they face a very similar economic situation; there are no substantial differences in their
husband’s earnings, which they feel the need to supplement, but not necessarily with
another full-time income. However, the disctinction between them can be made on the
two inter-related dimensions of employment prospects and attitudes to employment.
Carol and Susan, who work part-time, have low status and low paid jobs compared to
Sandy and Angela, who work full-time, and are less work orientated. These two phe-
nomena are related; there is considerable endogeneity between work orientation, hours
worked and hourly pay. Sandy in particular works very long hours in her job, something
that Carol and Susan do not seem prepared to do in order to sustain what is a better
position. The impact of attitudes can be seen not just statistically but longitudinally as
well. The women’s occupational histories have taken very different paths since leaving
school. Angela and Sandy did not take any labour market breaks when they had chil-
dren, while Carol and Susan have taken the more gendered route of employment breaks
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and part-time working. Although the full-time working mothers are no more qualified
educationally, their occupational paths have diverged so much that Carol and Susan
could not choose to do what Angela and Sandy do now, even if they wanted to.
This gap between the two paths has been exacerbated by a policy environment that has
left them with these two stark choices, through its lack of help in the reconciliation of
work and care. The situation is different for the mothers in the younger cohort, in which
the part-time working mothers, Karen and Margaret, do not seem to have fallen behind
their full-time counterparts, Nicola and Lisa, nearly as much. Karen and Margaret hold
higher status and better paid jobs than Carol and Susan, and could potentially earn as
much as their husbands were they to work full-time. That they do not seems to come
down to individual attitudes. This can be illustrated by a comparison between Margaret
and Nicola. Although Nicola feels a strong economic imperative to work given her hus-
band’s earnings, she does not have to work full-time; because she does, as a household,
their earnings are much higher than average. However, she is highly work-orientated,
has been in continuous full-time work since leaving school at 16, and has achieved sev-
eral promotions in her current employment. This can be contrasted with Margaret, who
has worked part-time since returning after the birth of her first child. Although her
part-time hours mean that the household’s income is a bit lower than average, she has
traditional attitudes towards the family, which might well partly explain her decision to
work part-time. Margaret has followed a more traditional secondary-earner path since
the birth of her first child, but seems to have had more opportunities to maintain a career
trajectory that is closer to that of a full-time earner than her counterparts in the older
cohort. This may well be due to the increased opportunities for part time and flexible
working that she has. It is also interesting to note that, although she took a labour mar-
ket break after her first child, by the time her second was born maternity leave had been
considerably extended, and she is not recorded as having taken a break at this time. This
suggests that the extension to maternity leave has allowed her to maintain labour force
attachment, which has subsequently benefited her.
7.2.3 Hypotheses
Overall, it seems that mothers in the younger cohort experience greater push and pull
factors into employment, and fewer barriers to it. Therefore, it is hypothesised that:
H1: Mothers in the younger cohort are more likely to be in work than those in the older
cohort.
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This effect is expected to persist even after controlling for systematic individual-level
differences between the cohorts that might make employment more likely. Women in
the younger cohort with the same level of human capital as someone in the older cohort
are more likely to be employed by virtue of the policy and wider economic environment
in which they find themselves.
However, two factors make the return to work more likely to be part time, and therefore
there will be a greater proportion of part-time workers in the younger cohort. Firstly,
these are women who in the absence of the new policy support would have chosen to stay
at home rather than work full-time; therefore if this type of woman is encouraged into
work, it is arguably more likely to be on a part-time basis. Secondly, as discussed above,
the available policy supports are facilitating maternal employment within a mother as
carer first and part-time earner second paradigm.
Therefore, it might be expected that:
H2: Of mothers who are in work, those in the younger cohort are more likely to be in
part time work than those in the older cohort.
7.3 Descriptive analysis
7.3.1 In or out of work
The dependent variable here is a binary indicator of whether the mother is in work or
not. Mothers working full or part-time are considered to be in work, while those stating
their primary activity as home/family are considered not to be in work. Mothers in
other categories such as absent from work due to sickness are excluded for the reasons
outlined at the start of this chapter. Any mother on maternity leave at the time of the
survey is categorised as being in employment, because this is how their status is recorded
in the data. Any woman still under contract and intending to return is coded as being in
employment, while those who have ceased to be employed are coded as home/family.
Thus, women whose primary activity is looking after children can be coded as ‘in work’
even though they may not physically be going into work every day, but there is no way
of knowing this from the data.
Table 7.2 shows the distribution of this variable by cohort. It shows that more mothers
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Table 7.2: Mothers’ work participation by cohort
Cohort
Mother’s employment status NCDS BCS Total N
% % %
Home/family 33.9 27.4 31.1 1,766
In work 66.1 72.6 68.9 3,911
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 5,677
Pearson chi2(1) = 26.8278 Pr = 0.000
Figure 7.2: Work participation by cohort and age of youngest child and number of children
in the younger cohort are in work than in the older cohort, as predicted by hypothesis 1.
A chi square test finds this association to be statistically significant. As time out of the
labour market is almost always a temporary phenomenon, it is also interesting to con-
sider how this participation varies by age and number of children, and how this differs
between the two cohorts. Figure 7.2 shows what might be expected; that being in the
younger cohort, and having fewer children, makes being in employment more likely.2.
Over 70% of first time mothers in the younger cohort are still in employment; they may
well be on maternity leave, but they intend to return and are still under contract. This
compares with just over half of all first time mothers in the younger cohort. By the time
the youngest child is 7, participation rates are very similar between the two cohorts and
between women with one or more children.
Therefore, predictions about mothers in the younger cohort being both more pushed
and more pulled into work seem to be borne out in these figures. However, the analysis
cannot simply stop here, as before differences between the cohorts in maternal employ-
2A full table of this data is given in table A.7 in Appendix A
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Table 7.3: Mothers’ full-time or part-time status by cohort
Cohort
Mother works full or part time NCDS BCS Total N
% % %
Part time 67.3 65.5 66.5 2,600
Full time 32.7 34.5 33.5 1,311
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 3,911
Pearson chi2(1) = 1.5076 Pr = 0.220
ment can be attributed to their environment, it is necessary to control for other pertinent
differences between their characteristics that make employment more or less likely. This
is what the regression analysis does below.
7.3.2 Full-time or part-time
The other dependent variable used in this chapter pertains only to women in employ-
ment, and distinguishes between those in full-time employment, and those in part-time
employment, which is defined in the data as less than 30 hours per week. Again it
is worth noting that maternity leave is counted as being in whatever employment the
mother had previously been in, which makes this variable slightly less useful than it
could be. For example, it cannot distinguish between a woman who is on maternity
leave but is still coded as full-time, and a woman who has returned to work part-time.
Table 7.3 shows the distribution of this variable by cohort. More mothers in the younger
cohort than the older cohort are in full-time work, contrary to hypothesis 2. However, the
chi square test suggests that the association is not statistically significant. Therefore, at
this raw stage of the analysis the expected pattern of more part time work in the younger
cohort does not appear to be borne out. However, more rigorous analysis is needed to




7.4.1 Variables and specification
Two regression models are presented here; one predicting work participation, the other
predicts full-time participation for mothers in work. There are six blocks of explanatory
variables (table 7.4) that try to capture the different dimensions of the work decision as
conceptualised above.
Table 7.4: Explanatory variables
Block Variables
Block 1: Policy environment Cohort
Block 2: Mother’s human capital Mother’s (imputed) wage
Mother’s highest qualification
Longstanding illness or disability
Block 3: Partner’s human capital Partner’s (imputed) wage
Age partner left school
Block 4: External resources Sources of external help
Nonwage income
Accommodation in joint name
Block 5: Attitudes and preferences Attitudes to working mothers




Block 6: Size and distribution of household burden Number of children
Number of children 0-4
Who mostly does the cooking
Who mostly does the shopping
Who mostly does the cleaning
Who mostly does the laundry
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Block 1 is simply cohort membership; a dummy variable taking 1 for the younger cohort
and zero for the older cohort. This encapsulates the main issue of interest in the analysis;
the difference between the policy, normative and socioeconomic environments facing the
two cohorts. The other blocks represent the relevant controls to ensure that the cohort
effect is not simply an artefact of their different characteristics.
Resources and relative resources
Block 2 represents the mother’s human capital. It attempts to use as much of the avail-
able information as possible, not only on present status but on historical labour market
behaviour, to give a realistic idea of what each woman might expect to earn in the labour
market, even if she is not currently in employment. The variables in this block are either
wage or imputed wage where no current wage data is available 3, a dummy for disability,
and a categorical measure of highest qualification. Although qualification is used in the
calculation with imputed wage, it is not very strongly correlated with the final imputed
measure, and it was found by likelihood ratio test to improve the model, so it is included
here as well.
Block 3 represents partner’s human capital, to the extent that this is possible with the
data available. Partner’s income is the starting point in the theoretical conceptualisation
of the work decision here, and it also represents the economic disparities in the house-
hold that can have an impact on mothers’ bargaining power. The income measure used
is of income from all sources, to represent his overall financial contribution to the house-
hold. As with mother’s human capital, it is a partially imputed measure; although all
fathers are in work, there is a lot of missing wage data, and where it is missing it has
been imputed to avoid casewise deletion. Again a measure of educational qualification
was also found to improve the model and is included.
Block 4 tries to give a picture of the mother’s external resources, which are assumed to
augment her bargaining power and thus her ability to choose her preferred employment
outcome from the household’s capability set. It contains variables on sources of external
help, income from nonwage sources4 and a tenure status dummy indicating whether the
couple’s tenancy or mortgage is jointly registered.
Preferences
3As outlined in the methodology chapter, the imputed wage variable takes into account education, labour
market history and regional wage variation.
4Although there is potentially a correlation between benefit income and work status, all the women in
this sample cohabit with working partners, therefore those out of work are not entitled to income support.
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Block 5 tries to capture the mother’s attitudes to work and family, both directly from at-
titudinal questions and through some factors that are assumed to have influenced these
attitudes. These try to give some indication of the preferences on which a final outcome
is chosen from the capability set. It was established in the discussion of the data in Chap-
ter 4 that the available variables on attitudes to family and work are suboptimal due to
the point at which they are collected, but provide the best available measure of these atti-
tudes in this dataset. Also included is a dummy variable indicating religious attachment,
as these may be indicators of a more traditional family orientation, and, given possible
intergeneral linkages in attitudes, an indication of whether the respondent’s own mother
worked before the respondent started school.5
Controls
Finally block 6 attempts to control for variation in the overall size of the unpaid work
burden to be shared. It is somewhat endogenous to the labour force participation deci-
sion, and any associations need to be interpreted with this in mind. However, these are
factors that may well affect a couple’s work and care decision and should be controlled
for. For example, a family with three children under five clearly faces a very different set
of costs and time constraints than one with a single secondary school aged child. Thus,
the block includes variables with the total number of children, and the number who
are under the age of five. It also includes measures of who does the household chores;
whether the mother does these all by herself or whether her partner is willing to help.
Although there is some circularity in representing attitudes with outcomes, this variable
may also be the best way given the data that is available to represent whether the father
is egalitarian or traditional in his family attitudes.
Issues with missing data on four variables meant that, although their inclusion is the-
oretically interesting, their impact on the sample size and resulting estimates cast too
much doubt on the results. Including all four brought the total proportion of missing
data from 25% to 44%. Therefore, there is no incorporation of data on the mother’s sav-
ings, her job aspirations at age 16, and the age her own mother left education. The only
variable of the four to be included is whether the mother’s own mother worked before
she started school, which reduces the sample by around 10%.
5Other variables that were thought to have a potential association were marital status, social class of
origin, and whether the respondent’s parents divorced, but these were found to be insignificant and did not
add to the explanatory power of the model, therefore they are not included in the presentation of results
here.
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Table 7.5: Means of explanatory variables
NCDS BCS
mean count mean count
Logged hourly wage (£, 1991 prices) 1.373 3228 1.506 2425
Has longstanding illness or disability 0.128 3246 0.224 2425
Highest qualification1 2.256 3193 2.635 2425
Partner’s logged weekly income (£, 1991 prices) 5.510 3102 5.642 2395
Age partner left full-time education2 2.129 3197 2.427 2387
Sources of help 2.400 3139 2.375 2419
Non-wage income (£, 1991 prices) 27.798 3193 51.622 2227
Accommodation in joint or own name 0.914 3234 0.917 2386
Identifies as Christian 0.631 3246 0.217 2424
Attitude to working mothers -0.040 2559 -0.162 2291
Attitude to family values -0.062 2559 0.091 2291
Attitude to work -0.246 2559 0.102 2291
Own mother employed before started school 0.305 2760 0.221 1749
Number of dependent children in household 2.063 3252 1.937 2425
Number of children 0-4 0.709 3252 0.793 2425
Who does the cooking3 1.177 3137 1.283 2409
Who does the shopping3 1.316 3134 1.289 2411
Who does the cleaning3 1.218 3135 1.280 2410
Who does the laundry3 1.128 3132 1.187 2411
1As measured on a scale from 0 (no qualifications) to 5 (degree or higher)
2As measured on a scale from 1 (under 16) to 4 (20 or over)
3Where 1 indicates ‘woman mostly’ and 2 indicates ‘shared or partner mostly’
Table 7.5 shows the means of these variables by cohort. This table demonstrates some
key differences between the two cohorts in these explanatory variables, which may have
implications for their work behaviour. For example, the younger cohort is more educated
and has a higher imputed wage, and human capital theory suggests that this would make
them more likely to be in work. Not all of these associations make the younger cohort
more likely to be in work; although mothers in the younger cohort are more tolerant
of working mothers, as indicated by the lower average value on this variable, the older
cohort are more work orientated. Differences in the number and age of children are
in line with demographic trends towards later childbearing; mothers in the younger
cohort have fewer children on average, and are more likely to have a child under five,
although these differences are fairly small. The next section will control for all these




Two logistic regression models were run; one predicting employment, and the other
predicting full-time employment for working mothers. The exact form and interpretation
of this type of model was outlined in Chapter 4.
7.4.2 Predicting employment
Main effects
Table 7.6: Regression results: mother is in work or stay at home mother
Variable Mother is in employment
Odds Ratio p-value
Cohort 1.366∗∗ (0.003)




O level 1.320 (0.090)
A level 1.255 (0.259)
Higher non-degree 2.798∗∗∗ (0.000)
Degree/higher degree 2.638∗∗∗ (0.000)
Has longstanding illness or disability 0.864 (0.203)
Partner’s logged weekly income (£, 1991 prices) 0.688∗∗∗ (0.000)
Age partner left full-time education




Sources of help 1.091 (0.142)
Non-wage income (£, 1991 prices) 1.000 (0.644)
Accommodation in joint or own name 1.743∗∗∗ (0.000)
Attitude to working mothers 0.583∗∗∗ (0.000)
Attitude to family values 0.980 (0.652)
Attitude to work 1.114∗ (0.018)
Identifies as Christian 1.011 (0.906)
Own mother employed before started school 1.220∗ (0.041)
Number of dependent children in household 0.796∗∗∗ (0.000)
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Number of children aged 0-4 in household
None ref -
1 0.328∗∗∗ (0.000)
2 or more 0.144∗∗∗ (0.000)
Cooking shared equally 1.957∗∗∗ (0.000)
Shopping shared equally 0.886 (0.236)
Who does the cleaning
Woman mostly ref -
Equal or partner 1.842∗∗∗ (0.000)
Someone else 2.021∗ (0.017)
Who does the laundry
Woman mostly ref -
Equal or partner 1.700∗∗ (0.004)




Hosmer-Lemeshow G.O.F. (p-value) .139
% correctly classified 74.7%
Exponentiated coefficients; p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 7.6 shows the results of the logistic regression for the variable predicting employ-
ment participation. Overall, the model does not provide a particularly full or satisfying
account of mothers’ labour force participation, although it does provide some supportive
evidence for the theoretical model that has been set out here. The pseudo-R2 of .184 sug-
gests that a limited amount of the variation in the model is explained by the independent
variables included here. The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test yielded a p-value
of .15; the nonsignificance of this result suggests that the fit of the model is acceptable.
Block 1: context
The coefficient on cohort is positive and significant, suggesting that mothers in the
younger cohort are more likely to be in work, as per Hypothesis 1. The value of 1.366 in-
dicates that the odds of being in employment are 37% higher. The model has controlled
for a range of other variables that might influence the probability of work participation,
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but the treatment effect remains significant. Therefore, this increased participation is not
just because the younger cohort are better educated or more work orientated, as these
factors have been controlled for to the extent that they are observable in this data. The
evidence is consistent with the theoretical propositions put forward in the previous chap-
ter about the impact of context, or conversion factors, on outcomes. Policy reforms have
made it easier and more attractive for mothers to work, which has been reinforced by
the opening of labour market opportunities for mothers, economic pressures for second
incomes, and normative shifts towards greater acceptance of maternal employment. In
short, the results are consistent with the proposition put forward in the previous chapter
that, on the whole, mothers in the younger cohort face stronger push and pull factors
into work, and fewer barriers in obtaining it.
Blocks 2, 3 and 4: absolute and relative resources
All the other blocks of variables are significant (see table A.8 in Appendix A), even if not
every individual variable within that block is. As these blocks were chosen to represent
the different dimensions in the theoretical model, it suggests that the model is a suitable
if incomplete representation of maternal employment.
The coefficients on the qualification dummies show that women educated to diploma
or degree level are more likely to be in employment than those with no qualifications;
the odds are around two and a half times as high. However no significant difference
was found between women with school level qualifications and those with none. When
highest qualification is controlled for, the coefficient on imputed wage is insignificant.
This casts some doubt on the proposition that women will be increasingly tempted into
work the higher their potential wage; it is not a higher wage per se that tempts women
into work. Rather, it suggests a particular type of mother that is more likely to be in em-
ployment; highly educated women who have made strong human capital investments,
suggesting not only high earnings potential but also strong orientation towards work.
These women have more desire to work, more to gain and fewer barriers to working.
This reinforces the idea that women with high levels of human capital have a greater
choice set.
Disability was not found to be a significant predictor of work status. Perhaps any impact
it might have on mothers’ employment has already happened; it is already encapsulated
in their qualification and work history variables.
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Partner’s wage was found to have a negative impact on how likely a mother is to be
in work; as suggested in the above discussion, this reduces the push on mothers to
be in employment. An increase of one (logged) unit reduces the odds of her being in
work by 30%. This corresponds with the idea in the theoretical framework that a higher
partner income gives women more choice not to work if they do not want to. The
effect is significant, although some caution should be exercised, as the standard error
calculated here has not taken account of the partially imputed nature of this variable
and may therefore have been underestimated, leading to a potentially false calculation
of significance. As with mother’s education, it is only the most educated fathers who
have a significant impact on their partner’s work participation. The fact that only the
post-school category is significant suggests that it is only a particular type of higher
earning father that can afford to support a non-working wife.
There is a positive, significant coefficient on the tenure status variable, suggesting that
women whose mortgage or rental agreement is in their name are in a stronger position
to negotiate less specialised household outcomes, and to help meet the costs and barri-
ers of returning to work. However, the association almost certainly implies the reverse
as well; that women in employment are able to secure better external resources. The
coefficient on nonwage income is not significant. This is perhaps because on average the
contribution of this source of income to the household is very small, and not enough to
impact the decision either way. Sources of help is not significant either; this may be due
to the imperfect way in which it captures the underlying concept, as discussed in the
methodology chapter.
Block 5: preferences and ability to obtain them
The significance of some of these variables in this block is supportive of the role of prefer-
ences as well as contextual factors in understanding household outcomes; in the model,
context is controlled for and significant, but attitudes remain at least partially significant.
It seems that there is a role for both structure and agency in this decisionmaking model.
The variables representing attitudes are hard to interpret numerically, because the un-
derlying numbers have no intuitive meaning, as they are derived from factor loadings, as
outlined in the methodology chapter. However, their direction and significance suggest
that attitudes play an important role in the decision to work, along the lines theorised
above. The variable representing attitudes to working motherhood is significant and
negative as expected; the less favourable a mother’s attitudes towards working mothers,
the less likely she is to be in employment. Attitudes to work were also found to be
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significant, with more work-orientated mothers more likely to be in employment. The
fact that these two variables are significant even when controlling for the human capital
factors above suggests that education and potential wage imperfectly capture orientation
towards work and family. As was suggested by the case studies, women need not have
particularly high human capital to be highly work orientated. The decision to work is not
just based on the prevailing incentives, but on orientations towards these relative costs
and benefits. The coefficient on family attitudes is not significant, perhaps reflecting the
imperfect association between abstract ideas about marriage, and personal views about
how one’s own household should operate.
A mother whose own mother worked before she started school is more likely to be in
employment; this increases the odds by 26%. This lends some support to theories of
an imperfect but perceptible transmission of values about working motherhood between
generations.
Block 6: controls for family responsibilities
It is interesting to note the degree to which the explanatory power of the model im-
proves with the addition of the final block controlling for the size and distribution of
family responsibilities. Before adding this block, the pseudo-R2 is around .09, but after-
wards it increases to .18. Therefore, these variables alone account for half of the model’s
explanatory power, with the other variables playing quite a small role in explaining vari-
ation in mothers’ employment. These results suggest that the costs of and barriers to
employment are higher, the larger and less equally shared the unpaid work burden is,
and that the mechanisms to support working mothers only do so up to a point. This
is also consistent with ideas in Chapter 6 about the cumulative impact of motherhood
creating a vicious circle of gendered specialisation. However, it is important also to con-
sider the potential endogeneity between family size, task distribution and egalitarianism.
Perhaps more traditional women are happier to specialise in child care, and are therefore
more likely to have more children and do more household work because they are not
trying to combine work and care. Or it may also suggest that couples who prefer a more
egalitarian arrangement may limit their family size in order to achieve this.
The number of children in the household and their ages are both significant variables.
Each additional child reduces the odds of being in work by 20%. The impact of the pres-
ence of pre-school children is even higher; compared to mothers who have no preschool
children, the odds of being in work are two thirds lower for mothers with one pre-school
child, and 85% lower for women with two or more. This may reflect normative ideas
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and individual preferences about the care of very young as opposed to older children.
However, the high price of childcare for preschool aged children will also exert pressure
in the same negative direction by imposing a barrier to employment. It is impossible to
say from these results which of these factors is having the strongest influence.
Some of the household task division variables were found to be significant; having a
partner who shares the cooking, cleaning and laundry at least equally are associated
with a mother being in work; the odds are nearly twice as high in the case of sharing
the cooking. There is almost certainly a degree of endogeneity or at least simultaneity in
these results; mothers may perform the majority of the household chores because they do
not work, and this is how they organise the division of work and care. However, given
the evidence in Chapter 6 that men with full-time working partners do not necessarily
help with the household tasks, a mother may also take into account how helpful her
partner is with these tasks when weighing up whether to go back to work. A final
point worth noting is that the largest coefficient in the household task variables is on
the category of someone else doing the cleaning; the odds of a mother with an external
cleaner being in work are twice as high than a woman who does most of the cleaning
herself. This compares with 1.8 times higher for women whose partners help. Therefore,
it would seem that being able to shift the burden rather than having to redistribute is a
more likely route to an egalitarian division of labour.
As the above model is large and not every variable is significant, a more parsimonious
model was also run, which omitted the insignificant variables, as the inclusion of irrele-
vant variables inflates the standard errors, leading to false conclusions of insignificance
(Menard 1995:59). The results of this are given in table A.9 in Appendix A. Omitting the
insignificant variables increased the sample size by 171, at almost no cost to the explana-
tory power of the model as measured by the pseudo-R2. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test
also indicated that the model remains a good fit for the data. However, there were also
some drawbacks to estimating this more parsimonious form of the model. Coefficients
in the reduced model were identical in direction but slightly larger than the full model,
indicating the bias that occurs when relevant variables are omitted in a regression model;
the effects of the remaining variables are overstated because they are accounting for the
effect of the omitted ones. Therefore, this problem, combined with some doubt over
the usefulness of the Wald test for significance in logistic models (Menard 1995; Agresti
1996) meant that the final model used in this chapter was the one with all the variables.
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Cohort effects and interactions
As with the previous chapter, tests were conducted to establish whether the pooling of
the two cohorts into a single model was acceptable. A likelihood ratio test of the pooled
versus separate models was significant, suggesting differences between the two cohorts
in the magnitude of the coefficients. Running the two models separately (table A.10 in
Appendix A) shows some differences in the magnitude, significance and even direction
of some of the coefficients. This suggests that there may be interaction effects between
cohort and other explanatory variables. These suspected interactions were also tested
for significance, by re-running the model with interaction terms. Most of the interac-
tions were not found to be significant, based on the Wald test. For example, table A.10
shows that the odds ratios on the higher education dummies appear to be higher for the
younger cohort, suggesting a stronger impact, but the interaction between qualification
and cohort was not found to be significant.
Some suspected interactions did however turn out to be significant; the coefficients on
the significant interaction terms are shown in table 7.7. The impact of both own and
partner’s income was found to vary by cohort. This was suggested in the table with the
separate models, which shows that the impact of wage is completely different in the two
cohorts. Table A.10 shows that mother’s wage is positive and significant for the younger
cohort, and the impact is strong; an increase of one (logged) unit increases the odds of
participation by 47%. However the coefficient is negative and insignificant for the older
cohort. This marked difference perhaps also gives some insight into why the variable
was found to be insignificant in the pooled model. Partner’s income also has a different
effect in each cohort, being negative and significant in the older cohort, and negative but
insignificant in the younger cohort. This perhaps suggests different attitudes to income
pooling in the two cohorts; that mothers in the younger cohort do not expect to be
financially supported in the same way that the older cohort did, and therefore do not
adjust their employment behaviour in response to their partner’s earnings as much.
The coefficient on the product term of cohort and own wage (table 7.7) indicates that
the positive impact of an additional unit of income on work participation is 1.9 times
higher for the younger cohort. Similarly, the negative impact of an additional unit of
partner’s income is 1.5 times weaker for the younger cohort. Therefore, it would seem
that mothers’ employment in the younger cohort is more responsive to their own earn-
ing potential, and less responsive to their partner’s. This lends some support to the
contention that mothers in the younger cohort face both lower barriers and greater push
and pull factors to earn. The fact that own wage has no effect for the older cohort sug-
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gests that mothers in this cohort were unable to respond to wage incentives in the same
way as mothers in the younger cohort because they faced additional barriers to work
participation. Furthermore, the insignificance of partner’s wage in the younger cohort
suggests that mothers in this cohort face greater pressure to earn, due to the economy
and the cost of living, even if their partners are well paid, while mothers in the older
cohort found it easier not to work.
The other significant interaction is between cohort and children under five. The coeffi-
cient on this interaction suggests that the negative impact of an additional child under
five is 27% stronger for the younger cohort. This may reflect stronger preferences on the
part of this cohort towards home care of small children, although the variable means
in table 7.5 suggested that this cohort are more favourable towards working mothers.
Therefore, it may reflect the barriers this cohort face in combining work and care.
Table 7.7: Impact of selected interaction term coefficients on the dependent variable
Interaction term Mother is in employment
Odds Ratio p-value
Cohort * logged hourly wage 1.886∗∗ (0.006)
Cohort * logged partner’s wage 1.470∗ (0.026)
Cohort * partner’s qualification 0.771∗ (0.041)
Cohort * number of children aged 0-4 0.731∗ (0.033)
7.4.3 Predicting full-time participation
Table 7.8 shows the results for the model predicting full-time versus part-time participa-
tion. The pseudo-R2 of .146 suggests that the explanatory variables used here are even
less satisfactory for explaining work hours than they are for explaining employment
participation. However some are significant, and the Hosmer-Lemeshow test indicates a
good fit for the data.
Unlike the previous model, the coefficient on cohort is not significant. The odds ratio of
0.884 indicates a relationship in the hypothesised direction, but it was not found to differ
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significantly from 1. Therefore, this confirms what was suggested in the descriptive anal-
ysis above; that the decision to participate full or part time does not vary systematically
by cohort. It is necessary to look beyond the influence of policy, cultural or economic
factors in understanding why mothers work the hours they do.
Table 7.8: Regression results: mother works full-time or part-time
Variable Mother works full-time
Odds Ratio p-value
Cohort 0.884 (0.300)




O level 1.244 (0.289)
A level 1.433 (0.153)
Higher non-degree 1.898∗∗ (0.005)
Degree/higher degree 2.591∗∗∗ (0.000)
Has longstanding illness or disability 0.788 (0.078)
Partner’s logged weekly income (£, 1991 prices) 0.793∗ (0.027)
Age partner left full-time education




Sources of help 0.912 (0.178)
Non-wage income (£, 1991 prices) 1.000 (0.134)
Accommodation in joint or own name 0.912 (0.619)
Attitude to working mothers 0.696∗∗∗ (0.000)
Attitude to family values 0.869∗∗ (0.007)
Attitude to work 1.169∗∗ (0.003)
Identifies as Christian 0.920 (0.455)
Own mother employed before started school 1.347∗∗ (0.004)
Number of dependent children in household 0.624∗∗∗ (0.000)
Number of children aged 0-4 in household
None ref -
1 0.569∗∗∗ (0.000)
2 or more 0.473∗∗∗ (0.000)
Who does the cooking
Woman mostly ref -
Equal or partner 1.964∗∗∗ (0.000)
Someone else 2.729 (0.357)
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Who does the shopping
Woman mostly ref -
Equal or partner 1.343∗∗ (0.006)
Someone else 3.989 (0.347)
Who does the cleaning
Woman mostly ref -
Equal or partner 1.788∗∗∗ (0.000)
Someone else 1.891∗ (0.016)
Who does the laundry
Woman mostly ref -
Equal or partner 1.564∗∗ (0.002)




Hosmer-Lemeshow G.O.F. (p-value) .375
% correctly classified 73.2%
Exponentiated coefficients; p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
All of the other blocks of explanatory variables were significant, apart from block 4
(see table A.11 in Appendix A). As far as absolute and relative resources are concerned,
only mother’s education was found to be significant, and within this only the highest
category. The odds of a degree-educated woman being in full-time employment are
2.6 times higher than a woman with no qualifications. This variable seems to capture
any effect of the additional income such women are likely to earn, as the coefficient
on imputed wage is not significant. Partner’s income or education are not significant
predictors of whether a mother is in full or part-time work, suggesting that while the
decision whether to work is based in part on economic imperative, the decision of how
many hours is based more on expected rewards and attitudes to work.
All three attitude variables are significant, and the direction of the coefficients is as
expected. Women who are more work orientated are more likely to be in full-time em-
ployment, while women whose views are less favourable to working mothers and more
traditional with respect to family values are less likely to be in full-time employment.
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This lends some support to the idea that employment and family orientation plays some
role in determining a mother’s employment behaviour, although the results are also
consistent with less agentic interpretations. They suggest an element of doing gender;
perhaps mothers who would prefer to be stay at home mothers are more likely to work
part-time because it allows them to perform this aspect of their perceived role as a good
mother. They are also consistent with ideas of intergenerational transmission of values.
As with the previous model, having a mother who worked is highly significant, and
increases the odds of being in full-time work by 35%, thus lending support to the idea
of intergenerational value transmission as well.
Both number of children and number of children under 5 are found to have a signif-
icant impact. The former makes more of a difference to work hours than it does to
employment participation, but whether children are younger makes less of a difference.
However, the effects are still fairly substantial in both cases; an additional child reduces
the odds of working full time by 38%, while one additional child under five reduces the
odds by 43% and more than that by a further 10%. The household task variables are all
significant, indicating a strong but probably bi-directional link between task sharing and
the division of paid work. As with the previous model, the largest of these coefficients is
on having an external cleaner, suggesting the importance of outsourcing domestic work.
As might be expected given the insignificant cohort effect, a Chow test does not detect
any significant difference between the coefficients in the two cohorts. Therefore, there
is little point in presenting the separate models, or carrying out any tests of interaction
between cohort and the other variables.
7.5 Discussion
The key finding here with respect to differences between the cohorts in mothers work
and care capabilities is that the era of childbearing has a significant impact on whether
they are in work, even after controlling for other potential explanatory factors. The New
Labour government wanted to get more women into work, and the evidence is consis-
tent with it having succeeded; there does appear to be something about childbearing in
2004 that is more conducive to combining work and motherhood than childbearing in
1991. This cohort effect persists even after controlling for systematic differences in the
individual-level characteristics that make work more likely. Therefore, if a woman from
each cohort has the same level of human capital and the same attitudes towards work
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and family, the woman in the younger cohort is more likely to be in work. This suggests
that policy reform, in combination with other relevant economic and normative changes,
has expanded women’s capabilities to combine work and motherhood. Although it is
also consistent with the idea that women in the younger cohort feel greater pressure as
well as incentive to work.
However, it should also be noted that the change in maternal employment, although
significant and consistent with the theoretical propositions set out above, has been small
in magnitude. The difference in rates of maternal employment between the two cohorts is
6.5 percentage points (table 7.2); policy reform has not precipitated an influx of mothers
into employment. This further reinforces the previous chapter’s conclusions about the
resilience of gendered parenting behaviours. Even more strikingly, what seems not to
have changed at all is mothers’ propensity to work part-time as opposed to full-time.
This is also an interesting finding, as it suggests that women’s capabilities to combine
work with full-time motherhood have not improved. Looking at the coefficients on the
dummy variables for number of children, even in the younger cohort there is a steep
negative effect of each additional child on the likelihood of employment and full-time
working. This suggests that the care costs of additional children are considerable, and
that the expansion in childcare has still failed to make nursery care for more than one
child feasible for many parents.
Considerable continuity in maternal employment behaviour was predicted for several
reasons, but in particular it was thought to be likely due to the insufficiency of child-
care to support full-time work, and the entrenchment of mothers in secondary earner
roles due to the gender asymmetric extension of parental leave. These factors were all
predicted to adversely affect mothers’ capabilities to combine paid work and care, and
the results here are consistent with this theoretical perspective. However, these results
are also consistent with a preference-based explanation for the persistence of a gendered
division of labour between partners. It could be that, regardless of changing policy
provisions, a substantial proportion of mothers simply prefer not to work, or to work
part-time, as their optimal strategy for the reconciliation of work and care. There is no
way to tell in this type of analysis which of these interpretations is correct, or the extent
to which there may be truth in both of them.
The results also generate an interesting finding around determinants of work and care
beyond policy factors. There seems to be a difference between the drivers behind the
decision whether to work at all, and those driving the decision to work full-time. In the
model of the former, it was absolute and relative human capital variables that showed
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the strongest effects. Mothers with higher earning partners were less likely to be in
employment, although it is not clear that this effect extends to the younger cohort. On the
other hand, in the model predicting full-time employment, it was attitudes that seemed
to be the key explanatory variables. This suggests that once the required hours have
been reached to earn sufficient household income, mothers’ decisions about work hours
depend more on their orientations to work and care.
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Chapter 8
Mind the gap: motherhood penalties
in pay and status
This chapter will examine differences in pay and status between mothers and non-
mothers. Unlike previous chapters, it brings childless respondents into the analysis,
in order to establish the comparative penalty to motherhood. It seeks to establish the
extent of the labour market penalties associated with motherhood in each cohort, and to
compare these penalties between cohorts, in order to illuminate the potential impact of
the changing policy environment on mothers’ labour market opportunities.
It is not entirely clear from what has been presented so far what might be expected with
regard to this difference. On the one hand, mothers’ employment outcomes seem to have
improved over the relevant period. At the aggregate level, the gap between male and
female labour force participation narrowed between 1991 and 2004, the two time points
under consideration here; this gap narrowed by 7 percentage points, although this was
due to a decrease in male participation as well as an increase in female (see Figure 1.1
in Chapter 1). Over the same time period, the gender pay gap also fell, by 9 percentage
points (see Figure 1.2 in Chapter 1). Chapter 7 did suggest that mothers in the younger
cohort are more likely to be in employment than mothers in the younger cohort. How-
ever, it was also found that they are no more likely to be in full-time employment, and
are therefore still subject to the same penalties to part-time working. Chapter 6 also sug-
gested that mothers in the younger cohort are more likely to take primary responsibility
for childcare. This may limit their labour market possibilities, as mothers might avoid
jobs they are otherwise qualified for in order to fulfil their childcare responsibilities.
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In light of this ambiguity, the final step of the analysis in this thesis will be to look
directly at the pay and status of the mothers in the two cohorts. The chapter starts
by delineating the relevant dimensions of labour market performance, and using the
theoretical framework to generate hypotheses about differences between the two cohorts
in these respects. It then uses regression models to compare the two cohorts, bringing in
non-mothers as well in order to understand the extent to which mothers’ labour market
disadvantage is due to motherhood and how this has changed.
8.1 Questions and sample
This chapter asks what drives the motherhood gap, how these influences differ between
the two cohorts, and whether the gap itself is changing. Differences between the cohorts
may be a result of differences in their characteristics at the individual level, or it may
suggest salient differences in the environment in which mothers in the two cohorts are
balancing work and care. Of particular interest among these environmental factors is the
role of policy in influencing the costs and opportunities that mothers face, and whether
the extension of work-family reconciliation policies has facilitated maternal employment
in a capability-enhancing way.
There are many ways in which status in the labour market might be conceptualised and
operationalised. To delineate a manageable scope, this chapter focuses on two aspects;
pay, and socioeconomic classification. These two aspects are related, but they are not
the same thing, as the latter takes into account other aspects of a job such as where
it is situated within the system of relations between employees in the labour market.
However pay itself is still important, as there may still be systematically gendered intra-
status inequalities in pay, which contribute to the gender pay gap.
Specifically, the questions under consideration are:
1) To what extent do job characteristics drive the gap in pay and status between mothers
and non-mothers?
2) To what extent does motherhood itself drive the gap in pay and status between moth-
ers and non-mothers?
3) Is the motherhood gap in status smaller in the younger cohort?
4) Is the motherhood gap in pay smaller in the younger cohort?
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The sample under consideration here needs to incorporate non-mothers as well as moth-
ers, and calculate the motherhood effect within each cohort rather than a cohort effect
within a single model. This is because there are considerable differences between the
two cohorts as a whole in terms of pay and status; a higher proportion of the younger
cohort are in professional occupations, and wages are on average higher, even after
price standardisation. Therefore a simple cohort effect will incorporate large macro level
socio-economic changes as well as those related to the progress, or otherwise, that moth-
ers have made. For this reason, the motherhood effect will be calculated separately and
then compared between cohorts.
The analysis uses a broader sample than previous chapters, as it will incorporate all
those in employment, with or without children. All those in the sample are married or
cohabiting; as single parents are excluded from the analysis, the non-parents should be
partnered as well for comparability. All cohort members have a partner in employment,
either full-time or part-time. This is necessary for symmetry between male and female
respondents. As none of the female cohort members in this sample are stay at home
mothers, the sample of male cohort members needs to exclude any with a stay at home
partner as well, in order to compare like with like. Sub-sample sizes are given in table 8.1.
Table 8.1: Sub-sample sizes
Cohort
Sex/parenthood status NCDS BCS Total
Female, children 2,193 1,818 4,011
Female, no children 648 672 1,320
Male, children 1,725 1,409 3,134
Male, no children 834 765 1,599
Total 5,400 4,664 10,064
8.2 Hypotheses
This section will generate hypotheses for the questions posed above, based on the capabilities-
based theoretical framework that has been employed throughout this analysis. This
framework attempts to reconcile the idea of human capital effects on labour market out-
comes with the constraints that lead to human capital disparities in the first instance.
Orthodox human capital theories conceptualise the employment behaviour of mothers
as a choice made by the mothers themselves, made willingly according to preference.
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This effect is assumed to operate entirely on the ‘supply side’; there should be no sys-
tematic undervaluation or discrimination on the demand side as this is irrational on the
part of employers. However other theories argue that mothers are constrained in their
work options by external factors on the one hand, such as discrimination and systematic
undervaluation, and by their care responsibilities, which are distributed unequally, on
the other.
The theoretical framework used here conceptualises household outcomes in terms of
capabilities rather than choice, therefore it asks what options mothers truly have in
balancing the need and desire to work with the responsibility and desire to care. As
developed in previous chapters, these options are understood as a capability set, which
is determined by the opportunity-enhancing resources they have at their disposal, and
the conversion factors that restrict their opportunities. This chapter seeks to establish
the difference between the cohorts with respect to their capability set of labour market
opportunities, and the extent to which policy reforms have been capability enhancing.
8.2.1 Understanding the problem within the capabilities framework
Resources
As established in previous chapters, capabilities are enhanced by human capital, the
things that are assumed under the orthodox human capital perspective to endow labour
maket ‘value’; education and employment experience (Mincer 1958, 1974; Becker 1964,
1975). The more human capital a person has, the greater potential value they can com-
mand in the labour market. Mothers are disadvantaged relative to non-mothers in this
respect because they trade these value-enhancing investments for time out of the labour
market, or part-time or flexible working, in order to fulfil their care responsibilities. Any
deviation from a labour market trajectory of continuous full-time employment has a
negative impact on pay and status. Mothers make this trade-off to varying extents, de-
pending on their own preferences, their unique employment and family situation, and
wider labour market and policy factors. Non-mothers make this trade-off to a lesser
extent, if at all; previous chapters have shown that the vast majority of fathers work
full-time.
The nature of this ‘family-friendy’ trade-off may be a reduction in hours, which can take
the form of a switch to part-time hours after having children, or even a reduction from
173
long hours to normal full-time hours. Furthermore, even among full-time employees,
there may be differences in the jobs that mothers do. They may take on or be assigned
fewer managerial or supervisory responsibilities, and they may be more likely to work
in particular sectors, industries or occupations that are both female dominated and rela-
tively lower paid (Manning and Petrongolo 2008; Mumford and Smith 2009). As human
capital accumulation is a dynamic process, these disparities have a cumulative effect on
future labour market value if they persist for an extended period of time.
The analysis presented so far has suggested that mothers in the younger cohort may
have the upper hand over their older counterparts in human capital terms. Working
mothers in the younger cohort were found to have a higher potential wage (table 7.5 in
Chapter 7), and more likely to be in employment, even controlling for individual-level
factors (table 7.6 in Chapter 7). Therefore it might be expected that they are in a stronger
position with regard to the labour market opportunities at their disposal. However, it
was also found that they are just as likely to be in part-time employment (table 7.8 in
Chapter 7), which may limit not only human capital accumulation but their ability to
use the human capital they do have, if the best jobs require full-time attachment. The
net impact of these differences depends on the extent to which part-time positions offer
better opportunities for the younger cohort compared with the older cohort.
Conversion factors
Motherhood has a profound impact on resource accumulation due to employment be-
haviours around childbearing. However, for a given level of resources – i.e. assum-
ing that a mother and a non-mother have theoretically the same labour market value
– mothers may still achieve less. This is due to a number of practical and normative
conversion factors that prevent them from using their human capital in the same way as
non-mothers, and thus restricts their capability set of labour market opportunities.
On a practical level, mothers may have problems in reconciling employment and care
responsibilities. Unpaid work responsibilities may reduce the amount of time and energy
available for paid work; the ‘work effort hypothesis’ (Becker 1985). Two people with the
same potential earnings will not in reality have the same labour market opportunities if
one has additional household work to perform in addition to their paid work tasks. The
gendered distribution of household tasks (figure 1.3 in Chapter 1) means that household
work is more likely to be a labour market handicap for women, and the problem is
further exacerbated for mothers, who also take on the majority of the additional work
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generated by children.
Work-family reconciliation policy can facilitate employment by relieving mothers of
some of their care responsibilities. The state can assume some of these responsibili-
ties, by providing or subsidising childcare, or by allowing mothers to redistribute care
responsibilities to fathers by extending leave and flexibility provisions to both parents.
However, Chapter 5 suggested that, in reality, the policy environment does not accom-
plish this for either cohort. The lack of work-family reconciliation support for the older
cohort perpetuates a gendered status quo because there is no impetus to move towards
more egalitarian outcomes. Meanwhile, the asymmetrical extension of parental leave to
mothers in the younger cohort has entrenched a gendered division of labour in which
they become primary carer and secondary earner. Thus, in both cohorts, mothers are
constrained in pursuing continuous, full-time labour market participation, with the as-
sociated labour market penalties that this entails.
One possible advantage for the younger cohort is that they should have greater ability
to work flexibly and part-time, thanks to enhanced rights to request such arrangements.
This may have a negative effect on their earnings compared with non-mothers in their
cohort, as the jobs offering the most flexibility may not be the best paid or most senior.
However, relative to their counterparts in the older cohort, they may be able to obtain
and hold on to jobs that might otherwise have been incompatible with their childcare
responsibilities.
Negative perceptions of working mothers may impose normative constraints on mothers’
labour market participation. These perceptions exist on both the demand side among
employers, and the supply side among mothers themselves. Employers may discriminate
against mothers on the basis of their likely competency and commitment, which they
may perceive as lower due to their care responsibilities (Cuddy et al 2004; Fuegen et
al 2004; Correll et al 2007). Gendered organisational processes may determine which
employees the company decides to invest the most training and resources in, which
may mean that women are employed but kept out of the more lucrative opportunities
(Reskin 1993; Tomaskovic-Devey et al 2005; Manning and Swaffield 2008). These factors
are almost impossible to measure, and are certainly impossible to capture directly within
the scope of this research, but a motherhood penalty that persists after controlling for
the kind of human capital differences outlined above supports the possibility of their
existence.
Norms about parenting roles may also delimit the acceptable possibilities for division
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of labour in the household, and the extent to which mothers can devote their time and
energy to paid work. These norms are transmitted from their own parents, and although
each generation is on average more egalitarian than the last, some inter-generational
correlation exists (Burt and Scott 2002; Cichy et al 2007; Van Putten et al 2008). These
norms affect not only the allocation of tasks, but also how they are perceived and in-
terpreted. The strong norm of father as breadwinner means that the male partner in a
couple is almost always constructed as the main earner, even when he earns less than
his partner, and similarly the household work tends to remain women’s domain even
when the work is shared (Deutsch and Saxon 1998; Tichenor 1999; Charles and James
2005; Dema-Moreno 2009; Legerski and Cornwall 2010). Therefore there may be strong
normative reinforcement of mothers’ labour market participation as secondary, which
does not allow them to prioritise it in the same way as fathers.
Policy is less effective in eliminating these normative barriers than it is with practical
ones. Policy can be used to outlaw overt discrimination, and mandate a certain level
of family-friendliness in the terms on which workers are employed. However it cannot
necessarily overcome the more opaque and subtle forms of discrimination that may occur
against mothers, which are based on ingrained beliefs about working mothers. The most
it can do is to open up as many opportunities as possible to mothers, who then have
the opportunity to demonstrate competence and commitment and ultimately challenge
these beliefs. Similarly, it cannot directly challenge the unequal division of labour in
the home, but without opening up these opportunities by equalising policy provision to
men and women, there is no opportunity to establish new parenting norms.
Preferences
The final element of the capabilities approach, after the range of possible capabilites has
been delineated, is individual preference. Mothers will vary in the extent to which they
want to trade family friendliness for reduced pay and status, depending on how much
they value paid work and their attitudes to parenting and family. There is considerable
heterogeneity in this; some mothers may wish to maintain as tight a hold as possible
on the labour market, others may place considerable value on caring for their children
at home, whatever the cost to their own labour market opportunities. These attitudes
will be shaped by the prevailing normative environment, which will vary between the
two cohorts, but it also has an individual element such that the correlation between
attitudes and cohort will be imperfect. Therefore the models below need to incorporate
this individual element of preferences as well as the macro level difference in attitudes
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to work and care.
8.2.2 Hypotheses
The first two questions posed at the beginning of this chapter were concerned with
establishing the human capital and motherhood factors associated with the gender pay
gap in both cohorts. The resource disparities caused by motherhood that were outlined
above should have a negative impact on the capability set of labour market options.
Thus:
H1: The more ‘motherhood-friendly’ a mother’s employment (in terms of deviations
from continuous full-time employment), the less she will be paid and the less likely
she is to be in a professional job.
However, although the gap will have a human capital element, this alone will not explain
the gap. I also expect motherhood to exert an independent effect due to care responsi-
bilities holding them back from jobs that they would otherwise have the opportunity to
do. Thus:
H2: Mothers will be in systematically lower-paid and lower status jobs than non-mothers
for a given level of employment attachment and human capital.
The second two questions concern the relative size of the motherhood gap between the
two cohorts. The likely explanatory factors for any differences are not all in favour of
one cohort over another. The effect of changes in employment behaviour and household
division of labour is ambiguous, as is the impact of policy, which may have entrenched
inequality. However, overall it should be eaiser for mothers to get better jobs; there is
better policy support in place, and the prevailing normative climate is more favourable
towards working motherhood. In short, a mother in the younger cohort should get a
better job than a mother in the older cohort with the same level of human capital. Thus:
H3: The motherhood gap in socioeconomic classification will be smaller in the younger
cohort.
H4: The motherhood gap in pay will be smaller in the younger cohort.
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Table 8.2: Median hourly wage, net weekly pay and weekly working hours by sex,













Female, children 3.65 78 23.2 2,193
Female, no children 4.85 185 37.7 648
Male, children 5.06 222 44.2 1,725
Male, no children 5.24 225 43.7 834
Total 4.47 170 34.6 5,400
Sex/parenthood, BCS
Female, children 4.65 114 26.6 1,818
Female, no children 5.35 215 40.3 672
Male, children 5.72 256 46.7 1,409
Male, no children 6.02 267 45.9 765
Total 5.28 198 37.5 4,664
The remainder of the chapter will test these hypotheses empirically.
8.3 Descriptive analysis
This section explores the variables that will be used in the regression modelling in the
next section. The figures presented represent a simple bivariate approach to the question
of the size of the motherhood penalty and how it differs between the two cohorts. More
sophisticated analysis needs to be carried out before any firm conclusions can be drawn.
8.3.1 Dependent variables
In this analysis, pay is represented by the hourly wage. Table 8.2 shows that mothers in
both cohorts have a lower hourly wage than men and childless women, although this gap
is narrowing. The gap between mothers and fathers is 31% in the older cohort and 21%
in the younger cohort. Childless women have a lower hourly wage than men, indicating
a gender as well as motherhood gap; in fact this gap is slightly larger in the younger
cohort than the older cohort. In both cohorts, fathers have a lower hourly wage than
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childless men but equal or greater median weekly pay, suggesting that they work longer
hours than childless men, and indeed the data for mean hours would suggest this.
Figure 8.1: NS-SEC by sex, parenthood status and cohort
Job status is measured using the National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NS-
SEC). Figure 8.1 shows the occupational distribution in each cohort; the proportion of
the sample in each NS-SEC category. Within this, the segments in each bar indicate the
proportion of each category that is mothers, childless women, fathers and childless men.
Comparing the two panels overall shows how the occupational distribution has shifted
upwards. In other words, the younger cohort are more likely to be in professional or
managerial occupations than the older cohort. Women have increased their representa-
tion in the lower professional and managerial category, but the highest category remains
male dominated, which has implications for the gender pay gap, as this highest category
is likely to be the most highly remunerated. This suggests that, although mothers have
made some advances in the labour market, the most senior and high status jobs are still
incompatible with their childcare responsibilities. The whole distribution is gendered;
women now make up the vast majority of those in intermediate occupations, while self-
employed and technical occupations remain male dominated. Therefore occupational
segregation would seem to exist at the NS-SEC level as well as within job groups.
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Female, children 35.5 71.8 44.0 2,193
Female, no children 54.4 61.2 44.8 648
Male, children 57.5 20.1 29.5 1,725
Male, no children 61.1 24.3 30.0 834
Total 48.6 46.8 37.5 5,400
Sex/parenthood, BCS
Female, children 33.3 68.1 45.2 1,818
Female, no children 50.5 55.1 40.1 672
Male, children 52.6 19.5 24.7 1,409
Male, no children 53.8 23.6 25.0 765
Total 45.0 44.2 35.3 4,664
8.3.2 Explanatory variables
It is also useful to examine whether the dimensions of family-friendliness that are hy-
pothesised to affect pay and status vary between the sexes and cohorts as predicted
above. Table 8.2 also shows mean working hours by sex, parenthood status and cohort.
Working hours are longer in the younger cohort for all groups; mothers, fathers and
childless men and women. In fact, the biggest increase is among mothers, who work on
average an extra 3.5 hours per week, an increase of 13%. However, mothers still work by
far the fewest hours per week, and fathers work the longest. There is some gender dis-
crepancy as well; childless women average a standard full-time week, whilst men report
working slightly more than this.
The proportion of each group reporting managerial or supervisory responsibilities is
shown in table 8.3. This suggests a lower proportion of the younger cohort reporting
managerial responsibilities, although the different question framing in the two surveys
casts some doubt on the comparability of the data between cohorts. However, within
cohorts, the relationship is broadly as might be expected if we assume that childcare
responsibilities limit the ability of mothers to take on managerial responsibilities at work.
Mothers are the least likely to report managerial responsibilities, with childless women
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slightly less likely than men, but closer to men than mothers.
Occupational segregation is also shown in table 8.3. This variable indicates the percent-
age of women in the respondent’s occupation.1 The closer this percentage is to 50, the
less gender-segregated the occupation. The table displays the average of this percentage
within each group. It suggests that women – both mothers and childless women – in the
younger cohort are on average in less segregated jobs. However, there is still consider-
able polarisation, especially between mothers and fathers. Even in the younger cohort,
fathers are in jobs in which men outnumber women 4 to 1, while mothers are in jobs in
which women outnumber men by around 2 to 1.
Finally, table 8.3 also shows the proportion of each group working in the public sector.
There is a clear gender split here, with mothers and childless women both much more
likely to work in the public sector than men; indeed; there seems to be far more variation
by gender than by parenthood status. If mothers are more likely to work in the public
sector, and also more likely to earn less than anyone else, then perhaps working in the
public sector is part of the trade-off between family friendliness and pay and status.
Chapter 5 demonstrated the way in which the public sector has always lead the way in
offering family friendly provisions.
Figure 8.2 shows the average amount of time spent in each economic state for partnered
men and women with and without children.2 If we compare the mothers in the two co-
horts, those in the younger cohort have spent on average less time out of the labour force
looking after family than those in the older cohort. Although they have spent less time
on average in full-time employment, they have spent considerably more in education,
which is also a human capital accumulating activity. However, the differences between
mothers in the two cohorts are small, and they have much more in common with each
other than they do with fathers and childless women in their own cohorts. Partnered
men, with and without children, and childless women have spent the vast majority of
their time in either education or full-time employment. Mothers in both cohorts spend
only around half of their time in education or full-time employment, and are the only
1This information is obtained from census data, which is used to calculate the proportion female within
each occupational code. This was originally carried out by Hakim (1998), whose conversion scheme is used
here for the NCDS respondents. For the BCS respondents, the method was replicated using census data
from the year 2000.
2Note that these diagrams do not describe a typical trajectory; rather, they are an aggregation of all
respondents within that type. Thus for example a figure of 50% of time in full-time work could be an
aggregation of half of the sample working full-time continuously, and the other half not at all; it does
not necessarily describe any given case in the dataset. What it does describe is group-level differences in
human capital accumulation over the adult lifecourse up to this point, and therefore some explanation of
the instantaneous gaps that exist.
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Figure 8.2: Time spent in different states by sex, parenthood status and cohort
ones who have spent any substantial amount of time in part-time work. These figures
provide quite a stark illustration of why the gender pay gap persists; change within
mothers has been small, and mothers still lag far behind men and childless women in
their lifetime human capital accumulation.
The descriptive figures presented in this section suggest that so far the data appears to
confirm the relevance of the theoretical framework, and reinforces the hypotheses that
have been derived from it. The next section will test these associations more rigorously,




The first set of models presented here looks at the motherhood gap in job status, and its
determinants.
Model specification
The model regresses job status against human capital, domestic division of labour, at-
titudes and motherhood itself. Status is a dichotomous variable indicating whether the
respondent is in a professional or managerial occupation, or not.3 A logistic regression
model is used to predict the probability of being in a professional occupation (this type
of model is explained in section 1.2 of chapter 4). Separate models are run for each
cohort, to enable a comparison of motherhood effects as explained above.
The first independent variable entered into the model is sex and parenthood status; a
four-category variable that distinguishes whether the respondent is a mother, childless
woman, father or childless man. This is entered alone in the first instance, in order to
see the size of the raw gap, unadjusted for human capital differences or other factors
that might drive the motherhood penalty. The rest of the explanatory variables are then
added sequentially in blocks, to see how their addition improves the model, and the
effect that they have on the size and significance of the motherhood penalty.
The first such block is the human capital characteristics that are assumed to drive dis-
parities in status and pay; the resources, in the language of the framework employed
above. The two key variables theoretically are education and labour market experience,
but although highest qualification is included here, experience is not. A version of the
model was run including labour market breaks, but there is so much missing data for
the older cohort that its inclusion has a detrimental effect on the model; dropping it
more than doubles the number of cases and improves model fit. The block also includes
job characteristics that are assumed to be associated with status and pay; hours worked,
managerial or supervisory responsibilities, occupational segregation and sector of em-
3An ordinal logistic regression model was also run, using a three category variable (profes-
sional/managerial, intermediate, routine/manual) as its dependent. However the coefficients obtained
were very similar to those obtained from the binary model, therefore this model is not presented here as it
does not provide any additional insight.
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ployment.
The next block of variables reflects the division of work and care in the household. The
employment characteristics of the respondent’s partner are represented by whether they
work full-time, what they are paid, their job status and their educational level. Division
of housework is represented by the number of ‘feminine’ tasks shared or done by the
respondent’s partner; these tasks are cooking, shopping, laundry and cleaning (childcare
cannot be included because there are childless people in the sample). It is expected
that having a partner who works fewer hours or has a lower status job, and who does
some or all of the housework, is likely to have a positive impact on the respondent’s
pay and status. Partner’s educational level is also assumed to be a rough proxy for
the egalitarianism of their attitudes to work and care, as there is no information on the
dataset about their actual attitudes.
Finally, the respondent’s attitudes to working motherhood, and their work orientation, is
included in the model. This is assumed to be important for predicting outcomes because,
even if high status or well-paid jobs are available to mothers, this does not mean that
they will automatically take these jobs.
Results
Results for the older cohort are given in table 8.4. Model 1 in the table is the first model
with the motherhood effect only. Motherhood is the reference category, therefore the
three coefficients represent the difference between mothers and childless women, fathers
and childless men respectively. All three categories show a significant, positive coeffi-
cient, suggesting that all three groups are more likely than mothers to be in professional
or managerial jobs. The odds are 1.6 times higher for fathers, 2.2 times higher for child-
less women, and 2.7 times higher for childless men. The variable on its own is not a very
good predictor of status, with the pseudo-R2 suggesting that it explains just 3% of the
variation in status.
Table 8.4: Regression results: being in a professional or managerial occupation, NCDS
Variable Respondent is in a professional occupation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Odds ratio Odds ratio Odds ratio Odds ratio
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
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Sex and parenthood status
Female, children ref ref ref ref
- - - -
Female, no children 2.219∗∗∗ 1.244 1.074 1.093
(0.000) (0.180) (0.674) (0.601)
Male, children 1.548∗∗∗ 0.595∗∗ 0.535∗ 0.546∗
(0.000) (0.002) (0.011) (0.015)
Male, no children 2.666∗∗∗ 0.889 0.664 0.687
(0.000) (0.517) (0.075) (0.108)
Education
School ref ref ref
- - -
None 0.367∗∗∗ 0.424∗∗ 0.424∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Post school 12.23∗∗∗ 9.807∗∗∗ 9.785∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Hours worked per week 1.022∗∗∗ 1.021∗∗∗ 1.020∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Has managerial/supervisory duties 4.128∗∗∗ 4.129∗∗∗ 4.127∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Percent female in occupation 0.989∗∗∗ 0.989∗∗∗ 0.989∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Works in public sector 1.606∗∗∗ 1.574∗∗∗ 1.564∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Partner works part-time 0.954 0.964
(0.790) (0.837)
Partner’s income 0.988 0.986
(0.903) (0.887)
Partner’s job status











Post school 2.742∗∗∗ 2.742∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Number of routine tasks shared 1.050 1.047
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(0.391) (0.417)
Attitude to working mothers 0.953
(0.340)
Attitude to work 0.992
(0.877)
N 3034 3034 3034 3034
Pseudo-R2 0.0245 0.330 0.348 0.348
LL -1968.8 -1353.1 -1316.7 -1316.2
Exponentiated coefficients; p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Results for the older cohort are given in table 8.4. Model 1 in the table is the first model
with the motherhood effect only. Motherhood is the reference category, therefore the
three coefficients represent the difference between mothers and childless women, fathers
and childless men respectively. All three categories show a significant, positive coeffi-
cient, suggesting that all three groups are more likely than mothers to be in professional
or managerial jobs. The odds are 1.6 times higher for fathers, 2.2 times higher for child-
less women, and 2.7 times higher for childless men. The variable on its own is not a very
good predictor of status, with the pseudo-R2 suggesting that it explains just 3% of the
variation in status.
Considerable improvement in predictive power is achieved with the addition of the hu-
man capital variables, which bring the variation explained up to about a third; this is
shown in the second column of table 8.4. Their addition also has a profound impact
on the estimated motherhood penalty. The odds ratios on childless men and women
become insignificant, suggesting no significant difference in status between them and
mothers after controlling for the human capital factors here. Furthermore, the odds ra-
tio on fathers remains significant but becomes negative. Controlling for human capital,
fathers have 40% lower odds than mothers of being in a professional or managerial job.
This situation remains largely unchanged with the addition of the remaining variables
reflecting partner’s human capital and attitudes (models 3 and 4 respectively), which
only slightly further weaken fathers’ position relative to mothers. These results show
the extent to which the human capital differences between mothers and non-mothers
are driving the gap in status; once these factors are controlled for, the gap completely
changes from a deficit to an advantage.
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The odds ratios on the human capital variables themselves further confirm the impor-
tance of these investments as drivers of job status. Those with a degree have nine times
the odds of being in a professional job than those with school level qualifications, who
are in turn more likely than those with no qualifications. Number of hours worked per
week has a positive effect, with the odds of being in a professional job increasing by
2% with each additional hour worked; a magnitude that has the potential to translate
into a substantial gap if we compare, say, someone who works 15 hours per week with
someone else who works 30 hours per week. Similarly, the decrease of 1% in these
odds with each additional percentage female in an occupation is substantial when you
consider that mothers are highly concentrated in very female dominated occupations.
In this dataset, the average proportion of female employees in mothers’ occupations is
80%. Having managerial or supervisory responsibilities also has the expected effect, with
those having such responsibilities having four times the odds of being in a professional
job. The only potentially surprising result is that on working in the public sector, which
is found to have a significant positive effect. It might have been assumed that, as women
are more likely to work in the public sector and less likely to be in higher status jobs,
there might be a negative correlation. However, perhaps the occupational structure of
the public sector is such that jobs are more likely to be classified as professional.
Most of the partner variables are not found to have any significant effect. Those with
partners in professional jobs are more likely to themselves be in professional jobs than
those with partners who have routine and manual jobs. This suggests that some kind
of assortative partnering effect (i.e. selecting someone with similar human capital) is
outweighing any negative impact of having a partner in a professional job on one’s own
work commitment. Having a partner with post-school qualifications has a positive effect
relative to having a partner with no qualifications; the odds of being in a professional job
are 2.7 times higher. Again this probably reflects this partnering effect, and additionally
perhaps confirms an association between education and egalitarianism in the division
of work and care. However, the division of household tasks was not found to be a
significant predictor of professional employment. Own attitudes to work and care were
not found to be significant either, and their inclusion does not improve predictive power
or model fit.
Table 8.5: Regression results: being in a professional or managerial occupation, BCS
Variable Respondent is in a professional occupation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Odds ratio Odds ratio Odds ratio Odds ratio
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
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Sex and parenthood status
Female, children ref ref ref ref
- - - -
Female, no children 2.274∗∗∗ 1.175 1.028 1.061
(0.000) (0.295) (0.859) (0.708)
Male, children 1.510∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male, no children 2.328∗∗∗ 0.607∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗ 0.456∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)
Education
School ref ref ref
- - -
None 0.337∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Post school 6.692∗∗∗ 5.034∗∗∗ 5.103∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Hours worked per week 1.015∗∗ 1.016∗∗∗ 1.015∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Has managerial/supervisory duties 9.799∗∗∗ 9.449∗∗∗ 9.456∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Percent female in occupation 0.981∗∗∗ 0.982∗∗∗ 0.982∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Works in public sector 1.724∗∗∗ 1.675∗∗∗ 1.657∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Partner works part-time 1.240 1.266
(0.179) (0.142)
Partner’s income 1.142 1.136
(0.097) (0.111)
Partner’s job status











Post school 2.279∗∗ 2.249∗∗
(0.002) (0.003)
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Number of routine tasks shared 1.080 1.073
(0.092) (0.122)
Attitude to working mothers 0.878∗
(0.012)
Attitude to work 1.045
(0.378)
Observations 3381 3381 3381 3381
Pseudo-R2 0.0216 0.357 0.371 0.372
LL -2282.7 -1500.5 -1468.3 -1464.7
Exponentiated coefficients; p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The results for the younger cohort (table 8.5) are not enormously dissimilar, although
there are some differences. As with the older cohort, the gap between mothers and
childless women disappears after controlling for human capital variables. However, this
time, the odds ratios on both fathers and childless men remain significant and become
negative. Indeed, this reversal of the motherhood penalty is even more marked in the
younger cohort, suggesting an even stronger association between mothers’ human capital
interruptions and their adverse labour market outcomes. By the time all the additional
variables on partner’s human captial and attitudes to work and care have been added,
the odds of childless men being in professional occupations are 54% lower than for
mothers, and the odds for fathers are 70% lower.
The odds ratios on the explanatory variables are mostly quite similar as those for the
older cohort; in fact they are almost identical in the case of hours worked, occupational
segregation and sector. The influence of partner’s human capital is largely insignificant
here too, although the association between having a professional job and a highly ed-
ucated partner remains. Having post-school qualifications is not as strongly associated
with professional employment in the younger cohort, but the association with having
managerial responsibilities in one’s job is stronger than in the older cohort. The main
departure from the previous model is the significance of attitudes to working mothers
in the younger cohort. This is found to have a negative effect; the more traditional the
cohort member, the less likely they are to be in a professional or managerial job. The
fact that attitudes are significant suggests that this cohort have greater capabilities with
respect to their employment opportunities, as it suggests that they are able to exercise
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some choice in a way that the older cohort is not.
Overall, the predictive power of the final model in both cohorts is reasonable; .348 in the
older cohort, and slightly higher at .372 in the younger. In both cases, most of this comes
from the second block of human capital variables. This suggests that the key drivers
of professional employment centre around one’s own human capital endowments and
ability to work long hours and take on responsibilities.
8.4.2 Pay
Model specification
The explanatory variables in these models are almost identical to the above, as the same
predictive factors are assumed to be important. The only difference is that this model
also controls for status. The dependent variable is logged hourly wage, which has been
imputed in the event that real wage data is missing in the dataset.4 As this dependent
variable is continuous rather than binary, the regression model used is linear rather
than logistic. As with the models for status above, separate regressions are estimated
for each cohort, in order to measure and make a valid comparison between the size of
the motherhood penalty in the two cohorts. And again, the raw motherhood penalty is
estimated first, before adding the remaining blocks of variables to the model.
Results
Results for the older cohort are given in table 8.6.5 The coefficients on the sex and
parenthood status variable when entered alone (model 1 in table 8.6) show significant
differences between mothers and the three other groups. The largest premium is to
childless men, followed closely by fathers, with childless women having a somewhat
lower premium, suggesting a gender as well as parenthood effect. The value for R2
suggests that this variable explains 10% of the variation in the dependent variable. This
is a higher proportion than for status, although these statistics should be compared with
4This imputation process is explained in detail in section 2.2 of Chapter 4.
5All the coefficients in the table have been exponentiated for ease of interpretation; because the depen-
dent variable is logged, these coefficients represent the factor of change in the dependent variable that is
precipitated by a change in the independent variable, the same as the logistic models used elsewhere in this
thesis.
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caution, as they are calculated differently.
Table 8.6: Regression results: hourly pay, NCDS
Variable Hourly pay
(1) (2) (3) (4)
eβ eβ eβ eβ
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
Sex and parenthood status
Female, children ref ref ref ref
- - - -
Female, no children 1.217∗∗∗ 1.189∗∗∗ 1.163∗∗∗ 1.157∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male, children 1.329∗∗∗ 1.363∗∗∗ 1.310∗∗∗ 1.300∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male, no children 1.349∗∗∗ 1.299∗∗∗ 1.236∗∗∗ 1.222∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education
School ref ref ref
- - -
None 0.922∗∗∗ 0.935∗∗ 0.934∗∗
(0.001) (0.005) (0.004)
Post school 1.193∗∗∗ 1.158∗∗∗ 1.160∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Hours worked per week 0.993∗∗∗ 0.993∗∗∗ 0.993∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Has managerial/supervisory duties 1.091∗∗∗ 1.092∗∗∗ 1.091∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Percent female in occupation 0.998∗∗∗ 0.998∗∗∗ 0.998∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Works in public sector 1.035∗ 1.037∗∗ 1.038∗∗
(0.011) (0.007) (0.005)
Job status
Routine ref ref ref
- - -
Intermediate 1.236∗∗∗ 1.218∗∗∗ 1.219∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Managerial and professional 1.345∗∗∗ 1.313∗∗∗ 1.314∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Partner works part-time 1.067∗∗ 1.065∗∗
(0.006) (0.007)















Post school 1.102∗∗∗ 1.103∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Number of routine tasks shared 1.021∗∗ 1.022∗∗
(0.003) (0.002)
Attitude to working mothers 1.012
(0.053)
Attitude to work 1.013∗
(0.048)
Observations 3034 3034 3034 3034
Adj. R2 0.103 0.351 0.367 0.368
F 117.5 150.1 98.50 89.20
Exponentiated coefficients; p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
When the human capital variables are added, the coefficients on sex and parenthood
remain significant, and fathers overtake childless men, now experiencing the largest
premium relative to mothers. This ordering persists as the other blocks of variables are
added, and the magnitude of the effect gets smaller but only slightly. Despite adding a
range of human capital and other potentially explanatory variables, the motherhood gap
in pay changes hardly at all from its raw from. In the full model (model 4), the hourly
wage premium to fathers relative to mothers is 30%, compared with a raw gap of 33%.
Childless men earn 22% more per hour than mothers, and childless women earn 16%
more per hour.
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The block of human capital variables, as with the models for status above, is all signifi-
cant and provides most of the explanatory power in the model. The effects flow largely
in the expected directions, particularly with the predictable premium to qualifications
and job status. Being in a female dominated occupation has a negative effect, although
the effect of working in the public sector is positive, despite the fact that the public sector
is female dominated and women earn less. Perhaps an alternative explanation for this
is that working in the public sector protects women’s wages, making them higher than
they might otherwise be in the private sector. Managerial or supervisory responsibilities
have a positive effect on hourly wage of 9%, even after controlling for status, suggesting
a correlation between responsibility and earnings at all levels. If mothers are constrained
in their ability to take on such responsibilities by their care obligations, then this will be
a contributing factor to the motherhood penalty. Interestingly, number of hours worked
exhibits a negative relationship with hourly pay; it would seem that, although weekly
income can be augmented by working additional hours, long hours do not necessarily
mean better-paid jobs.
The impact of partner characteristics is stronger in this model than it was in the status
models. Having a partner who works part time carries a wage premium of 6.5%, and
as such people are almost all fathers then this will be driving the gap between mothers
and fathers. It is a similar story with task sharing, with a wage premium of 2% for each
additional task shared; again the gender differences in household work are likely to be
driving a wage gap, and the model does not even include the division of childcare.
Finally, attitude to family was not found to be a significant predictor of wage, but work
orientation had the expected positive effect; the more work orientated the indvidiual, the
more they are likely to earn.
The results for the younger cohort are very similar (table 8.7). On raw pay gaps, childless
men have the upper hand, but once other variables are added, the largest premium is
to fathers. In the final model this is identical to the older cohort, at 30%. Childless men
are a little closer to fathers with a premium of 28%, while childless women do less well
with a premium of 13%. Going on their relative position to mothers, it seems that there
is a greater divergence between childless men and women in the younger cohort.6 Thus,
gender seems to playing a larger role in the motherhood gap than parenthood status in
the younger cohort.
6Although the coefficients here cannot provide direct evidence of this, as they only compare each group
with mothers, and not with each other.
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Table 8.7: Regression results: hourly pay, BCS
Variable Hourly pay
(1) (2) (3) (4)
eβ eβ eβ eβ
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
Sex and parenthood status
Female, children ref ref ref ref
- - - -
Female, no children 1.140∗∗∗ 1.153∗∗∗ 1.128∗∗∗ 1.130∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male, children 1.248∗∗∗ 1.347∗∗∗ 1.298∗∗∗ 1.300∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male, no children 1.299∗∗∗ 1.333∗∗∗ 1.278∗∗∗ 1.282∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education
School ref ref ref
- - -
None 0.973 1.000 0.999
(0.520) (0.994) (0.981)
Post school 1.219∗∗∗ 1.178∗∗∗ 1.179∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Hours worked per week 0.989∗∗∗ 0.989∗∗∗ 0.989∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Has managerial/supervisory duties 1.139∗∗∗ 1.129∗∗∗ 1.129∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Percent female in occupation 0.997∗∗∗ 0.997∗∗∗ 0.997∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Works in the public sector 0.995 0.993 0.992
(0.830) (0.724) (0.710)
Job status
Routine ref ref ref
- - -
Intermediate 1.250∗∗∗ 1.241∗∗∗ 1.240∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Managerial and professional 1.309∗∗∗ 1.282∗∗∗ 1.281∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Partner works part-time 1.125∗∗∗ 1.126∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000)















Post school 0.986 0.985
(0.794) (0.782)
Number of routine tasks shared 1.028∗∗ 1.028∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Attitude to working mothers 0.994
(0.584)
Attitude to work 1.003
(0.802)
Observations 3381 3381 3381 3381
Adj. R2 0.0314 0.172 0.194 0.194
F 37.52 64.82 46.33 41.69
Exponentiated coefficients; p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
There are a few minor differences in the remaining coefficients, although the results still
largely support the underlying theoretical model. Qualifications and high status occu-
pations still have positive and significant effects, and similarly for the negative effects of
hours and occupational segregation. The effect of working in the public sector becomes
negative, perhaps reflecting the growth of private sector wages over the period, but it is
not significant. Partner’s education and job status are not significant, although having
a partner who works part-time remains significant and the premium is 12.6%, almost
twice as high as for the older cohort. The impact of shared tasks remains positive and
significant, and of a similar magnitude to the older cohort at 2.8%. Neither of the attitude
variables were found to have any significant effect.
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Perhaps the biggest difference between the two cohorts is in overall model fit. The ad-
justed R2 is much lower for the younger cohort; just .194 in the final model, compared
with .368 in the older cohort. The set of explanatory variables seems to be doing a poor
job of predicting pay in the younger cohort, and motherhood seems to be a particularly
tiny aspect, explaining just 3% of the variation. Thus while the direction and significance
of the coefficients does not suggest that the model is wrong or irrelevant, the unimpres-
sive overall evaluation suggests that the important explanatory factors are not contained
within it.
8.5 Discussion
The results presented here suggest that the impact of motherhood on job status is not
the same as the impact on pay. The unadjusted gaps both suggest that motherhood has
a negative impact on both pay and job status, but the adjusted gaps look very different.
For job status, human capital factors seem to be the key drivers of the motherhood
penalty; in fact their inclusion in the model reverses it, rejecting the predictions of Hy-
pothesis 2. Once human capital factors are controlled for, there is no significant differ-
ence between mothers and childless men or women, and more interestingly the penalty
relative to fathers becomes a premium. Thus, the human capital investments that moth-
ers make are driving any gap in job status.
What this says about their labour market capabilities is not entirely clear. As with the
previous chapter, the results are consistent with the theory that mothers are choosing
to forgo these human capital investments in order to look after their children, and the
type of data used here cannot distinguish between preference and capabilities based ex-
planations. It would need to consider the temporal ordering of attitudes, human capital
decisions and childbearing to get some impression of which of these are causal factors,
which it has not done. It is also difficult to ascertain why mothers have made the deci-
sions they have without asking them for their perspective on these decisions. However,
the considerable human capital disparities that mothers accumulate do seem to be an in-
evitable consequence of a policy environment that leaves them little other option, apart
from rejecting motherhood altogether. They have no opportunity to transfer leave enti-
tlements to their partners, and childcare, although improving, does not yet affordably
support full-time employment for anyone but the most well-off mothers. There is little
to suggest a large capability set of work and care options; the human capital sacrifices
196
driving the motherhood status gap seem inevitable.
The impact of motherhood on hourly wage is considerably different. The human cap-
ital variables are significant, but their addition to the model barely changes the esti-
mated penalty to motherhood, which shows remarkable tenacity. This is more in line
with what was hypothesised, although perhaps greater weakening of the motherhood
penalty might have been expected after controlling for the other explanatory variables.
These results show that, regardless of the human capital investments that mothers make,
the motherhood penalty will affect them. Motherhood is affecting the way they are able
to deploy the capital they have in the labour market. This is further confirmed by the
coefficients on the partner variables, which suggest a wage premium to having a partner
who works less and does more housework. Men, especially fathers, are more likely to
have this, while mothers are more likely to be that partner. This effect is magnified by
a policy environment that, even for the younger cohort, encourages such specialisation.
These additional responsibilities mean that they are entering the labour market on fun-
damentally different terms to fathers; they differ in what they can offer employers. Thus,
their capability set of labour market opportunities is smaller.
It is hard to say from these results whether the motherhood penalty in status is smaller
in the younger cohort; by the time all the explanatory variables are added, it is not a
penalty at all. The premium experienced by the younger cohort is stronger, which is
good news for women who have made human capital investments that are more similar
to those of their male peers. However, it also suggests that, as long as mothers continue
to accumulate less human capital than non-mothers, the penalty will persist, and that
this effect has only become stronger for the younger cohort.
The pay gap is very similar in the two cohorts; in fact, the difference between fathers
and mothers is identical at 30%. Thus, contrary to Hypothesis 4, the motherhood gap
does not seem to be smaller in the younger cohort. That this gap is so fixed represents a
strong continuity in gendered household roles; even in dual-earning households, women
continue to be the secondary earner, as well as, and because they are, the primary carer.
The discussion at the beginning of this chapter acknowledged the ambiguity of the im-
pact of changes over time in mothers’ labour market participation, and in policy, on the
motherhood gap in labour market outcomes. Thus, it is not entirely surprising that the
results in this chapter paint a picture of great similarity between the two cohorts with
respect to the impact of motherhood and other factors on pay and status. Despite consid-
erable policy reform and other potential contextual differences between the two cohorts,
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mothers in the younger cohort seem to face the same labour market disadvantage as their
older counterparts. Policy reform may have made it easier for the younger cohorts to
do their ‘one and a half’ balancing act between work and care, but it has not opened up





This chapter offers a summary and discussion of the research findings presented in this
thesis. It first of all reflects on the conceptual basis of the research, and the contributions
and pitfalls of the framework that was developed and used as a basis for the empirical
work. It then considers the methodology that was employed, and evaluates the useful-
ness both of the statistical and case study analysis techniques. Finally, it discusses the
three substantive findings chapters in turn, outlining the contribution that the findings
have made, and what the results could and could not say in relation to the questions set
at the beginning of the thesis.
9.1 Conceptual
The creation of an underpinning theoretical framework began with the review of the
literature in Chapter 2, which set out the main theoretical perspectives in the existing
literature on the division of paid work and care. These formed the basis of the framework
developed in Chapter 3, which tried to capture insights from the different disciplines
through the application of Amartya Sen’s concepts of situated agency and capabilities.
From this framework, and taking into account the information presented in Chapter 5
about changes in the policy environment, hypotheses were derived about differences
between the two cohorts of women in terms of their work and care outcomes.
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9.1.1 Conceptualising the impact of policy and policy change
The problem of the household division of work and care and its determinants is con-
ceptualised within a framework that draws together existing, competing, perspectives
within a capabilities-based approach. Explanations of gender disparities in the house-
hold and the labour market that are rooted in agency and choice are brought together
with perspectives that emphasise the role of power, gender, and institutional context in
determining these phenomena. Economics provides an agentic, tangible human capi-
tal based model of labour market reward and time allocation in the household, while
more sociological perspectives emphasise the role of gender norms and power in arriv-
ing at outcomes. Social policy, particularly feminist welfare state perspectives, add an
account of how these normative forces shape, and are shaped by, the prevailing policy
and market institutions.
The capabilities approach is invoked to bring these ideas together into the concept of
situated agency; the conceptualisation of individual and household level decision mak-
ing played out in a context that shapes not only the choices that are available but also
people’s perceptions of their own interests and well-being. Thus, although couples
may have preferences regarding the ideal division of labour, these are not only practi-
cally constrained by labour market opportunities and state support, but normatively by
ideas about appropriate parenting. Furthermore, what is normatively ‘preferred’ is itself
shaped by prevailing norms and the perception of the choices that are available. What
the research here suggests is that the one-and-a-half model of father working full-time,
mother part-time, is not so much popular as the most financially viable and normatively
acceptable option provided by the prevailing environment.
The use of the capabilities approach is appropriate but not unproblematic. It represents
an improvement on the more narrow human capital approach, because rather than take
the prevailing environment as given, it tries to understand how this environment im-
poses constraints on choice, and how it might change in order to widen this choice.
Thus, policy is given a clear evaluative space; to what extent does it enhance or dimin-
ish capabilities? However, although the capabilities approach is theoretically neat, it is
complex in its operationalization. Indeed, it could be argued that capabilities can never
be measured because they represent a hypothetical set of choices, from which only the
final outcome can be observed. The theoretical model developed here is used to derive
hypotheses, and to guide model selection and interpretation, but its illumination of the
choice set is speculative.
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9.1.2 The research questions and hypotheses
The capabilities framework was used to derive hypotheses to the specific questions under
consideration in this research. The first question addressed was whether the younger
cohort have greater capabilities for sharing paid work and care. The hypothesis was that
division of labour should be more egalitarian in the younger cohort. This is due to the
fact that, given aggregate trends in education and employment, they were expected to
have more earning power than their counterparts in the older cohort. This should give
them greater capabilities to negotiate their preferred outcome, and previous research has
suggested that this greater earning power is likely to result in them not choosing to be
full-time carers.
The second question was whether policy changes have improved mothers’ capabilities
to participate in paid employment. The changes that occurred after 1997 were hypothe-
sised to have worked together to offer better support for maternal employment, and this
should therefore be reflected in higher maternal employment. Lengthening leave entitle-
ments and subsidised childcare facilitate labour market attachment, while increases in
flexible working should expand the capabilities of a dual-earning family in reconciling
work and care. These factors should also work in the same direction in trends towards
greater female employment that were driven by rising female education and changing
social norms about the role of mothers.
Finally, the research sought to establish whether the penalty to motherhood in employ-
ment is any smaller in the younger cohort, perhaps as a result of changes in their employ-
ment behaviour, and also if a different policy approach to supporting working families
had any impact on the barriers that mothers face in the labour market. Again, it was
hypothesised that mothers’ capabilities to use their human capital should be better; that
changing workplace and social norms, alongside greater support for working parents,
should have narrowed the gap in the labour market between mothers and everyone else.
9.2 Addressing the research questions
In order to understand the impact of policy, the research compared two cohorts of par-
ents experiencing the same age under different policy – and socio-economic and nor-
mative – environments. The data on these cohorts was in the form of two large-scale,
longitudinal survey datasets, and the analysis of this data was primarily in the form of
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regression models. However, the analysis also included an element of attempting to anal-
yse the data, or rather selected members of each dataset, at the case level. This section
will discuss the contribution and weaknesses of the methodology employed, reiterating
some of the issues that were mentioned in Chapter 4, but also reflecting post hoc on the
methodology and its usefulness.
9.2.1 Comparative quantitative analysis
The research here exploited a policy discontinuity within the UK, in order to look com-
paratively at two different policy arrangements. The New Labour government that was
elected in 1997 had a different understanding of the role of the state in helping parents
to reconcile their work and care responsibilities, compared with the Conservative gov-
ernment that had preceded them. This manifested itself in a considerable extension in
financial support to families, the provision and subsidy of childcare, and the extent to
which businesses were obliged to make allowances for those with family responsibilities.
This change, along with other economic and social changes, altered the environment in
which parents decide how best to reconcile work and care, and thus potentially affected
the outcomes of these decisions. In turn, a rebalancing of duties between parents may
have had an impact on the way that mothers are able to engage with the labour market.
This policy change is the source of variation that the research exploits in order to un-
derstand the impact of policy on the division of work and care, and on mothers’ labour
market participation. The strategy employed is to compare two cohorts of parents, both
surveyed in their early thirties, but who, by virtue of being born twelve years apart,
straddle this policy discontinuity. The aim is to establish the differences between them
with respect to the outcomes of interest, and crucially to try to disentangle the extent to
which any differences might plausibly be attributed to policy.
As set out above, the research employs a comparative strategy, comparing two cohorts of
parents dividing work and care in different policy environments, with the change over
time within a country, rather than cross-national comparison. This is operationalized
with data from two large-scale surveys that have followed two cohorts from birth until
the present day. The older, born in 1958, were surveyed at the age of 33 in 1991; the
younger, born in 1970, were surveyed at the age of 34 in 2004. Thus if 1991 and 2004
correspond to the Conservative and New Labour eras respectively, then differences be-
tween the two cohorts with respect to employment and household outcomes might in
part be attributable to this difference in policy.
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Logistic regression models are used to quantify the impact of cohort membership on the
outcomes of interest, controlling for relevant individual-level factors, in order to discern
as far as possible the true impact of the prevailing environment on household decision-
making and mothers’ labour market participation. Contained within this cohort effect
is the impact of policy, along with the impact of other factors such as labour market,
socioeconomic and normative conditions. The theoretical framework helps make sense
of the impact of the prevailing environment on work and care outcomes, via the way
that it expands or limits capabilities.
In building the logistic regression models, the building blocks of the capability approach,
as developed and customised in Chapter 3, are used to guide the variable selection. The
relevant individual level variation is in the aspects of a person that expand capabilities;
the resources that give them the related attributes of external employability and influence
within the household. Also included are variables encapsulating preferences around
work and family life, as an important step between the options on offer and what is
chosen.
9.2.2 Deriving and testing the hypotheses
The regression modelling was performed in conjunction with some case-level analysis of
selected individuals from the datasets, who were selected on the basis that they represent
average household situations in terms of key variables such as their income level and
family size. All of the cases fell into one of the three most common categories; the
fathers all worked full-time, and the mothers either worked full-time, worked part-time,
or did not work. Cases with different divisions of labour were then compared, in order
to establish the similarities and differences between them, with a view to highlighting
potential causal mechanisms. Although this approach is more qualitative in nature, the
inclusion of this aspect of the research cannot be said to have challenged the underlying
quantitative paradigm; the ‘weight’ of the conclusions still comes from the results of the
statistical models. The case analysis was employed as part of the process of deriving
hypotheses, as an optional add-on rather than an additional methodological approach.
The main reason for doing this case-level analysis was to illustrate the interplay of dif-
ferent factors, in a way that is difficult or impossible to do in a statistical model. The
coefficients in a regression models give the impact of one variable, holding all of the
others constant; looking at how these variables relate to each other across a single case
tells the story in a different way. The high level of detail in the datasets means that this
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complex story can be extracted, but conventional statistical analyses cannot capture it.
Many of the variables had to be dropped from the models here because of the case loss
from missing data, or for reasons of parsimony and avoiding multicollinearity. Case level
analysis allowed some consideration of this rich information before it was discarded.
Two specific examples illustrate the two key analytical insights in this research that the
case analysis contributed towards. The first is the interacting economic and normative
rationales for returning to work or not. One of the mothers in the older cohort, Carol1, is
a classic example of a woman whose labour market trajectory is typically ‘motherhood’;
she has taken time out after the birth of her children, and then returned part-time. It
is then interesting to examine the way in which she differs from mothers who have not
taken this path. When compared to Janet, a mother who has dropped out of work com-
pletely, it appears that, although they have very similar earning potential and attitudes
towards work and motherhood, Carol’s partner earns much less than Janet’s. This em-
phasises the economic nature of mothers’ decision to return to work. At the other end
of the scale, Sandy has never taken a career break and has always worked full-time. This
continuous, full-time employment trajectory is likely to be part of the reason why her
earning potential is higher than Carol’s or Janet’s. She is also much more work orien-
tated, emphasising the attitudinal dimension of whether a mother works full-time or
part-time.
The second is the way that a comparison of women in the two cohorts can illustrate the
way in which the penalty exacted by motherhood is less severe under a policy regime
that facilitates labour market attachment. Like Carol in the older cohort, Margaret is a
mother in the younger cohort who has taken time out of the labour market and now
works part-time. However, Margaret’s employment breaks have been much shorter, and
in fact non-existent in the case of her second child. This may well have something to do
with the more generous maternity leave on offer to her, which by the time her second
child was born would have permitted up to a year’s leave without having to give up
her position. Unlike Carol, Margaret has never had to ‘downshift’ on her return to the
labour market; she has been able to maintain the same level, or even the same job. This is
consistent with the idea that stronger rights to return to work help to facilitate mothers’
labour market attachment and earning power.
The approach of using case-level analysis is unusual, and it is an illustrative rather than
intrinsic aspect of the analysis. What it does, however, is to anchor what could be quite
an abstract conceptual discussion in something more intuitive. The research is ultimately
1A summary of each case is given on page 72
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trying to tell a story about mothers and the way they reconcile paid work and care, and
looking at individual cases can help to communicate this story in a more accessible and
readable way than a list of regression coefficients. This accessibility is arguably important
when conducting policy relevant, quantitative social science, and case-level analysis is
potentially one tool with which to achieve it. In addition, it is not just the reader who
needs to understand the underlying story, but the researcher themselves, in order to find
the right questions to ask.
One modification that might increase the contribution of the method is to pick out un-
usual cases as well, and compare them to the more average ones. In this kind of analysis,
it is difficult, if not impossible, to understand what makes couples adopt non-traditional
outcomes, because they are too rare to incorporate robustly into a statistical model. How-
ever, looking more closely at these households where they do exist might suggest some
factors that make unusual outcomes more likely. This could add a dimension to the story
that normal statistical analysis cannot.
9.2.3 Evaluating the method
The data and methodology were characterised by a number of weaknesses, which un-
dermine the validity of the conclusions that can be drawn from the research. One such
issue was the dichotomous nature of the dependent variables, which was driven to a
great extent by the way in which the data had been collected. Thus it was impossible
to distinguish, for example, between couples who divide childcare almost but not quite
equally, and one in which the mother does almost all of it; both would be classified in the
same category. This problem is compounded by the fact that household outcomes are
continually renegotiated over time, while the outcomes represent only an instantaneous
snapshot; transitory arrangements may not represent a couple’s overall preferences or
aspirations around the division of work and care. Thus, dichotomous variables risk
drawing false distinctions between observations, or failing to draw them where they
should exist, and this undermines any attempt to relate outcomes to explanatory factors,
thus weakening the effect of the independent variables and potentially understating their
importance.
The models here are also characterised by another problem, which potentially overstates
the impact of the explanatory variables. There may be systematic differences between
mothers and non-mothers, and between the mothers in the two cohorts. For example,
there may be differences in the social background and education of the samples of moth-
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ers from the two cohorts. Given the trend for delayed childbearing, particularly among
educated women from advantaged socioeconomic backgrounds, this type of mother may
be less prevalent in the younger cohort, because such women are less likely to have had
a child by the age of 34 than those in the older cohort. The research here did not attempt
any systematic analysis of these differences, and future work would need to do so, in
order to understand whether these differences are also factors correlated with the em-
ployment outcomes of interest. If such correlations exist, then the simple logistic models
used here will overstate the impact of motherhood on employment outcomes. More
complex selection models would need to be employed to compensate for this bias.
The static nature of the models used in this research is particularly unfortunate given the
fact that the data being used is longitudinal, and the analysis does not exploit this aspect
of the data to its full potential. Rather than seeing the division of paid work and care
as an equilibrium, it is better to think of these outcomes as a stage in a labour market
career, and one of a set of changes that occur after childbearing. The presence of data
on employment trajectories allows this to some extent, and a measure of labour market
attachment before childbearing seems an important control for behaviour after it. Future
work would need to apply better imputation methods, in order to overcome the issue of
the large amount of data that is missing on these variables, and use them in the analysis
in a more robust way. The way in which the employment history data is used here, in a
simple imputation of earning potential, means that the results around this variable need
to be interpreted with considerable caution.
However, it should also be noted that, because data collection is at fairly wide intervals,
the data is not particularly suitable for the analysis of short term changes in couples’
circumstances, as fine detail is not available at regular time intervals. In particular, there
is no recording of maternity leave, which is coded as being in employment; however,
the difference between the two states with respect to the impact on the division of work
and care is important. Furthermore, the division of work and care is recorded only at
the time of survey, thus the data does not reflect every change that occurs. Thus, there
are some questions about change over time that this data cannot answer, and another
dataset would need to be consulted in order to do so.
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9.3 Main conclusions
The research addressed three questions about gender, work and care. The first was at the
household level; whether couples in the younger cohort are more likely to divide work
and care on an egalitarian basis. The second asked whether mothers in the younger
cohort were more likely to be in work, and if so in full-time work, as a result of policy
changes aimed at faciliating this. The third question was whether, in light of changes
in maternal employment, mothers faced smaller penalties in the workplace. These are
addressed in turn in this section, which summarises the answers that the research has
suggested.
Some consideration is also given here what the research was unable to say. Much of this
revolves around an issue that is intrinsic to quantitative research of this nature; the ‘black
box’. The research can say something about aggregate change and systematic response
to change, which is an important part of assessing the impact of a policy. However, what
it cannot fully illuminate is what lies between the inputs and the outputs; the causal
mechanism that links them. Theory can be used to guess at what is inside, and the data
determines the extent to which this explanation is plausible, and this is as far as this
method can go in understanding this mechanism. The hypothesised mechanism here is
that behaviour will not have responded as much as policy has changed because capabili-
ties have not been sufficiently expanded and mothers still face contraints in maintaining
labour market attachment. This theme can be seen throughout the results that were
obtained.
9.3.1 The division of paid work and care
The first question to be addressed, in Chapter 6, was the persistence of a gendered
division of paid work and care in the household. It had been hypothesised that the
younger cohort should be more able to achieve egalitarian outcomes. However, the
younger cohort was in fact found to be less likely to report equal sharing of childcare
than the older cohort.
One possibility is that this result is an artefact of the way in which task sharing is mea-
sured by the survey instrument, which has two issues. Firstly, the respondent is asked
for their subjective view on whether task sharing is equal, which may not reflect the
actual situation. Thus, when making interpersonal comparisons in division of labour, as
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this analysis does, the same situation may not be reflected in the same answer given. It
could therefore be the case that the younger cohort are not less likely to share childcare
equally, but, perhaps because expectations have changed, they are systematically more
likely to evaluate a situation as unequal than the older cohort. The second issue with this
measure is that there are a finite number of options, some of which may reflect a range
of different situations; for example a respondent who says that they do most of a task
could be doing anything from 51% to 100%. It could be that for mothers in the younger
cohort, although they are more likely to shoulder the majority of the childcare burden,
this may constitute on average a smaller share than the mothers in the older cohort.
However, this methodological explanation seems less likely in light of the fact that the
other results were as expected. All of the other childcare and household tasks are moving
in the expected direction; it is only general childcare whose direction is counter to what
was hypothesised. Indeed, it might be interesting to further examine changes in these
other tasks; this research focussed in-depth on general childcare, which was assumed to
represent a broad overview of childcare activities.
Furthermore, the expected relationship between resources and egalitarianism was seen
within each cohort. Higher relative resources do correspond to a more egalitarian divi-
sion of childcare, suggesting that mothers who make a greater economic contribution do
have greater capabilities with respect to negotiating less gendered outcomes. Paradox-
ically, this effect is not seen across the cohorts; the younger cohort, despite more equal
relative resources, does not report a more egalitarian division of childcare.
To say that women in the younger cohort simply prefer to take primary responsibility
for childcare is not only odd in light of their greater preference for egalitarianism in
every other task, but also contrary to the capabilities framework that has been used to
understand this phenomenon. Their preferences for childcare arrangements are situated
within a context of available options, and in fact it is not hard to see how their capabilities
to achieve egalitarian outcomes may be lower than that in the older cohort. The key
factor is the policy environment facing the younger cohort, which actually encourages
gender specialisation. It does so through longer leaves and the facilitation of the kind
of family-friendly employment that brings lower labour market rewards and entrenches
their role in the household as primary carer and secondary earner. From the household
perspective, the difference that this creates between mothers and fathers can quickly turn
into both a strong rational argument for – and a power balance that makes it difficult to
challenge – the gendered status quo.
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From an institutional perspective, feminist welfare state theories have drawn attention to
the way that policies are both based on and perpetuate gendered patterns of behaviour.
The case of UK family policy arguably demonstrates this quite well. As outlined in
Chapter 5, the postwar welfare state was set up around an assumption of a male bread-
winner system, and offered little support for mothers to be earners on the same terms
as fathers. The system has changed, but it has done so in a way that supports the role
of mothers as second but secondary earners, and as a result this role has become further
entrenched, as seen in the younger cohort.
The institutional structure is simply not set up for couples to reconcile childcare respon-
sibilities with two full-time jobs. There is no comprehensive childcare provision to meet
the high cost of full-time childcare, and although mothers in the younger cohort receive
more support for childcare, the care itself was cheaper for mothers in the older cohort
and did not represent such a significant expense. Furthermore, because leave is reserved
almost exclusively for mothers, there is little opportunity to adopt non-traditional par-
enting roles. Large extensions of leave to mothers but not to fathers has supported a
situation of role differentiation rather than shared parenting. The impact of this at the
aggregate level is persistent gender inequalities in the labour market, as mothers are
forced into the intermittent, part-time patterns of labour force participation that dam-
age their earning power. These aggregate level inequalities then potentially themselves
impact the way that negotiations occur in the household, by normalising a gendered
system in which men’s employment is the default. Without any impetus to change this
situation, the status quo is likely to persist.
Therefore, despite considerable reform in work-family reconciliation policy at the turn of
the twenty-first century, these reforms have not resulted in this reconciliation becoming
any more egalitarian from a gender perspective. However, this was not the rationale be-
hind the policy reform, which has achieved its intended consequences; it has increased
female labour force participation to meet employment targets. Gender equality was not
the policy rationale, and indeed it has not been facilitated; instead, the unintended con-
sequence of the policy reform has been to reinforce an unequal status quo rather than
create opportunities to change it. Such opportunities would require further, radical, re-
form, such as a universal system of childcare. However, the vast expense of this makes its
introduction unlikely in an era of social policy retrenchment. Gender equality also rests
on a system that opens up leave provisions for fathers, and perhaps even incentivises
fathers to take these up.
This discussion of the impact of policy is not to say that preferences about work and
209
care do not play a role as well; indeed these were found to be significant predictors of
the division of work and care. The relative impact of preference and constraint cannot
be ascertained from these results, which merely shows evidence consistent with both
interpretations. However, this analysis has tried to construct a theoretical case for why
it is not enough to put outcomes down to one or the other, to preference or constraint.
The capabilities approach to understanding choice stresses that it is a mixture of both,
and the inconsistency between results at the intra and inter cohort level suggests external
constraints as well as individual choice.
9.3.2 Mothers’ employment behaviour
Chapter 7 addressed two key facets of mothers’ labour market participation; whether
they work, and if so whether they work full-time or part-time. The chapter considered
the factors that enhance the capability to work, diminish capability to not work, or di-
minish the capability to work. These were hypothesised, on balance, to make maternal
employment in the younger cohort more likely, through a combination of financial in-
centives and loosening constraints on maternal employment due to greater flexibility
and tolerance. Indeed, the empirical analysis found mothers in the younger cohort to be
more likely to be in employment. However, it should be noted that the change is small in
magnitude, and does not suggest any seismic shift in maternal employment in the near
future.
At the intra-household level, as with the division of childcare, higher relative resources
were found to result in it being more likely that a mother is in work. However, it is
not just mother’s absolute and relative resources that are important; partner’s earning
power also plays a key role. For a given level of mother’s human capital, her partner’s
human capital has a negative impact. In other words, while mothers with better earning
potential are more likely to be in the labour market, a mother is less likely to be in the
labour market the more her husband earns. Thus, there is an economic rationale behind
mothers’ decision to work, and it is less likely that she will the less she ’has’ to. That is
not to say that attitudes do not play a role, as those who feel that mothers should stay at
home are less likely to be in work, while those for whom work is important to them are
more likely.
No cohort difference was found in mothers’ propensity to work full-time as opposed
to part-time. None of the policy or other environmental changes that occurred seem to
have had any impact on this; indeed, the results found individual attitudes to work and
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care to be the strongest predictors of this variable. Human capital factors were found to
be poor predictors. Thus, it would seem that the decision to work is made on economic
grounds, but once this decision has been made, hours worked are more about individual
preference. Those who feel that maternal employment is damaging are less likely to be
in full-time work, while the strongly work orientated are more likely to be in full-time
work. These preferences of course occur within a policy and labour market environment
that does not offer many options beyond full-time or part-time work for mothers. Despite
considerable policy reform, it is not necessarily any easier to work full-time for mothers
in the younger cohort, particularly given the high cost of childcare. As the results from
the previous chapter also seemed to suggest, policy does not facilitate a dual-full-time
model. Furthermore, by incentivising some options over others, the gender culture on
which the policies are based is reinforced and perpetuated.
What these results show is evidence, at the aggregate level, of a lack of change over time
in mothers’ labour force participation. This is consistent with the theoretical story about
a lack of change in mothers’ capabilities, but does not conclusively prove that this is why
the observed results have happened in this way. Furthermore, it should be noted that the
behaviour of the younger cohort compared to the older one does not necessarily mean
that change between these two points in time has been linear, or that it will continue in
the same direction in the future. This second point seems particularly important in light
of the slow pace of change that seems to be suggested by the results presented here,
compared with the more rapid changes that occurred earlier in the 20th century.
9.3.3 The motherhood penalty
The final analysis chapter, Chapter 8, investigated the labour market penalties of moth-
erhood; the impact that motherhood has on the way that women are able to engage
with the labour market, and whether this differs between the two cohorts. Allowing for
other differences between the two cohorts, might the different policy environment affect
the kind of headline statistics that motivated the research in the first place, such as the
gender pay gap? The analysis focussed on two specific aspects of labour market perfor-
mance, job status and pay, and the extent to which mothers have poorer labour market
performance than fathers and childless men and women.
The results for the penalty to status were surprising. Motherhood itself is associated
with being less likely to be in a professional or managerial job, although alone it is a
poor predictor of status, explaining very little of the variation in status. Unexpectedly,
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this penalty not only disappeared after controlling for differences in human capital; it
actually reversed. Controlling for human capital, mothers are more likely than fathers to
be in a professional or managerial job. These results suggest that the mechanism through
which the motherhood penalty operates is the human capital differences between moth-
ers and fathers, caused by mothers’ labour market interruptions.
Key predictors of status in the regression models were hours worked and managerial re-
sponsibilities, which both have a significant, positive association with higher status jobs.
This suggests that higher status jobs may exclude those with caring responsibilities, be-
cause they require a particularly high level of commitment that is difficult to reconcile
with childcare. Thus, as it is women who predominantly take on such caring responsi-
bilities, this will result in mothers being disadvantaged in the labour market. capabilities
to achieve in the labour market hampered by caring work and policy does not offer the
help to overcome this
The results pertaining to status are stronger in the younger cohort. This is good news
for mothers in this cohort who can manage to ‘be like men’ in their accumulation of
human capital and commitment to work, as they will be rewarded for this in the labour
market, while their counterparts who follow a more traditional family-friendly path will
continue to be disadvantaged. However, the former are probably a rare and specific
subset of mothers, and their experience is unlikely to be representative of the way in
which most mothers experience the reconciliation of work and care.
The results on the financial penalty to motherhood are quite different to those of the
status penalty. Again, the raw gap due to motherhood is significant and in the expected
negative direction. However, this time it stays constant with the addition of more vari-
ables, which control for a range of potential wage determinants. Even after controlling
for these, the motherhood penalty not only remains, but stays almost exactly the same
size as the raw gap. The additional variables in the wage models are still important
predictors. Human capital in particular is a key driving factor of differences in pay,
suggesting that the attributes assumed by human capital theorists to be rewarded in the
labour market are indeed rewarded. However, the motherhood penalty is remarkably
consistent even controlling for human capital.
The analysis here cannot say definitively why this penalty persists; only that its persis-
tence is consistent with a number of theories about why mothers’ labour market capa-
bilities might be constrained. Unexplained pay differentials, after controlling for human
capital differences, lend some support to the theories of discrimination, segregation and
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systematic devaluation found in the literature. However, it is possible there are system-
atic human capital differences between mothers and non-mothers that are not included in
the model, either erroneously or because they are not observable. If this is the case then
the model will overestimate the impact of motherhood itself. Furthermore, the evidence
is consistent with more choice-based explanations of why mothers end up in lower-paid
jobs, and it cannot say anything about the relative influence of choice and constraint
on mothers’ occupational choices. However, the capabilities approach employed here
emphasises the way in which a purely choice-based explanation is meaningless in a situ-
ation of asymmetric policy entitlements and continued gendered norms about parenting
roles.
9.4 Capable of change?
The picture presented here of the reconciliation of work and care is one of considerable
continuity over time in the gendered division of labour and the penalties to motherhood
in the labour market. In some cases, movement towards greater egalitarianism seems
even to have reversed. The question, then, remains; are these phenomena capable of
change? The evidence presented here has suggested that they are, but with some caveats.
Greater support for working motherhood, in a context of shrinking gender disparities
in human capital and changing attitudes towards working mothers, have meant that the
capability set of the mothers in the younger cohort is larger than that of the mothers in
the older cohort. This has manifested itself in signs of greater egalitarianism. Although
the division of childcare in general is not reported as being more equal, other results
here suggest a move towards greater egalitarianism. Mothers are more likely to be in
work, are rewarded more equally for it, and things are slowly beginning to change in
other ways at the household level, such as the division of non-childcare tasks.
However, there are still mutually reinforcing inequalities in the household and the labour
market, and the institutional conditions are not in place to provide the possibility of rad-
ically altering this situation. Indeed, the asymmetric way in which leave provision has
been extended to mothers and fathers has positively discouraged greater egalitarianism.
If mothers are entitled to up to a year, whilst fathers are entitled to just two weeks, a gen-
dered pattern of specialisation is set in motion. Some possibility of splitting this period
of leave more equally would be necessary to undermine this inevitable specialisation. It
is true that, since the younger cohort were surveyed in 2004, such changes have been set
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in motion, and this is an interesting avenue for future research. However, the experience
of the Nordic countries suggests that widespread uptake of such provision is unlikely
from such a deeply entrenched starting point of a gendered division of labour. The low
level of leave compensation in the UK is also likely to represent a barrier to uptake,
and it is difficult to envisage a British government prepared to offer Nordic levels of
remuneration.
A final point that should be taken from this research, relating to the possibility of change,
is something that the capabilities approach helps to illustrate very well; that change
needs to be actively facilitated as well as being allowed on principle. It is not enough
to conclude from maternal employment patterns that mothers prefer to work part-time.
To do so is to ignore the way in which their capabilities to do otherwise are limited:
by expensive childcare, particularly if their expected remuneration is low; by gendered
assumptions about parenting roles; and by a policy environment that reinforces their
role as primary carer and secondary earner. Because of these factors, anything other
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Table A.1: Sample size at each sweep
N
National Child Development Study
1958 (All babies born) 17634
1958 (birth sweep) 17415
1965 (age 7) 15051
1969 (age 11) 14757
1974 (age 16) 13917
1981 (age 23) 12044
1991 (age 33) 10986
2000 (age 42) 10979
2004 (age 46) 9534
2008 (age 50) 9790
British Cohort Study
1970 (All babies born) 17287
1970 (birth sweep) 16571
1975 (age 5) 12981
1980 (age 10) 14350
1986 (age 16) 11206
1996 (age 26) 8654
2000 (age 30) 10833
2004 (age 34) 9665













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.4: Division of childcare by number of children under five in the household
Number of children 0-4 (reduced)
0 1 2+ Total N
% % % %
Division of childcare, NCDS
Woman mostly 40.5 53.6 65.8 50.6 3,367
Equal 58.5 45.5 32.9 48.3 3,214
Man mostly 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.8 55
Someone else 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 12
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 6,648
Division of childcare, BCS
Woman mostly 42.5 58.1 72.2 54.8 2,810
Equal 55.3 39.6 26.8 43.1 2,207
Man mostly 2.0 1.9 0.8 1.8 90
Someone else 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.4 18
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 5,125
Table A.5: Collinearity diagnostics for the dependent variables used in the logistic regression
model predicting division of care
Variable Tolerance
Household earning type 0.869
Relative education 0.991
Total household income 0.848
Percent female in household income 0.936
Accommodation in mother’s name 0.987
Male nonwage income 0.923
Female nonwage income 0.930
Cohort 0.921
Attitudes to maternal employment 0.950
Attitudes to family morality 0.985
Attitudes to work 0.969
Number of dependent children 0.916
Number of children under 5 0.911
Table A.6: Significance of each block of variables in the logistic regression model predicting
division of care
LL LR df p-value AIC BIC
Block 1 -5479.24 906.5 3 0.000 10966 10995
Block 2 -5433.49 91.5 4 0.000 10883 10939
Block 3 -5427.41 12.2 3 0.007 10877 10954
Block 4 -5402.80 49.2 1 0.000 10830 10914
Block 5 -5365.29 75.0 3 0.000 10761 10866
Block 6 -5311.38 107.8 2 0.000 10657 10777
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Table A.7: Proportion of mothers in work by cohort, number of children and age of youngest
child
Age of youngest child NCDS BCS
1 child >1 child 1 child >1 child
% % % %
0 53.7 36.2 71.4 50.0
1 61.7 51.1 76.6 58.6
2 64.0 50.6 74.5 59.2
3 61.0 61.8 77.9 65.7
4 77.6 60.7 86.8 74.7
5 76.2 75.9 90.0 76.3
6 83.0 73.2 86.8 82.6
7 96.4 86.0 83.9 81.7
8 82.1 80.5 100.0 84.7
9 91.7 80.3 100.0 86.2
10 78.8 83.3 92.0 93.3
11 81.0 87.5 90.9 76.5
12 93.0 91.7 86.2 87.2
Table A.8: Significance of each block of variables in the logistic regression model predicting
maternal employment
LL LR df block p-value AIC BIC
Block 1 -2089.47 25.1 1 0.000 4183 4195
Block 2 -2077.01 24.9 7 0.001 4172 4227
Block 3 -2028.10 97.8 4 0.000 4082 4162
Block 4 -2018.84 18.5 3 0.000 4070 4168
Block 5 -1915.81 206.1 5 0.000 3874 4003
Block 6 -1715.73 400.2 9 0.000 3491 3676
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Table A.9: A parsimonius regression model






O level 1.347 (0.060)
A level 1.231 (0.282)
Higher non-degree 3.010∗∗∗ (0.000)
Degree/higher degree 3.068∗∗∗ (0.000)
Partner’s logged weekly income (£, 1991 prices) 0.703∗∗∗ (0.000)
Age partner left full-time education




Accommodation in joint or own name 1.669∗∗∗ (0.000)
Attitude to working mothers 0.580∗∗∗ (0.000)
Attitude to work 1.124∗∗ (0.008)
Own mother employed before started school 1.228∗ (0.031)
Number of dependent children in household 0.786∗∗∗ (0.000)
Number of children aged 0-4 in household
None ref -
1 0.345∗∗∗ (0.000)
2 or more 0.153∗∗∗ (0.000)
Cooking shared equally 1.791∗∗∗ (0.000)
Who does the cleaning
Woman mostly ref -
Equal or partner 1.810∗∗∗ (0.000)
Someone else 2.196∗∗ (0.006)
Who does the laundry
Woman mostly ref -
237
Equal or partner 1.545∗ (0.013)




Hosmer-Lemeshow G.O.F. (p-value) .220
% correctly classified 74.3%
Exponentiated coefficients; p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.10: Separate models for the two cohorts
Variable Mother is in employment
NCDS BCS
Odds Ratio Odds Ratio
(p-value) (p-value)







O level 1.110 2.092∗
(0.606) (0.010)
A level 0.862 2.718∗∗
(0.554) (0.005)
Higher non-degree 2.363∗∗∗ 5.381∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000)
Degree/higher degree 2.337∗∗ 4.623∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.000)
Has longstanding illness or disability 0.831 0.909
(0.254) (0.570)
Partner’s logged weekly income (£, 1991 prices) 0.568∗∗∗ 0.782∗
(0.000) (0.026)
Age partner left full-time education









Sources of help 1.080 1.060
(0.340) (0.516)
Non-wage income (£, 1991 prices) 1.000 1.000
(0.885) (0.742)
Accommodation in joint or own name 2.029∗∗∗ 1.563
(0.000) (0.077)
Attitude to working mothers 0.604∗∗∗ 0.533∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Attitude to family values 0.978 0.981
(0.678) (0.809)
Attitude to work 1.136∗ 1.068
(0.026) (0.397)
Identifies as Christian 0.996 1.079
(0.976) (0.674)
Own mother employed before started school 1.089 1.501∗
(0.478) (0.019)
Number of dependent children in household 0.777∗∗∗ 0.815∗
(0.000) (0.028)





2 or more 0.182∗∗∗ 0.0976∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Cooking shared equally 1.621∗∗ 2.554∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.000)
Shopping shared equally 0.857 0.903
(0.228) (0.559)
Who does the cleaning
Woman mostly ref ref
- -
Equal or partner 1.692∗∗ 2.111∗∗
(0.004) (0.002)
Someone else 2.150 1.864
239
(0.050) (0.165)
Who does the laundry
Woman mostly ref ref
- -
Equal or partner 2.762∗∗∗ 1.151
(0.001) (0.586)





Exponentiated coefficients; p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.11: Significance of each block of variables in the logistic regression model predicting
full-time versus part-time employment
LL LR df block p-value AIC BIC
Block 1 -1529.60 2.2 1 0.135 3063 3075
Block 2 -1509.88 39.4 7 0.000 3038 3090
Block 3 -1499.88 20.0 4 0.001 3026 3101
Block 4 -1497.83 4.1 3 0.251 3028 3120
Block 5 -1437.65 120.4 5 0.000 2917 3039




Cohort members have been asked questions about their social, political and moral at-
titudes, most of which are guaged on a five-point scale from ‘Strongly disagree’ to
‘Strongly Agree’. Some of this information pertains to attitudes about work and fam-
ily, and is therefore potentially useful in understanding work and care outcomes, and
should be incorporated into the statistical models.
There were a large number of attitudinal variables available; the two surveys have 42
of these five-response attitude variables in common. Not all of these were likely to be
relevant, but a large number number potentially were. Furthermore, many of the ques-
tions pertain to the same attitude, but are phrased slightly differently. It was therefore
impossible to include all of the potentially relevant variables individually because they
are likely to be highly correlated, creating collinearity problems in the estimation of the
model. Exploratory factor analysis was used to distinguish the unique attitudinal di-
mensions, and to make variables representing those dimensions relevant to this analysis.
Principal components factor analysis was performed in Stata, using the factor command,
and then performing an orthogonal rotation (rotate). The factor loadings obtained are































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B.2: Work orientation
Variable N Mean St Dev Min Max
Attitudes to work 17473 0 1 -3.48 2.65
Clear factors emerged, and these are highlighted in bold. The table also gives the Cron-
bach Alpha for each group of variables.
This method of factor analysis, and the resulting underlying attitudinal ‘dimensions’, are
very similar to a number of other analysis that have used the cohort studies’ attitudinal
data (Wiggins and Bynner 1993; Wiggins et al 1997; Deary et al 2008; Schoon et al 2010).
The table shows that some of the variables pertain to attitudes that have little to do with
the reconciliation of work and care, such as those pertaining to race. The variables that
were kept were those relating to work orientation, parenting roles, and family morality.
A fourth dimension was found that related to the importance of children, but as the
cohort members analysed here are already parents, this variable was not deemed to add
much to the analysis and was dropped.
A variable was then constructed to represent each of the three attitudinal dimensions
that were included in the analysis. One option might have been to pick one of the group
of variables to represent the attitude, but this strategy misses out on the breadth, depth
and greater reliability provided by using a battery of items (Cheng et al 2012). Thus,
composite indicators were created from all the variables within each dimension, using
the factor loadings as weights (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007), rather than a simple sum
or average. This method increases the validity of the resulting indicator by weighting it
towards those that explain most of the variation in the attitude.
The main disadvantage, however, is that the resulting variable is difficult to interpret
intuitively. To take an example, the variable representing work orientation is summarised
in table B.2. Looking at this variable, it can be said that the value -3.48 represents the
least work orientated a person can be, while 2.65 represents the most work orientated.
Inter-personal comparisons, or comparisons by cohort, gender or any other grouping
are also possible; the person or group with the higher value is more work orientated.
However, it is difficult to say what any absolute value in between the minimum and
maximum might mean. In the same way, regression coefficients, which give the impact
of a one-unit increase in a variable, cannot be readily interpreted.
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